Do not open a public GitHub issue for security-sensitive problems. Public disclosure before a fix can put downstream users at risk.

Instead, email the maintainer directly:

• Primary contact: info@oguzhansert.dev
• Response SLA: first acknowledgement within 72 hours; initial triage within 5 business days; patch timeline depends on severity

Email rather than file a public issue if your report includes any of:

• Credential, token, or secret exposure in the repo, git history, CI logs, or generated artefacts
• Auth bypass, privilege escalation, injection (SQL / command / LLM-prompt), SSRF, webhook signature bypass, or multi-tenant escape in the scaffolder templates or any pack-included skill
• Supply-chain or dependency vulnerability (malicious upstream, typo-squatting, compromised pin)
• Hook or MCP surface that executes unreviewed user-controlled input
• Proof-of-concept that makes the /ulak-director or /ulak-scaffold protocol produce false signoffs under adversarial prompts

• Affected Ulak OS version or commit SHA
• Affected file path(s) and line numbers, or adversarial input that triggers the issue
• Minimal reproduction (command sequence, input file, expected vs actual)
• Your assessment of severity and blast radius
• Whether you're open to coordinated disclosure and the timeline you prefer

• Acknowledgement (within 72 hours)
• Triage verdict (affected surface, severity, fix path)
• Coordinated-disclosure timeline (typical: 14–90 days depending on severity and upstream dependencies)
• Credit in the advisory + CHANGELOG unless you request anonymity

In scope:

• This repository's runtime contract, commands, skills, agents, hooks, templates, and scripts
• Installer scripts (scripts/install.sh, scripts/install.ps1, bin/ulak)
• Governance + pack-unit defaults that ship in a cold clone

Out of scope:

• Vulnerabilities in third-party LLM providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google) — report to the respective vendors
• Vulnerabilities in Claude Code / Codex / Gemini CLI themselves — report to the respective vendors
• Vulnerabilities in a scaffolded project after the operator runs /ulak-scaffold — those are in the operator's own repo, not this one (though if a scaffolder template is to blame, that IS in scope)
• Social-engineering or operator-misconfiguration scenarios

• SEC-INCIDENT-2026-04-21 — v2.1.4 tag credential leak — Resend + Cloudflare keys were recoverable from public v2.1.4 tag. RESOLVED via local git-filter-repo history rewrite (2026-04-21 evening). Force-push to origin pending operator approval. Key rotation still recommended (defense-in-depth).

Accepted reports will be credited here unless anonymity is requested.

— (none yet — first report goes here)