Security audit — 2026-06-13

[versila22]

Pentest mini-report — versila22/lima-app — 2026-06-13

Probed URL: https://limaimpro.duckdns.org/
Stack: React 18 / Vite / TypeScript / FastAPI (Python) / PWA=yes (vite-plugin-pwa + Workbox)
Counts: Critical=1 High=2 Medium=2 Low=1 Info=1

Findings

Sev	Cat	Title	Location
Critical	SAST	Hardcoded admin seed credentials auto-deployed to production DB	backend/app/main.py:48-53
High	Dep	npm: vitest ≤2.1.8 — UI server arbitrary file read/execute (GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp)	package.json (devDep)
High	Dep	npm: serialize-javascript — RCE via RegExp.flags (GHSA-5c6j-r48x-rmvq)	package.json (devDep)
Medium	SAST	Auth cookies set SameSite=None — widens CSRF surface	backend/app/utils/security.py:111,120
Medium	Dep	npm: react-router — open redirect via protocol-relative URL (GHSA-2j2x-hqr9-3h42)	package.json
Low	Dep	npm: esbuild — dev server arbitrary file read on Windows (GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr)	package.json (devDep)
Info	Dep	npm: brace-expansion — numeric range DoS (GHSA-jxxr-4gwj-5jf2)	package.json (devDep)

Top 3 fixes

1. Hardcoded seed admin credentials — Gate _ensure_seed_data() behind APP_ENV == "development" and remove plaintext passwords from source; rotate admin@lima-impro.fr if it exists in production.
2. npm dependency upgrades — Run npm audit fix to patch vitest, serialize-javascript, and react-router; at minimum upgrade vitest (Critical upstream) and react-router.
3. SameSite=None cookies — Change samesite="none" to samesite="lax" unless cross-site cookie sharing is explicitly required.

Evidence (Critical/High only)

Critical — Hardcoded admin seed credentials

• Location: backend/app/main.py:48, lifespan calls _ensure_seed_data() unconditionally at line 133
• Snippet: {"email": "admin@lima-impro.fr", ..., "app_role": "admin", "password": "Admin1234!"}
• Behaviour: Runs on every production startup with no APP_ENV guard. On a fresh or wiped DB, creates admin@lima-impro.fr / Admin1234! and 7 other accounts with known passwords. Source is public on GitHub.
• Impact: Any actor who reads the repo can authenticate as admin if the DB was ever freshly migrated.
• Fix: Add if settings.APP_ENV == "development": return at top of _ensure_seed_data(), remove plaintext passwords from source.

High — Vitest UI arbitrary file read/execute (GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp)

• Snippet: "vitest": "^2.1.8" — fixed in ≥2.1.9
• Impact: If vitest --ui is run in a shared CI/dev environment, arbitrary files on the host can be read and executed.
• Fix: npm install -D vitest@latest

High — serialize-javascript RCE (GHSA-5c6j-r48x-rmvq)

• Snippet: Transitive via rollup/vite build chain; serialize-javascript <6.0.2
• Impact: Crafted RegExp/Date objects during build-time serialization can achieve RCE.
• Fix: npm audit fix

Verified safe

• No hardcoded API keys/tokens/private keys in source
• No XSS sinks (innerHTML, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, eval) in React components
• No token storage in localStorage/sessionStorage
• JWT secret validation blocks server startup with default value in non-dev mode
• CORS origins are explicit (no wildcard)
• Security headers middleware present: HSTS, nosniff, X-Frame-Options DENY, CSP default-src 'none', COOP
• TLS 1.0/1.1 disabled; TLS 1.2+1.3 enabled
• No .git/ or .env* exposed (all 403)
• No VAPID private key in client code

Needs server-side verification

• Confirm APP_ENV=production is set on Railway
• Verify admin@lima-impro.fr does not exist in production DB (or password rotated)
• HTTP response headers on deployed frontend (DAST blocked by network egress policy in audit env)
• Cookie flags as seen by browser in production

Tools

ran=npm-audit, grep-secret-scan, openssl-tls; skipped=DAST-headers (network egress policy blocked outbound HTTP — proxy returned 403 host_not_allowed)

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