█▄▀ █░█ █░░ ▀█▀
█░█ ▀▄▀ █▄▄ ░█░

kvlt /kʌlt/ noun — pronounced “cult”; the v stands in for u, the old-Norse-runic spelling popularized by black-metal aesthetics (cf. trve kvlt).

🔐 Pluggable secrets vault. Local-first. No daemon.

A single-binary secrets vault for projects that don't have HashiCorp Vault and don't want one. Encrypts with age using your existing SSH keys; named vaults give you a stable call site (kvlt get prod API_KEY) regardless of whether the backend is local age files today, AWS Secrets Manager tomorrow.

✨ Features

• 🔐 age + SSH keys — encrypts with ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub, decrypts with the matching private key. Borrows your existing protection chain (passphrase + ssh-agent + Touch ID via secretive); kvlt doesn't reinvent the lock.
• 🪪 Named vaults — kvlt get prod API_KEY, never kvlt get_aws(…); the backend is an implementation detail. Switching from local age files to AWS Secrets Manager later doesn't touch a single call site.
• 🔌 Pluggable backends — Provider interface + factory registry. AWS Secrets Manager (planned) sits behind a //go:build aws guard so the base binary stays dependency-light.
• 👥 Multi-recipient — encrypt to N SSH public keys, any one of those private keys can decrypt. The team-sharing escape hatch.
• 🤫 Stdin / TTY input modes — echo $VAL | kvlt put keeps secrets out of shell history; bare kvlt put prompts with echo off.
• 🐚 Shell-friendly — kvlt env vault for eval "$(…)" direnv integration; kvlt run vault -- cmd for scoped env injection like aws-vault exec / op run.
• 🚫 No service, no daemon — pure CLI; nothing listening, nothing persistent.
• 📦 Single static binary — Go, CGO off, darwin / linux / windows × amd64 / arm64.

📦 Install

curl -fsSL https://github.com/retr0h/kvlt/raw/main/install.sh | sh

Installs to ~/.local/bin (or /usr/local/bin as root) — SHA256 checksums verified. Override with KVLT_INSTALL_DIR=/some/path or pin a version with KVLT_VERSION=1.1.1.

🔨 Build from source

git clone https://github.com/retr0h/kvlt.git
cd kvlt
go build -o kvlt .
install -m 755 kvlt ~/.local/bin/kvlt

Cloud backends opt in via build tags: go build -tags aws -o kvlt .

🚀 Quick start

kvlt vault create --name dev                                    # bootstrap a vault (encrypts to ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)
kvlt vault create --name prod -p ~/.ssh/team.pub                # encrypt to a non-default public key
kvlt secret put --vault dev --key API_KEY --value sk-1234       # store a secret (lands in shell history)
echo "$DB_PASS" | kvlt secret put --vault dev --key DB_PASS     # stdin → no shell history
kvlt secret put --vault dev --key TOKEN                         # interactive, echo off
kvlt secret import --vault dev --env ~/.env                     # bulk-import a dotenv file
kvlt secret import --vault dev --file ~/kc.yaml --key KC        # one whole file stored as one secret
kvlt secret get --vault dev --key API_KEY                       # decrypt — prompts for SSH passphrase if not in agent
kvlt secret get --vault dev --key API_KEY -i ~/work/id_ed25519  # use a specific private key
kvlt secret list --vault dev                                    # names only, never values
kvlt secret delete --vault dev --key OLD_KEY                    # remove a secret (prompts unless --force)
kvlt env --vault dev                                            # all secrets as `export KEY=VALUE` for `eval`
kvlt run --vault dev -- npm start                               # exec child with vault secrets in env
kvlt vault delete --name dev                                    # delete the vault + every secret in it (prompts)

Override the default decrypt key globally with KVLT_PRIVATE_KEY=/path/to/key.

Full recipe collection in docs/recipes.md.

🛡️ Why SSH keys (and why this is meaningfully more secure)

Most secret stuff on a dev laptop is a plaintext file. ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml (your GitHub PAT), .env files, npm tokens in ~/.npmrc, GitLab tokens in ~/.config/glab-cli/, every .kube/config — all sitting there in plaintext, readable by any process running as you. Once malware has user-level execution on your machine, every one of those is immediate, no friction.

The clever bit isn't kvlt — it's delegating the lock to the SSH protection chain, one of the few credential systems on a dev machine that actually has a human-in-the-loop step:

What's on disk	Attacker w/ user code-exec does	Result
~/.aws/credentials plaintext	cat	full AWS access, instantly
.env with STRIPE_KEY=…	cat	Stripe access, instantly
gh / glab / npm tokens	cat	git host access, instantly
Key-file vault (key.txt next to blobs)	cat key.txt && cat blob	decrypt, instantly — key file is the secret
kvlt + passphrase-locked SSH key	reads .age + encrypted key file	needs the passphrase
kvlt + ssh-agent (timed unlock)	tries to decrypt	needs the passphrase to (re-)unlock the agent
kvlt + Secretive on macOS	tries to decrypt	needs your fingerprint (Touch ID)

Every kvlt decrypt requires something that isn't on disk: your typed passphrase, ssh-agent's in-memory unlock state, or a Touch ID prompt routed through the Secure Enclave. Reading every file under $HOME gets the attacker .age blobs — useless without the key — and an encrypted private key file, useless without the passphrase. The credentials never exist as plaintext at rest.

This is why a .env -> kvlt swap is a real upgrade, not just a re-shuffle. Vault designs that store the encryption key as a sibling text file in the repo don't help either — an attacker grabbing the vault grabs the key. kvlt moves the key out of the filesystem entirely; what's left on disk is useless without something off-disk (your passphrase, the agent's unlocked state, your fingerprint).

Honest about the limits:

• Cached ssh-agent unlock — once the agent is unlocked, anything running as you can sign with it. Mitigate with ssh-add -t 1h for time-limited caching, or skip the agent entirely on macOS by using Secretive (key lives in the Secure Enclave, every signature requires Touch ID).
• Keylogger on the box captures the passphrase the next time you type it. Beyond software's job.
• .age blobs are still copyable — an attacker with the blobs can sit on them waiting for a future key compromise. Rotate keys and the underlying secrets when threat-modeling demands it.

In short: kvlt is exactly as protective as your SSH private key is, which is far better than "as protective as a text file in $HOME."

Sharing a vault with teammates uses age's multi-recipient model — no shared keys, each person decrypts with their own SSH private key. Walkthrough in docs/recipes.md.

⚙️ How It Works

kvlt is a CLI; nothing runs between invocations. Each command opens the vault config, talks to the backend, and exits.

1. 🪪 Pick a vault by name — every verb takes a name (dev, prod, …); the name resolves to a backend through .kvlt/vaults/<type>/<id>.yaml
2. 🔐 Default backend is local (age + SSH keys) — kvlt put encrypts to one or more SSH public-key recipients via age; blobs land at .kvlt/secrets/local_encryption/<vault>/<key>.age. Decrypt requires the matching SSH private key — passphrase prompt fires on /dev/tty if your key isn't in ssh-agent already.
3. 🔌 Backends are pluggable — Provider interface + factory registry. Adding AWS Secrets Manager is one new file behind a //go:build aws guard; the base binary stays dependency-light.
4. 🔁 migrate is copy-then-swap — list keys, copy each value to the new backend, write the new config, delete the old one. Source stays functional until the very last step. (Planned; the backend abstraction supports it cleanly.)

The contract every backend implements is four methods (Get / Put / List / Name) — small on purpose. Anything fancier is layered on top by callers, not pushed into the backend.

💡 Inspiration

• age — pure-Go, audited, SSH-key-friendly encryption. kvlt is a vault wrapper around it; the crypto is age's.

🔀 Alternatives

Tool	Description
HashiCorp Vault	Full-featured secret-management platform
OpenBao	Open-source fork of Vault
1Password CLI	If you already live in 1Password
pass	GPG-encrypted files, the Unix way

kvlt is meant for the gap below "I need a Vault cluster" and above "I have a .env file."

🗺️ Roadmap

Shipped:

• 🪪 Project scaffold + CLI tree
• 🔐 local backend (age + SSH-key recipients)
• 🚪 vault create / secret put / secret get / secret list
• 🐚 kvlt env / kvlt run for shell + child-process integration
• 🔌 Pluggable backend registry (factory pattern)

Up next — only what earns its keep:

• 🤝 ssh-agent integration — friction-free decrypt; Touch ID via Secretive on macOS without re-prompting per read.
• 🔁 vault migrate — copy-then-swap, named-vault payoff: change backend type without touching call sites.
• 🔌 AWS Secrets Manager backend (-tags aws) — only if a real "dev local → prod cloud" use case shows up. Other tools (Azure Key Vault, 1Password, HashiCorp Vault) are intentionally not on the roadmap; if you live in those, use them directly.

📚 Docs

• docs/recipes.md — .envrc / direnv, kvlt run, GitLab + GitHub CI, Unix-pipe patterns, dotfiles, multi-vault setups
• docs/architecture.md — provider interface, on-disk layout, backend internals, migration semantics
• docs/development.md — setup, testing, conventions
• docs/contributing.md — PR workflow

📄 License

The MIT License.