π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix SSRF vulnerability in web_fetch tool#590
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix SSRF vulnerability in web_fetch tool#590mudcube wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: mudcube <101564+mudcube@users.noreply.github.com>
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| if ipv4.is_multicast() { | ||
| return false; | ||
| } | ||
| true |
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Block shared-address IPv4 ranges
The new SSRF gate still falls through to true for 100.64.0.0/10. When web_fetch is run on a host with services reachable on a CGNAT/overlay range, such as Tailscale addresses, or a metadata service exposed there, an attacker can supply a URL whose DNS result is in that range and the request will be pinned and sent, so the internal-resource read remains possible. This allowlist should reject shared-address/non-global IPv4 ranges before the final allow.
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web_fetchallowed requesting arbitrary internal endpoints or localhost via direct or redirect-based SSRF.reqwest'sresolveto prevent TOCTOU DNS rebinding.cargo test -p mill-plugin-systemto ensure functionality.PR created automatically by Jules for task 14048877648785991600 started by @mudcube