| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
0.0.x pre-alpha |
Best-effort (development) |
0.1.x alpha/beta |
Planned |
1.0.x |
Planned after RC |
Do not open a public GitHub issue for security-sensitive reports.
- Email or contact the repository maintainer privately.
- Include steps to reproduce, impact assessment, and affected version/commit.
- Allow reasonable time for a fix before public disclosure.
- Input Ingress boundaries: JSON-only agent I/O with rigid Pydantic validation (
extra="forbid"). - Execution isolation: No shell environments spawned (
shell=Truestrictly forbidden); file access is strictly normalized and resolved against allowlisted roots (Phase 1.4). - Write Hardening: Securing file modification through recursive parent symlink/junction audits, strict normalization checks, static integrity denylists, minimum disk space guards (100MB), and folder storage quotas (50MB) (Phase 1.5).
- Session Isolation & Ephemeral Scratchpads (Phase 1.6):
- Connects to SQLite backing database utilizing high timeout settings (
30.0s) and secure WAL configurations to mitigate lock contentions. - Automates active session capacities (< 50 concurrent active session quota) to prevent handshake flooding DoS attacks.
- Dynamically allowlists session-isolated scratchpads, locking permissions using POSIX
0o700flags. - Employs transactional garbage collection (purging DB metadata first inside a transaction to claim ownership) preventing concurrent TOCTOU file deletion races.
- Connects to SQLite backing database utilizing high timeout settings (
- Output Masking: Double-layered regex filters (secrets, AWS keys, GitHub tokens, credentials, PII) and XML CDATA wrap-enveloping to prevent downstream second-order prompt injections.
- CI Pipelines: Automated Ruff, strict MyPy, bandit, pip-audit, and dual-OS (Ubuntu + Windows) pytest runs.
See docs/security/ for trust boundaries and detailed threat models.