notes of blockchain governance by RandomWei · Pull Request #15 · npc-network/translator-website

RandomWei · 2018-07-06T10:00:39Z

No description provided.

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-07T09:55:22Z

+
 Explicit on-chain governance is typically touted as having several major advantages. First, unlike the highly conservative philosophy espoused by Bitcoin, it can evolve rapidly and accept needed technical improvements. Second, by creating an _explicit_ decentralized framework, it avoids the perceived pitfalls of _informal_ governance, which is viewed to either be too unstable and prone to chain splits, or prone to becoming too de-facto centralized - the latter being the same argument made in the famous 1972 essay “[Tyranny of Structurelessness](http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm)”.

+明确的链上治理通常被吹捧为具有几个主要优势。 首先，与比特币所倡导的高度保守的哲学不同，它可以迅速发展并接受所需的技术改进。 其次，通过创建一个_explicit_分散的框架，它可以避免非正式治理的缺陷，这种缺陷被认为既不稳定又容易出现连锁分裂，或者容易变得过于事实上的中心化——后者与1972年著名论文“Tyranny of Structurelessness”中的论点相同。http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm


其次，通过创建一个所谓的"明确"的去中心框架，它可以避免“非正式”治理的缺陷，（这里应该是对比_explicit_和_informal_，表示作者的不认同）

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-07T10:03:31Z


 > While all blockchains offer financial incentives for maintaining consensus on their ledgers, no blockchain has a robust on-chain mechanism that seamlessly amends the rules governing its protocol and rewards protocol development. As a result, first-generation blockchains empower de facto, centralized core development teams or miners to formulate design choices.

+> 尽管所有区块链都提供财务激励来维护对其分布式账本的一致性，但没有哪个区块链具备这么好鲁棒性的链上机制，能够实现无缝修改协议的管理规则和奖励协议开发规则。因此，第一代区块链完成的是从事实上的中心化的核心开发团队或矿工，到定制设计的选择多样化转变。


因此，第一代区块链完成的是从事实上的中心化的核心开发团队或矿工，到定制设计的选择多样化转变。（这句话，我的理解是，第一代区块链形成了事实上的，由核心开发团队或者矿工来制定区块链的设计选择。）

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-07T10:52:18Z


 In these cases, it’s in your interest to go if everyone else is going, and stop if everyone else is stopping. You can think of coordination institutions as putting up green or red flags in the air saying “go” or “stop”, _with an established culture_ that everyone watches these flags and (usually) does what they say. Why do people have the incentive to follow these flags? Because _everyone else_ is already following these flags, and you have the incentive to do the same thing as what everyone else is doing.

+在这些案例中，和大家的行动一致是你的利益驱使。你可以想象，协调机构举起绿色或者红色的旗帜代表“走”或“停”，根据已有的规则大家看到这些旗帜通常会做出机构所期望的行为。为什么人们有动机去跟随着这些旗帜的引导呢？因为其他人都这么做了，而你有动机像大家一样行动。


利益驱使有点变扭，和大家的行动一致符合你的利益。

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-07T10:56:38Z


 > **Strong claim**: this concept of coordination flags encompasses _all_ that we mean by "governance"; in scenarios where coordination games (or more generally, multi-equilibrium games) do not exist, the concept of governance is meaningless.

+强有力的宣言：这个协调指令的概念囊括了“治理”的所有内容，在一个协调博弈（或者更广义的来说，多平衡博弈）不存在的场景下，治理的概念是毫无意义的。


强有力的宣言 -> 着重声明

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-07T11:01:20Z

+
 In the real world, military orders from a general function as a flag, and in the blockchain world, the simplest example of such a flag is the mechanism that tells people whether or not a hard fork “is happening”. Coordination institutions can be very formal, or they can be informal, and often give suggestions that are ambiguous. Flags would ideally always be either red or green, but sometimes a flag might be yellow, or even holographic, appearing green to some participants and yellow or red to others. Sometimes that are also multiple flags that conflict with each other.

+在现实世界中，来自一个将军的军事命令是一面旗帜，在区块链世界中，这类指令最简单的例子是告诉人们是否进行硬分叉的机制。协调机构可以非常正式，也可以非正式，他们经常给出模糊的建议。而理想的指令，最好要么是红的要么是绿的，但有时候是也有黄的，甚至全息的，这意味着对有些人来说它是绿的，对有些人却是黄的或者红的。有时还有多条指令相互矛盾。


有的flag翻译成了指令，我觉得按照原文翻译成旗帜比较好，本来就是一个比喻。

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-12T23:33:18Z

+
 Aside from “the big hack” that received the bulk of the media attention, the DAO also had a number of much smaller game-theoretic vulnerabilities; [this article from HackingDistributed](http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/) does a good job of summarizing them. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Even if all of the finer details of a voting mechanism are implemented correctly, voting mechanisms in general have a large flaw: in any vote, the probability that any given voter will have an impact on the result is tiny, and so the personal incentive that each voter has to vote correctly is almost insignificant. And if each person’s size of the stake is small, their incentive to vote correctly is insignificant _squared_. Hence, a relatively small bribe spread out across the participants may suffice to sway their decision, possibly in a way that they collectively might quite disapprove of.

+除了受到大部分媒体关注的“大黑客”之外，DAO还有一些小得多的博弈论漏洞; 来自HackingDistributed的[这篇文章](http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/)对他们进行了很好的总结。但这只是冰山一角。即使投票机制的所有细节都得到了正确实施，投票机制通常也存在很大缺陷：在任何投票中，任何特定投票人对结果产生影响的可能性都很小，因此， 每个选民必须正确投票几乎是微不足道的。 如果每个人的股份规模都很小，他们正确投票的动机是微不足道的。 因此，在参与者身上散布的相对较小的贿赂可能足以影响他们的决定，可能以他们可能完全不同意的方式行事。


因此，每个选民必须正确投票几乎是微不足道的 => 动机是微不足道的

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-12T23:36:10Z

+
 First, there are ways to make a “bribe” that are quite plausible; for example, an exchange can offer interest rates for deposits (or, even more ambiguously, use the exchange’s own money to build a great interface and features), with the exchange operator using the large quantity of deposits to vote as they wish. Exchanges profit from chaos, so their incentives are clearly quite misaligned with users _and_ coin holders.

+首先，有一些方法可以使“贿赂”变得相当合理; 例如，交易所可以提供存款利率（或者更加含糊地，使用交易所自己的资金建立一个很好的界面和功能），交易所运营商使用大量存款进行投票。 交换从混乱中获利，因此他们的激励显然与用户和硬币持有人之间存在很大的偏差。


例如，交易所可以提供存款利率（或者更加含糊地，使用交易所自己的资金建立一个很好的界面和功能），交易所运营商使用大量存款进行投票。 => 作为交换，交易所运营商使用大量存款进行投票。

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-12T23:37:00Z

+
 First, there are ways to make a “bribe” that are quite plausible; for example, an exchange can offer interest rates for deposits (or, even more ambiguously, use the exchange’s own money to build a great interface and features), with the exchange operator using the large quantity of deposits to vote as they wish. Exchanges profit from chaos, so their incentives are clearly quite misaligned with users _and_ coin holders.

+首先，有一些方法可以使“贿赂”变得相当合理; 例如，交易所可以提供存款利率（或者更加含糊地，使用交易所自己的资金建立一个很好的界面和功能），交易所运营商使用大量存款进行投票。 交换从混乱中获利，因此他们的激励显然与用户和硬币持有人之间存在很大的偏差。


交换从混乱中获利，因此他们的激励显然与用户和硬币持有人之间存在很大的偏差。
=> 交易所从混乱中获利

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-12T23:47:57Z


 And as “Exhibit B” some voter bribes being paid out [in Ark](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1835497.new):

+而“图表B”中，一些选民贿赂（https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1835497.new)支付：


一些选民贿赂支付 => 一些选民贿赂值回了票价

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-12T23:57:18Z


+在这里，请注意紧密耦合和松散耦合的投票之间存在关键区别。 在一个松散耦合的投票中，直接或间接的投票贿赂也是可能的，但如果社区同意某些给定的提案或一组投票构成博弈论攻击，他们可以轻松地在全社会范围内同意忽略它。 事实上，这种情况已经发生 - Carbonvote包含与已知交换地址相对应的黑名单地址，并且不计算来自这些地址的投票。 在紧密耦合的投票中，没有办法在协议级别创建这样的黑名单，因为同意谁是黑名单的一部分本身就是区块链治理决策。 但由于黑名单是社区创建的投票工具的一部分，只会间接影响协议变更，因此社区可能会拒绝包含不良黑名单的投票工具。
+
 It’s worth noting that this section **is not** a prediction that all tightly coupled voting systems will quickly succumb to bribe attacks. It’s entirely possible that many will survive for one simple reason: all of these projects have founders or foundations with large premines, and these act as large centralized actors that are interested in their platforms’ success that are not vulnerable to bribes, and hold enough coins to outweigh most bribe attacks. However, this kind of centralized trust model, while arguably useful in some contexts in a project’s early stages, is clearly one that is not sustainable in the long term.


all of these projects have founders or foundations with large premines => premine 预挖矿

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-13T00:08:26Z

+
 Another important objection to voting is that coin holders are only one class of user, and may have interests that collide with those of other users. In the case of pure cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, store-of-value use (“[hodling](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=375643.0)”) and medium-of-exchange use (“buying coffees”) are naturally in conflict, as the store-of-value prizes security much more than the medium-of-exchange use case, which more strongly values usability. With Ethereum, the conflict is worse, as there are many people who use Ethereum for reasons that have nothing to do with ether (see: cryptokitties), or even value-bearing digital assets in general (see: ENS).

+对投票的另一个重要反对意见是，硬币持有者只是一类用户，并且可能具有与其他用户有相冲突的兴趣。 在像比特币这样的纯加密货币的情况下，使用存储价值[hodling]（https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=375643.0) 和交易所使用（“购买咖啡”） 自然会发生冲突，因为价值存储比安全交易用例更有价值，后者更强烈地重视可用性。 对于以太坊，冲突更加严重，因为有许多人使用以太坊的原因与以太无关（参见：cryptokitties），甚至是一般的有价值数字资产都是这样（参见：ENS）。


在像比特币这样的纯加密货币的情况下，使用存储价值[hodling]（https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=375643.0) 和交易所使用（“购买咖啡”）自然会发生冲突，因为价值存储比安全交易用例更有价值，
=> 像比特币这样的纯加密货币，价值存储的用法[持有]和交易媒介的用法[买咖啡]天然的有冲突，因为价值存储的用法比交易媒介的用法更重视安全，而交易媒介的用法更重视可用性。

XiaohuaNpc · 2018-08-13T00:31:24Z

+
 We _want_ to be able to say that a protocol change that violates any of these guarantees should be viewed as illegitimate - there should be a coordination institution that waves a red flag - even if they get approved by a vote. We also want to be able to say that a protocol change that follows the letter of a norm, but blatantly violates its spirit, the protocol change should _still_ be viewed as illegitimate. And having norms exist on layer 2 - in the minds of humans in the community, rather than in the code of the protocol - best achieves that goal.

+我们希望能够将任何违反这些保证的协议变更视为非法 - 应该有一个严格的协调机构 - 即使它们得到了投票批准。 我们也希望能够让协议改变遵循规范的每一条内容，但公然违反其精神的协议变更应该被视为非法的。 并且在第2层存在规范 - 在社区中的人类头脑中，而不是在协议的代码中 - 最好地实现该目标。


应该有一个严格的协调机构 => 应该有一个可出示红牌的的协调机构

XiaohuaNpc

@RandomWei 在我觉得有问题的地方写了review意见，如果有问题欢迎探讨：）

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		Explicit on-chain governance is typically touted as having several major advantages. First, unlike the highly conservative philosophy espoused by Bitcoin, it can evolve rapidly and accept needed technical improvements. Second, by creating an _explicit_ decentralized framework, it avoids the perceived pitfalls of _informal_ governance, which is viewed to either be too unstable and prone to chain splits, or prone to becoming too de-facto centralized - the latter being the same argument made in the famous 1972 essay “[Tyranny of Structurelessness](http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm)”.

		明确的链上治理通常被吹捧为具有几个主要优势。首先，与比特币所倡导的高度保守的哲学不同，它可以迅速发展并接受所需的技术改进。其次，通过创建一个_explicit_分散的框架，它可以避免非正式治理的缺陷，这种缺陷被认为既不稳定又容易出现连锁分裂，或者容易变得过于事实上的中心化——后者与1972年著名论文“Tyranny of Structurelessness”中的论点相同。http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm


		> While all blockchains offer financial incentives for maintaining consensus on their ledgers, no blockchain has a robust on-chain mechanism that seamlessly amends the rules governing its protocol and rewards protocol development. As a result, first-generation blockchains empower de facto, centralized core development teams or miners to formulate design choices.

		> 尽管所有区块链都提供财务激励来维护对其分布式账本的一致性，但没有哪个区块链具备这么好鲁棒性的链上机制，能够实现无缝修改协议的管理规则和奖励协议开发规则。因此，第一代区块链完成的是从事实上的中心化的核心开发团队或矿工，到定制设计的选择多样化转变。


		In these cases, it’s in your interest to go if everyone else is going, and stop if everyone else is stopping. You can think of coordination institutions as putting up green or red flags in the air saying “go” or “stop”, _with an established culture_ that everyone watches these flags and (usually) does what they say. Why do people have the incentive to follow these flags? Because _everyone else_ is already following these flags, and you have the incentive to do the same thing as what everyone else is doing.

		在这些案例中，和大家的行动一致是你的利益驱使。你可以想象，协调机构举起绿色或者红色的旗帜代表“走”或“停”，根据已有的规则大家看到这些旗帜通常会做出机构所期望的行为。为什么人们有动机去跟随着这些旗帜的引导呢？因为其他人都这么做了，而你有动机像大家一样行动。


		> Strong claim: this concept of coordination flags encompasses _all_ that we mean by "governance"; in scenarios where coordination games (or more generally, multi-equilibrium games) do not exist, the concept of governance is meaningless.

		强有力的宣言：这个协调指令的概念囊括了“治理”的所有内容，在一个协调博弈（或者更广义的来说，多平衡博弈）不存在的场景下，治理的概念是毫无意义的。


		In the real world, military orders from a general function as a flag, and in the blockchain world, the simplest example of such a flag is the mechanism that tells people whether or not a hard fork “is happening”. Coordination institutions can be very formal, or they can be informal, and often give suggestions that are ambiguous. Flags would ideally always be either red or green, but sometimes a flag might be yellow, or even holographic, appearing green to some participants and yellow or red to others. Sometimes that are also multiple flags that conflict with each other.

		在现实世界中，来自一个将军的军事命令是一面旗帜，在区块链世界中，这类指令最简单的例子是告诉人们是否进行硬分叉的机制。协调机构可以非常正式，也可以非正式，他们经常给出模糊的建议。而理想的指令，最好要么是红的要么是绿的，但有时候是也有黄的，甚至全息的，这意味着对有些人来说它是绿的，对有些人却是黄的或者红的。有时还有多条指令相互矛盾。


		Aside from “the big hack” that received the bulk of the media attention, the DAO also had a number of much smaller game-theoretic vulnerabilities; [this article from HackingDistributed](http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/) does a good job of summarizing them. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Even if all of the finer details of a voting mechanism are implemented correctly, voting mechanisms in general have a large flaw: in any vote, the probability that any given voter will have an impact on the result is tiny, and so the personal incentive that each voter has to vote correctly is almost insignificant. And if each person’s size of the stake is small, their incentive to vote correctly is insignificant _squared_. Hence, a relatively small bribe spread out across the participants may suffice to sway their decision, possibly in a way that they collectively might quite disapprove of.

		除了受到大部分媒体关注的“大黑客”之外，DAO还有一些小得多的博弈论漏洞; 来自HackingDistributed的[这篇文章](http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/)对他们进行了很好的总结。但这只是冰山一角。即使投票机制的所有细节都得到了正确实施，投票机制通常也存在很大缺陷：在任何投票中，任何特定投票人对结果产生影响的可能性都很小，因此，每个选民必须正确投票几乎是微不足道的。如果每个人的股份规模都很小，他们正确投票的动机是微不足道的。因此，在参与者身上散布的相对较小的贿赂可能足以影响他们的决定，可能以他们可能完全不同意的方式行事。


		First, there are ways to make a “bribe” that are quite plausible; for example, an exchange can offer interest rates for deposits (or, even more ambiguously, use the exchange’s own money to build a great interface and features), with the exchange operator using the large quantity of deposits to vote as they wish. Exchanges profit from chaos, so their incentives are clearly quite misaligned with users _and_ coin holders.

		首先，有一些方法可以使“贿赂”变得相当合理; 例如，交易所可以提供存款利率（或者更加含糊地，使用交易所自己的资金建立一个很好的界面和功能），交易所运营商使用大量存款进行投票。交换从混乱中获利，因此他们的激励显然与用户和硬币持有人之间存在很大的偏差。


		And as “Exhibit B” some voter bribes being paid out [in Ark](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1835497.new):

		而“图表B”中，一些选民贿赂（https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1835497.new)支付：


		在这里，请注意紧密耦合和松散耦合的投票之间存在关键区别。在一个松散耦合的投票中，直接或间接的投票贿赂也是可能的，但如果社区同意某些给定的提案或一组投票构成博弈论攻击，他们可以轻松地在全社会范围内同意忽略它。事实上，这种情况已经发生 - Carbonvote包含与已知交换地址相对应的黑名单地址，并且不计算来自这些地址的投票。在紧密耦合的投票中，没有办法在协议级别创建这样的黑名单，因为同意谁是黑名单的一部分本身就是区块链治理决策。但由于黑名单是社区创建的投票工具的一部分，只会间接影响协议变更，因此社区可能会拒绝包含不良黑名单的投票工具。

		It’s worth noting that this section is not a prediction that all tightly coupled voting systems will quickly succumb to bribe attacks. It’s entirely possible that many will survive for one simple reason: all of these projects have founders or foundations with large premines, and these act as large centralized actors that are interested in their platforms’ success that are not vulnerable to bribes, and hold enough coins to outweigh most bribe attacks. However, this kind of centralized trust model, while arguably useful in some contexts in a project’s early stages, is clearly one that is not sustainable in the long term.


		Another important objection to voting is that coin holders are only one class of user, and may have interests that collide with those of other users. In the case of pure cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, store-of-value use (“[hodling](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=375643.0)”) and medium-of-exchange use (“buying coffees”) are naturally in conflict, as the store-of-value prizes security much more than the medium-of-exchange use case, which more strongly values usability. With Ethereum, the conflict is worse, as there are many people who use Ethereum for reasons that have nothing to do with ether (see: cryptokitties), or even value-bearing digital assets in general (see: ENS).

		对投票的另一个重要反对意见是，硬币持有者只是一类用户，并且可能具有与其他用户有相冲突的兴趣。在像比特币这样的纯加密货币的情况下，使用存储价值[hodling]（https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=375643.0) 和交易所使用（“购买咖啡”）自然会发生冲突，因为价值存储比安全交易用例更有价值，后者更强烈地重视可用性。对于以太坊，冲突更加严重，因为有许多人使用以太坊的原因与以太无关（参见：cryptokitties），甚至是一般的有价值数字资产都是这样（参见：ENS）。


		We _want_ to be able to say that a protocol change that violates any of these guarantees should be viewed as illegitimate - there should be a coordination institution that waves a red flag - even if they get approved by a vote. We also want to be able to say that a protocol change that follows the letter of a norm, but blatantly violates its spirit, the protocol change should _still_ be viewed as illegitimate. And having norms exist on layer 2 - in the minds of humans in the community, rather than in the code of the protocol - best achieves that goal.

		我们希望能够将任何违反这些保证的协议变更视为非法 - 应该有一个严格的协调机构 - 即使它们得到了投票批准。我们也希望能够让协议改变遵循规范的每一条内容，但公然违反其精神的协议变更应该被视为非法的。并且在第2层存在规范 - 在社区中的人类头脑中，而不是在协议的代码中 - 最好地实现该目标。

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RandomWei commented Jul 6, 2018

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