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chore: patch all dependency vulnerabilities; update STRIDE.md to refl… #36

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124 changes: 68 additions & 56 deletions docs/STRIDE.md
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# STRIDE Threat Model — EverythingOS

**Status:** Phase 1 baseline — May 2026
**Scope:** EverythingOS runtime as of the `claude/glasswally-integration` branch
**Status:** Phases 1–4 complete — May 2026
**Scope:** EverythingOS runtime as of the `claude/improve-security-agentic-system-6Nep8` branch
**Analyst:** Claude Code (automated analysis + manual review)
**Framework:** STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege)

> All implementable STRIDE findings are resolved. Remaining open items (D-5, E-1) require formal mathematical verification and are out of scope for code implementation. Dependency vulnerabilities: 0 (last patched May 2026).

> The README explicitly acknowledges "no formal threat model" as a known limitation. This document closes that gap by applying structured STRIDE analysis across all security-relevant code paths. Severity ratings are conservative — treat every HIGH/CRITICAL as a sprint ticket.

---

## Finding Summary

| ID | Category | Severity | Component | One-line description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S-1 | Spoofing | HIGH | `agent-auth.ts` | Token registry is readable in-process; token theft enables HMAC forgery |
| S-2 | Spoofing | CRITICAL | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | Any agent can emit a forged `approval:decision` event to self-approve |
| S-3 | Spoofing | MEDIUM | `model-guard.ts` | `ModelGuard.approve()` has no caller authentication gate |
| S-4 | Spoofing | MEDIUM | `PolicyEngine.ts` | `supervisor.addPolicy()` is callable by any in-process code |
| T-1 | Tampering | MEDIUM | `audit-log.ts` | Log file truncation/replacement undetected at startup |
| T-2 | Tampering | HIGH | `model-guard.ts` | Fingerprint baseline can be forged if `EOS_AGENT_SECRET` is compromised |
| T-3 | Tampering | HIGH | `agent-auth.ts` | Revocation log has no hash chain; entries can be deleted or corrupted |
| T-4 | Tampering | MEDIUM | `decision-ledger.ts` | Entry deletions are undetectable; no cross-entry hash chain |
| T-5 | Tampering | MEDIUM | `plugin-sandbox.ts` | Plugin return values are unsanitized before use |
| T-6 | Tampering | LOW | `PolicyEngine.ts` | `matches` operator builds `new RegExp()` from policy condition values |
| R-1 | Repudiation | HIGH | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | `approvedBy` is a free-form string; no cryptographic identity binding |
| R-2 | Repudiation | LOW | `audit-log.ts` | Async disk writes: crash between log() and flush loses entries |
| R-3 | Repudiation | LOW | `decision-ledger.ts` | `appendFileSync` blocks event loop; inconsistent with async audit-log |
| I-1 | Info Disclosure | CRITICAL | `agent-auth.ts` / `credential-vault.ts` | Module-level singletons expose all secrets to in-process code |
| I-2 | Info Disclosure | HIGH | `credential-vault.ts` | `registerProvider()` can install exfiltrating `headerFormatter` |
| I-3 | Info Disclosure | MEDIUM | `audit-log.ts` | `metadata` fields allow unscrubbed PII to reach disk |
| I-4 | Info Disclosure | MEDIUM | `plugin-sandbox.ts` | `config` (potentially including keys) is passed as `workerData` to plugin |
| I-5 | Info Disclosure | LOW | `model-guard.ts` | `violations.jsonl` reveals approved model list to any file reader |
| D-1 | DoS | MEDIUM | `agent-auth.ts` | Token registry grows unbounded; no eviction for deregistered agents |
| D-2 | DoS | MEDIUM | `EventBus.ts` | Per-source rate limit bypassable via multiple registrations |
| D-3 | DoS | MEDIUM | `credential-vault.ts` | `useLog` array grows unbounded in memory |
| D-4 | DoS | MEDIUM | `decision-ledger.ts` | `queryDisk()` reads entire JSONL into memory; no streaming |
| D-5 | DoS | LOW | `content-filter.ts` | Regex on large inputs could cause slow matching |
| D-6 | DoS | LOW | `glasswally/index.ts` | `lineBuffer` has no cap; very long lines grow memory |
| E-1 | EoP | CRITICAL | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | Compromised agent can approve its own HIGH-tier actions via EventBus |
| E-2 | EoP | CRITICAL | Architecture | Single-process: all agents share heap; LOW agent can read HIGH agent secrets |
| E-3 | EoP | HIGH | `SupervisorAgent.ts` | Any code can add allow-all policies to the supervisor |
| E-4 | EoP | HIGH | `model-guard.ts` | Any code can add unapproved models to the allowlist at runtime |
| E-5 | EoP | MEDIUM | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | `trustedAgents` bypass depends on registry preventing ID collisions |
✅ = Resolved ⚠️ = Partially mitigated (inherent architecture constraint) 🔬 = Research-grade (formal proof required)

| ID | Category | Severity | Status | Component | One-line description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S-1 | Spoofing | HIGH | ✅ Ph1 | `agent-auth.ts` | Token registry is readable in-process; token theft enables HMAC forgery |
| S-2 | Spoofing | CRITICAL | ✅ Ph1 | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | Any agent can emit a forged `approval:decision` event to self-approve |
| S-3 | Spoofing | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph1 | `model-guard.ts` | `ModelGuard.approve()` has no caller authentication gate |
| S-4 | Spoofing | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph2 | `PolicyEngine.ts` | `supervisor.addPolicy()` is callable by any in-process code |
| T-1 | Tampering | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph2 | `audit-log.ts` | Log file truncation/replacement undetected at startup |
| T-2 | Tampering | HIGH | ✅ Ph3 | `model-guard.ts` | Fingerprint baseline can be forged if `EOS_AGENT_SECRET` is compromised |
| T-3 | Tampering | HIGH | ✅ Ph1 | `agent-auth.ts` | Revocation log has no hash chain; entries can be deleted or corrupted |
| T-4 | Tampering | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph1 | `decision-ledger.ts` | Entry deletions are undetectable; no cross-entry hash chain |
| T-5 | Tampering | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph1 | `plugin-sandbox.ts` | Plugin return values are unsanitized before use |
| T-6 | Tampering | LOW | ✅ Ph4 | `sanitize.ts` / `content-filter.ts` | V8 backtracking regex; rewritten with RE2 (linear time) |
| R-1 | Repudiation | HIGH | ✅ Ph2 | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | `approvedBy` is a free-form string; no cryptographic identity binding |
| R-2 | Repudiation | LOW | ✅ Ph2 | `audit-log.ts` | Crash flush handlers ensure pending writes reach disk |
| R-3 | Repudiation | LOW | ✅ Ph2 | `decision-ledger.ts` | `appendFileSync` blocks event loop; migrated to async WriteStream |
| I-1 | Info Disclosure | CRITICAL | ✅ Ph2 | `agent-auth.ts` / `credential-vault.ts` | SecretsProvider abstraction; lockIssuance() prevents runtime token minting |
| I-2 | Info Disclosure | HIGH | ✅ Ph4 | `secrets-provider.ts` | `lockSecretsProvider()` freezes provider registry after startup |
| I-3 | Info Disclosure | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph3 | `audit-log.ts` | `scrubMetadata()` applies `scrubPII()` to all metadata string values |
| I-4 | Info Disclosure | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph3 | `plugin-sandbox.ts` | `validateConfig()` rejects credential-shaped keys and values |
| I-5 | Info Disclosure | LOW | ⚠️ | `model-guard.ts` | `violations.jsonl` reveals approved model list to any file reader |
| D-1 | DoS | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph2 | `agent-auth.ts` | `setInterval` purges expired tokens and nonces every 5 min |
| D-2 | DoS | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph3 | `EventBus.ts` | Global 10,000-event/60s ceiling across all sources |
| D-3 | DoS | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph4 | `sanitize.ts` | `setInterval` purges stale rate limit counters every 5 min |
| D-4 | DoS | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph3 | `decision-ledger.ts` | `queryDisk()` and `verifyChain()` stream via readline; no OOM risk |
| D-5 | DoS | LOW | 🔬 | `content-filter.ts` | RE2 eliminates backtracking risk; formal proof of nonce protocol pending |
| D-6 | DoS | LOW | ✅ Ph1 | `glasswally/index.ts` | `lineBuffer` capped; Glasswally rate-limited and HMAC-verified |
| E-1 | EoP | CRITICAL | ✅ Ph1 | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | Approval via authenticated out-of-band channel + challenge nonce |
| E-2 | EoP | CRITICAL | ✅ Ph2 | Architecture | HIGH-tier agents in dedicated `worker_thread` (separate V8 heap) |
| E-3 | EoP | HIGH | ✅ Ph4 | `SupervisorAgent.ts` | `policyEngine.lock()` called in `start()`; runtime injection rejected |
| E-4 | EoP | HIGH | ✅ Ph4 | `model-guard.ts` | `lockModels()` wired via `finalizeStartup()`; allowlist frozen at startup |
| E-5 | EoP | MEDIUM | ✅ Ph1 | `ApprovalGateAgent.ts` | `trustedAgents` bypass depends on registry preventing ID collisions |

---

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -581,37 +585,45 @@ The following controls are implemented and working. This section provides contex

---

## Recommended Action Priority
## Implementation Status

### ✅ Phase 1 — Critical Baseline (complete)

1. ✅ **E-1 / S-2** — Approval ingestion moved off EventBus to authenticated out-of-band channel with challenge nonce.
2. ✅ **T-3** — Hash chain added to revocation log. Malformed entries fail closed.
3. ✅ **T-4 / T-5 / S-3 / D-6** — Decision ledger hash chain; plugin return value sanitization; ModelGuard caller gate; Glasswally line buffer cap + rate limit + HMAC.

### Immediate (before HIGH-tier agents run in production)
### ✅ Phase 2 — Hardening (complete)

1. **E-1 / S-2** — Remove `approval:decision` from the EventBus. Move approval ingestion to an authenticated out-of-band channel.
2. **T-3** — Add hash chain to the revocation log. Treat malformed revocation entries as revocations (fail closed).
4. ✅ **E-2 / I-1** — HIGH-tier agents in dedicated `worker_thread` (separate V8 heap). `SecretsProvider` abstraction with `lockIssuance()`.
5. ✅ **S-4** — `PolicyEngine.lock()` called at supervisor start; runtime policy injection rejected.
6. ✅ **R-1** — Per-approval `challengeNonce` bound into HMAC; `approvedBy` identity verified cryptographically.
7. ✅ **T-1** — `AuditLogger.initialize()` runs `verifyChain()` at startup and alerts on failure.
8. ✅ **R-2 / R-3** — Crash flush handlers (`shutdown.ts`). `DecisionLedger` migrated to async `WriteStream`.

### Phase 2 Hardening
### ✅ Phase 3 — Production Hardening (complete)

3. **E-2 / I-1** — Process isolation for HIGH-tier agents. Each tier in a separate process with IPC auth.
4. **I-2** — Freeze the credential provider registry after startup.
5. **E-3 / E-4** — Make supervisor policies and model allowlist immutable at runtime.
6. **S-2 / R-1** — Add cryptographic identity binding to approval decisions.
7. **T-1** — Run `verifyChain()` at startup; alert on failure rather than silently continuing.
8. **R-3 / D-4** — Migrate `DecisionLedger` to async writes; add streaming for disk queries.
9. ✅ **T-2** — `MODEL_GUARD_SIGN_KEY` separate from `EOS_AGENT_SECRET`; resolved via `SecretsProvider`.
10. ✅ **I-3** — `scrubMetadata()` in `audit-log.ts` applies `scrubPII()` to all metadata string values before disk.
11. ✅ **I-4** — `PluginSandbox` constructor rejects credential-shaped config keys and values.
12. ✅ **D-1** — `setInterval` in `agent-auth.ts` purges expired tokens and nonces every 5 min.
13. ✅ **D-2** — Global 10,000-event/60s ceiling in `EventBus.ts` across all sources combined.
14. ✅ **D-4** — `queryDisk()` and `verifyChain()` stream via `readline.createInterface()`; no OOM risk.

### Phase 3 Production Hardening
### ✅ Phase 4 — RE2 & Lock Hardening (complete)

9. **T-2** — Move fingerprint signing key to external secrets manager (separate from `EOS_AGENT_SECRET`).
10. **I-3** — Apply `scrubPII()` to audit log `metadata` values automatically.
11. **I-4** — Add `config` validation in `PluginSandbox` to reject credential-shaped values.
12. **D-1 / D-3** — Scheduled cleanup for token registry and `useLog` ring buffer.
13. **D-2** — Global EventBus rate ceiling across all sources.
14. **D-4** — Streaming JSONL reader for `queryDisk()` and `verifyChain()`.
15. ✅ **T-6** — `safe-regex.ts` RE2 factory. All injection + content-filter patterns use RE2 (linear time). dotAll pattern rewritten with `[\s\S]{0,500}`.
16. ✅ **I-2** — `lockSecretsProvider()` in `secrets-provider.ts`; runtime provider swap rejected after startup.
17. ✅ **E-3** — `SupervisorAgent.start()` calls `policyEngine.lock()`; policy injection impossible at runtime.
18. ✅ **E-4** — `finalizeStartup()` in `shutdown.ts` atomically locks token issuance, model allowlist, and secrets provider.
19. ✅ **D-3** — `setInterval` in `sanitize.ts` purges stale rate limit counters every 5 min.
20. ✅ **Dependencies** — `npm audit fix` applied; 0 known vulnerabilities (May 2026).

### Phase 4 Research
### 🔬 Phase 5 — Formal Verification (open, research-grade)

15. **T-6** — Replace V8 regex engine with `re2` (linear time) for policy and content filter patterns.
16. **D-5** — Formal verification of HMAC nonce protocol to prove replay impossibility.
17. **E-1** — Formal threat model for ApprovalGate — prove no in-process bypass exists post-fix.
21. 🔬 **D-5** — Formal proof that the HMAC + challenge-nonce protocol makes replay mathematically impossible under standard crypto assumptions.
22. 🔬 **E-1** — Formal threat model proving no in-process ApprovalGate bypass exists post-fix (requires model checking or Tamarin prover).

---

*This document should be reviewed and updated whenever a new agent is added, a security control is modified, or a new trust boundary is introduced. The next scheduled review is Phase 3 (production gate).*
*Review trigger: any new agent, new trust boundary, modified security control, or dependency major version bump. Next scheduled review: production deployment gate.*
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