Security audit — 2026-06-09

security/pentest-2026-06-09.md

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+# Pentest mini-report — versila22/lima-app — 2026-06-09
+
+**Probed URL:** https://limaimpro.duckdns.org/
+**Stack:** React 18 + Vite / npm / PWA=yes (vite-plugin-pwa, workbox, autoUpdate)
+**Counts:** Critical=0 High=3 Medium=4 Low=3 Info=2
+
+## Findings
+
+| Sev | Cat | Title | Location |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| High | SAST | JWT token stored in sessionStorage (Safari fallback) | `src/lib/api.ts:42-53` |
+| High | SAST | `.orig` backup file with localStorage token storage committed to git | `src/lib/api.ts.orig:22-33` |
+| High | Infra | react-router-dom open redirect via `//`-prefixed path (CVE GHSA-2j2x-hqr9-3h42) | `node_modules/react-router` v6 <6.30.4 |
+| Medium | SAST | `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` injects CSS from chart config into DOM | `src/components/ui/chart.tsx:70` |
+| Medium | PWA | Service worker caches all JS/CSS/HTML including auth routes (NetworkFirst for API, but SW intercepts) | `vite.config.ts` workbox globPatterns |
+| Medium | Infra | CSP `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` weakens XSS mitigation | `nginx.conf:18` |
+| Medium | Infra | Dependency audit: serialize-javascript RCE in build toolchain (GHSA-5c6j-r48x-rmvq) | `node_modules/serialize-javascript` (workbox-build dep) |
+| Low | SAST | Sidebar state cookie set without `Secure` or `SameSite` flags | `src/components/ui/sidebar.tsx:68` |
+| Low | Infra | `X-Powered-By` / `Server` header absent (good), but no `Cache-Control: no-store` on auth API responses — needs server-side check | API backend |
+| Low | Infra | `.env.production` and `.env.development` committed to git (contain VITE_API_URL only — no secrets currently, but sets bad precedent) | `.env.production`, `.env.development` |
+| Info | Infra | TLS 1.0/1.1 disabled, TLS 1.2+1.3 enabled, cert valid until 2026-07-09 | limaimpro.duckdns.org:443 |
+| Info | Infra | vitest critical CVE (GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp) — devDependency only, not deployed | `package.json` devDependencies |
+
+## Top 3 fixes
+1. **react-router open redirect** — Upgrade `react-router-dom` to ≥6.30.4 (`npm install react-router-dom@latest`).
+2. **sessionStorage JWT fallback** — Evaluate removing the Safari fallback or scope it strictly; rotate tokens frequently and document the accepted risk.
+3. **`.orig` file in git** — `git rm src/lib/api.ts.orig` and purge from history with `git filter-repo` to remove the old localStorage token pattern.
+
+## Evidence (Critical/High only)
+
+**H1 — JWT in sessionStorage**
+- Location: `src/lib/api.ts:42-53`, `src/contexts/AuthContext.tsx:73-76`
+- Snippet: `const _SESSION_KEY = "lima_access_token"; sessionStorage.setItem(_SESSION_KEY, token);`
+- Impact: Any same-origin JS (XSS, malicious extension) can steal the access token; XSS + sessionStorage = full auth compromise.
+- Fix: Prefer httpOnly cookies exclusively; remove sessionStorage fallback or gate it behind user-visible Safari warning.
+
+**H2 — `.orig` backup with localStorage token pattern committed**
+- Location: `src/lib/api.ts.orig:22-33` (tracked by git: `git ls-files` confirms)
+- Snippet: `const TOKEN_KEY = "lima_token"; localStorage.getItem(TOKEN_KEY); localStorage.setItem(TOKEN_KEY, token);`
+- Impact: Old insecure pattern (localStorage instead of httpOnly cookie) persists in repo history; token more persistent and broader-scope than sessionStorage.
+- Fix: `git rm src/lib/api.ts.orig && git filter-repo --path src/lib/api.ts.orig --invert-paths`
+
+**H3 — react-router open redirect**
+- Location: `node_modules/react-router` <6.30.4 (GHSA-2j2x-hqr9-3h42)
+- Snippet: `<Navigate to="//attacker.example" />` or `useNavigate()("//attacker.example")` → browser reinterprets as protocol-relative URL.
+- Impact: Phishing redirect after login; attacker can construct login links that redirect users to a malicious site.
+- Fix: `npm install react-router-dom@latest` (≥6.30.4).
+
+## Verified safe
+- No hardcoded secrets in committed files (`.env.production` contains only public VITE_API_URL, not keys)
+- CORS: explicit allowlist (`limaimpro.duckdns.org`, localhost variants) with `allow_credentials=True` — no wildcard reflection
+- HSTS enabled (`max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains`) on both nginx and backend middleware
+- `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'` in CSP — clickjacking protected
+- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` present
+- TLS 1.0/1.1 disabled; TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only
+- Sensitive file probes (.env, .git/config, backup.zip) all return 403
+- `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` in chart.tsx uses only hardcoded dev-time config (CSS color strings), not server data
+- JWT_SECRET weak-default check enforced at startup in non-dev mode (`validate_jwt_secret` validator)
+- No VAPID private key in client bundle (no push notifications configured)
+- No `eval()` or `document.write()` in source
+- react-markdown used without `rehype-raw` — no HTML passthrough risk
+
+## Needs server-side verification
+- Cookie flags (`HttpOnly`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Strict/Lax`) on auth cookies set by FastAPI backend (Railway-hosted, not audited here)
+- `Cache-Control: no-store` on `/auth/*` and `/api/*` responses from backend
+- Rate-limiting effectiveness on `/auth/login` (slowapi present in backend, thresholds not reviewed)
+- Backend CSP header values (SecurityHeadersMiddleware sets `default-src 'none'` for API — verify in prod response)
+- Sentry DSN exposure: `VITE_SENTRY_DSN` baked into bundle at build time — confirm it is intentionally public or rotate if leaked
+
+## Tools
+ran=npm-audit, curl-headers, curl-cors, curl-sensitive-file-probe, openssl-tls; skipped=none