Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 81: Uncontrolled data used in path expression#139
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…in path expression Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Potential fix for https://github.com/artiphishle/pkgviz/security/code-scanning/81
In general, to fix uncontrolled path usage you should (1) normalize the user‑supplied path, and (2) enforce that it stays within a trusted base directory (or otherwise validate it, e.g., via an allow list), before using it in filesystem APIs. This prevents directory traversal such as
../../../etc/passwdeven when the application appears to be working with a “directory root”.In this file,
safeReadFileSyncalready implements the “normalize relative to base and check prefix” pattern for files. We should adopt a similar approach for directories: introduce asafeResolveDirhelper that takes a trustedbaseDirand an untrusteddirectoryPath, resolves the directory path against the base, and verifies that the resulting absolute path is still underbaseDir(usingpath.resolveand astartsWithcheck that accounts for separators). Then, updateisCppRoot,isPythonRoot,isDelphiRoot, andisKotlinRootto use this helper instead of callingpath.resolvedirectly on the untrusteddirectoryPath. This preserves existing behavior for valid inputs while adding traversal protection.Concretely, in
src/shared/utils/detectLanguage.ts:safeReadFileSync, for examplesafeResolveDir(baseDir: string, directoryPath: string): string, that:const resolvedBaseDir = path.resolve(baseDir);const resolvedDirectoryPath = path.resolve(baseDir, directoryPath);resolvedDirectoryPathstarts withresolvedBaseDir + path.sep; if not, throws an error.resolvedDirectoryPath.process.cwd()) as the base for these language‑root checks, which matches typical “project root is under CWD” assumptions in tooling.isCppRoot,isPythonRoot,isDelphiRoot, andisKotlinRootthe lineconst resolvedPath = path.resolve(directoryPath);with a call tosafeResolveDir(process.cwd(), directoryPath);.No new imports are required because we already import
fsandpath, and Node’sprocess.cwd()is globally available.Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.