The official Node.js SDK for SikkerKey. Read-only access to secrets using Ed25519 machine authentication. Zero external dependencies - Node.js built-in crypto, fs, http, https only. Runs on persistent hosts (identity on disk) and on serverless or ephemeral environments (memory-only bootstrap).
npm install @sikkerkey/sdkRequires Node.js 18+.
import { SikkerKey } from '@sikkerkey/sdk'
const sk = SikkerKey.create('vault_abc123')
const apiKey = await sk.getSecret('sk_stripe_key')The SDK reads the machine identity from ~/.sikkerkey/vaults/<vault-id>/identity.json, signs every request with the machine's Ed25519 private key, and returns the decrypted value.
// Explicit vault ID
const sk = SikkerKey.create('vault_abc123')
// Direct path to identity file
const sk = SikkerKey.create('/etc/sikkerkey/vaults/vault_abc123/identity.json')
// Auto-detect: uses SIKKERKEY_IDENTITY env, or finds the single vault on disk
const sk = SikkerKey.create()Auto-detection throws ConfigurationError if multiple vaults are registered and no vault is specified.
On a long-lived host the SDK loads a persistent identity from disk. Serverless and other ephemeral or read-only-filesystem environments (Vercel, Netlify, AWS Lambda, Google Cloud Run, Fly.io, and similar) have no identity to persist. SikkerKey.bootstrap() handles that case: it generates an Ed25519 keypair in memory, enrolls a short-lived ephemeral machine with an enrollment token, and reads secrets, all without writing anything to disk.
import { SikkerKey } from '@sikkerkey/sdk'
const sk = await SikkerKey.bootstrap(
process.env.SIKKERKEY_VAULT_ID,
process.env.SIKKERKEY_ENROLLMENT_TOKEN,
).inMemory()
const dbUrl = await sk.getSecret('sk_db_prod')Create an enrollment token in the dashboard and supply its plaintext plus your vault ID. The token only registers an ephemeral machine scoped to the policy you set (projects, secrets, lifetime); it cannot read secrets on its own.
await bootstrap(vaultId, token, options?).inMemory()enrolls once: it generates a keypair in memory, registers an ephemeral machine, and returns a ready client.- The returned client signs every read with the in-memory private key, exactly like a disk-based client.
- Nothing is written to disk. The private key lives only in process memory and is gone when the instance is recycled.
- The ephemeral machine lives for the lifetime set on the enrollment token. Reading after it expires fails like any expired machine, so set the token's machine lifetime to suit your workload. The common path is to read at startup and hold the values.
Enrollment errors (bad token, sealed vault, IP not allowed) surface from the inMemory() call, so a misconfigured deployment fails at startup rather than on a later request.
| Option | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
hostname |
$HOSTNAME, then serverless |
Label recorded on the machine. Must match the token's hostname pattern if one is set |
name |
none | Optional machine name to request. Overridden when the enrollment token defines a name pattern (the server generates the name from it) |
The resolved value is an ordinary SikkerKey client with the same methods as a disk-based one (getSecret, getFields, getField, listSecrets, listSecretsByProject, export, watch, close).
When you create the enrollment token for a serverless deployment:
- Set a short machine lifetime (minutes). Each cold start mints a fresh ephemeral machine, and short-lived ones free their slot quickly as they expire.
- Set max-uses high enough for your cold-start and concurrency volume.
- Leave the source-CIDR restriction unset, since serverless egress IPs are dynamic.
- If the vault has an IP allowlist, make sure it permits the platform's egress or leave it off. Enrollment enforces the allowlist.
- Set a name pattern on the token (for example
vercel-{uuid8}) so each cold-start machine gets a clean, unique name in the dashboard instead of all sharing one hostname. A name pattern takes precedence over anynamethe SDK sends.{uuidN}inserts N random characters (4 to 32, default 8);{uuid}inserts 8.
Each live ephemeral machine counts against your plan's machine limit until it expires and is cleaned up, so size your plan for your expected concurrency.
Requires a Node.js runtime with outbound HTTPS. Edge runtimes, which lack Node's crypto and fs, are not supported yet.
const apiKey = await sk.getSecret('sk_stripe_prod')const fields = await sk.getFields('sk_db_prod')
const host = fields.host // "db.example.com"
const password = fields.password // "hunter2"Throws SecretStructureError if the secret value is not a JSON object.
const password = await sk.getField('sk_db_prod', 'password')Throws FieldNotFoundError if the field doesn't exist. The error message includes the available field names.
// All secrets this machine can access
const secrets = await sk.listSecrets()
for (const s of secrets) {
console.log(`${s.id}: ${s.name}`)
}
// Secrets in a specific project
const projectSecrets = await sk.listSecretsByProject('proj_production')Each SecretListItem has id, name, fieldNames (null for single-value), and projectId.
Export all accessible secrets as a flat key-value map in a single round trip:
const env = await sk.export()
// { API_KEY: "sk-live-...", DB_CREDS_HOST: "db.example.com", DB_CREDS_PASSWORD: "s3cret" }
// Scoped to a project
const env = await sk.export('proj_production')Secret names are converted to uppercase env format. Structured secrets are flattened: SECRET_NAME_FIELD_NAME.
Watch secrets for real-time updates. When a secret is rotated, updated, or deleted, the callback fires with the new value. Polling uses setInterval on Node's event loop - your application is never blocked.
sk.watch('sk_db_password', (event) => {
switch (event.status) {
case 'changed':
console.log(`New value: ${event.value}`)
// Structured secrets include parsed fields
console.log(`Fields:`, event.fields)
break
case 'deleted':
console.log('Secret was deleted')
break
case 'access_denied':
console.log('Access revoked')
break
case 'error':
console.log(`Error: ${event.error}`)
break
}
})// Auto-rotate database credentials
sk.watch('sk_db_credentials', (event) => {
if (event.status === 'changed') {
db.reconfigure({
username: event.fields!.username,
password: event.fields!.password,
})
}
})The default poll interval is 15 seconds. The server enforces a minimum of 10 seconds.
sk.setPollInterval(30) // seconds// Stop watching a specific secret
sk.unwatch('sk_db_password')
// Stop all watches and shut down polling
sk.close()const prod = SikkerKey.create('vault_a1b2c3')
const staging = SikkerKey.create('vault_x9y8z7')
const prodKey = await prod.getSecret('sk_api_key')
const stagingKey = await staging.getSecret('sk_api_key')const vaults = SikkerKey.listVaults()
// ["vault_a1b2c3", "vault_x9y8z7"]sk.machineId // "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
sk.machineName // "api-server-1"
sk.vaultId // "vault_abc123"
sk.apiUrl // "https://api.sikkerkey.com"The SDK uses typed exceptions for every error case:
import { SikkerKey, NotFoundError, AccessDeniedError, AuthenticationError } from '@sikkerkey/sdk'
try {
const secret = await sk.getSecret('sk_nonexistent')
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof NotFoundError) {
// Secret doesn't exist
} else if (e instanceof AccessDeniedError) {
// Machine not approved or no grant
} else if (e instanceof AuthenticationError) {
// Invalid signature or unknown machine
}
}SikkerKeyError
├── ConfigurationError — identity file missing, bad key, invalid config
├── SecretStructureError — secret is not a JSON object (getFields/getField)
├── FieldNotFoundError — field not in structured secret
└── ApiError — HTTP error from the API
├── AuthenticationError — 401
├── AccessDeniedError — 403
├── NotFoundError — 404
├── ConflictError — 409
├── RateLimitedError — 429
└── ServerSealedError — 503
ApiError has a httpStatus property with the HTTP status code.
The SDK resolves the identity file in this order:
- Explicit path — starts with
/or containsidentity.json - Vault ID — looks up
~/.sikkerkey/vaults/{vaultId}/identity.json SIKKERKEY_IDENTITYenv — path to identity file- Auto-detect — single vault on disk
The vault_ prefix is added automatically if not present.
| Variable | Description |
|---|---|
SIKKERKEY_IDENTITY |
Path to identity.json — overrides vault lookup |
SIKKERKEY_HOME |
Base config directory (default: ~/.sikkerkey) |
429 (rate limited) and 503 (server sealed) responses are retried up to 3 times with exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s). Each retry uses a fresh timestamp and nonce. Network errors are also retried.
Every request includes Ed25519-signed headers:
X-Machine-Id— machine UUIDX-Timestamp— Unix timestampX-Nonce— random base64 nonce (replay protection)X-Signature— signature ofmethod:path:timestamp:nonce:bodyHash
HTTPS is enforced for all non-localhost connections. 15-second request timeout.
| Method | Returns | Description |
|---|---|---|
SikkerKey.create(vaultOrPath?) |
SikkerKey |
Create client from disk identity (sync) |
SikkerKey.bootstrap(vaultId, token, options?) |
SikkerKeyBootstrap |
Memory-only serverless bootstrap (static); await .inMemory() returns a ready client |
SikkerKey.listVaults() |
string[] |
List registered vault IDs (static) |
getSecret(secretId) |
Promise<string> |
Read a secret value |
getFields(secretId) |
Promise<Record<string, string>> |
Read structured secret |
getField(secretId, field) |
Promise<string> |
Read single field |
listSecrets() |
Promise<SecretListItem[]> |
List all accessible secrets |
listSecretsByProject(projectId) |
Promise<SecretListItem[]> |
List secrets in a project |
export(projectId?) |
Promise<Record<string, string>> |
Export as env map |
watch(secretId, callback) |
void |
Watch a secret for changes |
unwatch(secretId) |
void |
Stop watching a secret |
setPollInterval(seconds) |
void |
Set poll interval (min 10s) |
close() |
void |
Stop all watches, shut down polling |
None. Uses Node.js built-ins only: crypto, fs, path, http, https.
MIT - see LICENSE for details.