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Security: Deln0r/willow-go

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

willow-go is pre-MVP (v0.1.0). Security fixes are applied to the latest tagged release on main. Older minor versions are not patched.

Version Supported
0.1.x yes
< 0.1 no

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you find a security issue, please report it privately rather than opening a public GitHub issue.

Email: ian00chechin@gmail.com

Please include:

  • A description of the issue and its impact
  • Steps to reproduce, or a minimal proof-of-concept
  • The affected version (or commit hash)
  • Any suggested mitigation, if known

I aim to acknowledge reports within 5 working days and provide an initial assessment within 14 days. Coordinated disclosure timelines are negotiated case by case; the default window is 90 days from initial report to public advisory.

Scope

In scope:

  • Encoding and decoding of Willow data-model types (Path, Entry, Range3d, Area), including the CompactU64 codec and absolute / relative path encodings
  • Meadowcap capability verification: communal capability delegation chains, Ed25519 handover signatures, AuthorisedEntry validation
  • WILLIAM3 payload digest (BLAKE3 compression function with a substituted IV) determinism and length-prefix handling
  • Attacker-supplied input to any decoder that could cause panic, out-of-bounds read, infinite loop, or unbounded memory growth (the upstream willow_test_vectors negative-test corpus already exercises this surface; new attack patterns outside that corpus are explicitly welcome)
  • gomobile-bound bindings (iOS, Android) where Go-side behaviour creates a vulnerability surfaced to the host application

Out of scope:

  • Vulnerabilities in dependencies. willow-go currently has one direct dependency (golang.org/x/mobile) plus stdlib-adjacent indirects (golang.org/x/mod, golang.org/x/sync, golang.org/x/tools). Please report advisories for those upstream to the Go team.
  • Confidential Sync (the layer formerly called WGPS), persistent store backend, owned and read capabilities, transport encryption. These are Phase 2 and not yet shipped; see TECH_DEBT.md. Reports against unshipped code are tracked as design feedback rather than as security advisories.
  • Issues that require a non-default, intentionally insecure configuration

Acknowledgements

Reporters will be credited in the release notes for the fix, unless anonymity is requested.

There aren't any published security advisories