The project currently maintains a single rolling line on master. Security
patches land there and are tagged at v3.x.x releases.
| Branch / tag | Status |
|---|---|
master (latest) |
✅ supported |
Tagged v3.x.x releases (latest minor) |
✅ supported |
Older v3.x.x releases |
Do not file a public GitHub issue for security reports. The dashboard and backend handle threat-intel data and authenticate against multiple datastores; a public issue is the wrong place to surface an exploit.
Email rinjanianalytics@gmail.com with:
- A description of the issue
- Steps to reproduce (or proof-of-concept if appropriate)
- Affected version / commit SHA
- Your name + how you'd like to be credited (or "anonymous")
We aim to:
- Acknowledge within 2 business days
- Provide an initial assessment within 5 business days
- Ship a fix and coordinated disclosure within 30 days for critical issues, longer for issues requiring a major refactor
We do not currently run a paid bounty programme, but we credit reporters by name (or handle) in the changelog and release notes, with permission.
- Authentication & authorisation logic (apps/api/src/middleware/auth.ts, apps/api/src/services/oauth.ts)
- Input validation on all REST / GraphQL / TAXII / WebSocket entry points
- SQL / NoSQL / Cypher / OpenSearch injection vectors
- Secrets handling and the bootlock model (apps/api/src/lib/bootlock.ts)
- Cookie + JWT handling, including the cookie-auth fallback used by the embedded Workbench dashboard
- The vendored
packages/workbench-core/fork — we own its supply-chain exposure, see packages/workbench-core/VENDOR.md - The dashboard repo's auth + cookie mirroring code
- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that we've already pinned to
patched versions (check SECURITY_AUDIT.md and
pnpm.overridesinpackage.jsonbefore reporting) - Self-XSS, social-engineering, physical access
- DoS via volumetric request flooding (handled at infra layer, not app)
- Findings against
.env.example(it ships placeholder values by design)
- 2026-05-27 — Full dependency + middleware audit triggered by the
TanStack supply-chain compromise (CVE-2026-45321). See
SECURITY_AUDIT.md. Verified not compromised;
hardened with version-floor
pnpm.overrides.