diff --git a/templates/attestation-policy.yaml b/templates/attestation-policy.yaml
index 6219e6c..acd38b2 100644
--- a/templates/attestation-policy.yaml
+++ b/templates/attestation-policy.yaml
@@ -10,85 +10,309 @@ data:
     package policy
 
     import rego.v1
+
+    # This policy validates multiple TEE platforms
+    # The policy is meant to capture the TCB requirements
+    # for confidential containers.
+
+    # This policy is used to generate an EAR Appraisal.
+    # Specifically it generates an AR4SI result.
+    # More information on AR4SI can be found at
+    # <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-ar4si/>
+
+    # For the `executables` trust claim, the value 33 stands for
+    # "Runtime memory includes executables, scripts, files, and/or
+    #  objects which are not recognized."
     default executables := 33
+
+    # For the `hardware` trust claim, the value 97 stands for
+    # "A Verifier does not recognize an Attester's hardware or
+    #  firmware, but it should be recognized."
     default hardware := 97
+
+    # For the `configuration` trust claim the value 36 stands for
+    # "Elements of the configuration relevant to security are
+    #  unavailable to the Verifier."
     default configuration := 36
 
+    # For the `filesystem` trust claim, the value 0 stands for
+    # "No assertion."
+    default file_system := 0
+
+    # For the `instance_identity` trust claim, the value 0 stands for
+    # "No assertion."
+    default instance_identity := 0
+
+    # For the `runtime_opaque` trust claim, the value 0 stands for
+    # "No assertion."
+    default runtime_opaque := 0
+
+    # For the `storage_opaque` trust claim, the value 0 stands for
+    # "No assertion."
+    default storage_opaque := 0
+
+    # For the `sourced_data` trust claim, the value 0 stands for
+    # "No assertion."
+    default sourced_data := 0
+
     trust_claims := {
       "executables": executables,
       "hardware": hardware,
       "configuration": configuration,
+      "file-system": file_system,
+      "instance-identity": instance_identity,
+      "runtime-opaque": runtime_opaque,
+      "storage-opaque": storage_opaque,
+      "sourced-data": sourced_data,
     }
 
+    extensions := [
+      {"name": "ear.trustee.identifiers",
+        "key": -18,
+        "value": {
+          "validated": validated_identifiers
+        }
+      }
+    ]
+
+    # Validated identifiers are information that describes a workload
+    # that are bound to the hardware evidence via attestation
+    # and bound to the workload by the guest runtime.
+    validated_identifiers := object.union_n([
+        container_images_id,
+        container_uids_id,
+    ])
+
+    # Use list comprehension to parse all of the images specified in the policy.
+    container_images := [img |
+        container := input["init_data_claims"]["agent_policy_claims"]["containers"][_]
+        img := container["OCI"]["Annotations"]["io.kubernetes.cri.image-name"]
+    ]
+
+    container_images_id := {"container_images": container_images} if {
+        count(container_images) > 0
+    } else := {}
+
+    # UIDs
+    container_uids := [uid |
+        container := input["init_data_claims"]["agent_policy_claims"]["containers"][_]
+        uid := container["OCI"]["Process"]["User"]["UID"]
+    ]
+
+    container_uids_id := {"container_uids": container_uids} if {
+        count(container_uids) > 0
+    } else := {}
+
     ##### Azure vTPM SNP
     executables := 3 if {
-      input["az-snp-vtpm"].tpm.pcr03 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr03")
-      input["az-snp-vtpm"].tpm.pcr08 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr08")
-      input["az-snp-vtpm"].tpm.pcr09 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr09")
-      input["az-snp-vtpm"].tpm.pcr11 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr11")
-      input["az-snp-vtpm"].tpm.pcr12 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr12")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"]
+
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].measurement in query_reference_value("measurement")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].tpm.pcr03 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr03")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].tpm.pcr08 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr08")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].tpm.pcr09 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr09")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].tpm.pcr11 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr11")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].tpm.pcr12 in query_reference_value("snp_pcr12")
     }
 
     hardware := 2 if {
-      input["az-snp-vtpm"]
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"]
+
+      # Check the reported TCB to validate the ASP FW
+      count(query_reference_value("tcb_bootloader")) > 0
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].reported_tcb_bootloader in query_reference_value("tcb_bootloader")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].reported_tcb_microcode in query_reference_value("tcb_microcode")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].reported_tcb_snp in query_reference_value("tcb_snp")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].reported_tcb_tee in query_reference_value("tcb_tee")
+    }
+
+    # Fallback: TCB reference values not collected for Azure yet
+    else := 3 if {
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"]
     }
 
+    # For the 'configuration' trust claim 2 stands for
+    # "The configuration is a known and approved config."
+    #
+    # For this, we compare all the configuration fields.
     configuration := 2 if {
-      input["az-snp-vtpm"]
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"]
+
+      count(query_reference_value("smt_enabled")) > 0
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].platform_smt_enabled in query_reference_value("smt_enabled")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].platform_tsme_enabled in query_reference_value("tsme_enabled")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].policy_abi_major in query_reference_value("abi_major")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].policy_abi_minor in query_reference_value("abi_minor")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].policy_single_socket in query_reference_value("single_socket")
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"].policy_smt_allowed in query_reference_value("smt_allowed")
+    }
+
+    # Fallback: configuration reference values not available
+    else := 3 if {
+      input["az_snp_vtpm"]
     }
 
     ##### Azure vTPM TDX
     executables := 3 if {
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"].tpm.pcr03 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr03")
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"].tpm.pcr08 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr08")
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"].tpm.pcr09 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr09")
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"].tpm.pcr11 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr11")
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"].tpm.pcr12 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr12")
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"]
+
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].tpm.pcr03 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr03")
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].tpm.pcr08 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr08")
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].tpm.pcr09 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr09")
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].tpm.pcr11 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr11")
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].tpm.pcr12 in query_reference_value("tdx_pcr12")
     }
 
     hardware := 2 if {
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"].quote.header.tee_type == "81000000"
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"].quote.header.vendor_id == "939a7233f79c4ca9940a0db3957f0607"
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"]
+
+      # Check the quote is a TDX quote signed by Intel SGX Quoting Enclave
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].quote.header.tee_type == "81000000"
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].quote.header.vendor_id == "939a7233f79c4ca9940a0db3957f0607"
+
+      # Check OVMF code hash
+      count(query_reference_value("mr_td")) > 0
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].quote.body.mr_td in query_reference_value("mr_td")
+
+      # Check TCB status (covers quote.body.tcb_svn claim check)
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].tcb_status == "UpToDate"
+    }
+
+    # Fallback: mr_td reference values not collected for Azure yet
+    else := 3 if {
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"]
+
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].quote.header.tee_type == "81000000"
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].quote.header.vendor_id == "939a7233f79c4ca9940a0db3957f0607"
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].tcb_status == "UpToDate"
     }
 
     configuration := 2 if {
-      input["az-tdx-vtpm"]
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"]
+
+      count(query_reference_value("xfam")) > 0
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"].quote.body.xfam in query_reference_value("xfam")
+    }
+
+    # Fallback: xfam reference values not available
+    else := 3 if {
+      input["az_tdx_vtpm"]
     }
 
-    ##### Baremetal TDX
+    ##### Bare Metal TDX
+    # CoCo pattern extension: uses init_data for runtime config verification
     executables := 3 if {
       input["tdx"]
+
+      # Check the kernel, initrd, and cmdline (including dmverity parameters) measurements
+      input["tdx"].quote.body.rtmr_1 in query_reference_value("rtmr_1")
+      input["tdx"].quote.body.rtmr_2 in query_reference_value("rtmr_2")
+
+      # CoCo pattern: init_data check (runtime configuration hash)
       input.init_data in query_reference_value("init_data")
     }
-    hardware := 2 if { input["tdx"] }
-    configuration := 2 if { input["tdx"] }
 
-    ##### Baremetal SNP
-    executables := 3 if {
-      input["snp"]
+    # Support for deployments without rtmr_2 reference values
+    else := 4 if {
+      input["tdx"]
+
+      # Check the kernel, initrd measurements
+      input["tdx"].quote.body.rtmr_1 in query_reference_value("rtmr_1")
+
+      # CoCo pattern: init_data check (runtime configuration hash)
       input.init_data in query_reference_value("init_data")
     }
-    hardware := 2 if { input["snp"] }
-    configuration := 2 if { input["snp"] }
-    {{- if .Values.kbs.gpu.enabled }}
 
-    ##### GPU Attestation (NVIDIA H100/H200) — CPU-class evidence with GPU data
     hardware := 2 if {
-      input["snp"]
-      input["gpu"]
+      input["tdx"]
+
+      # Check the quote is a TDX quote signed by Intel SGX Quoting Enclave
+      input["tdx"].quote.header.tee_type == "81000000"
+      input["tdx"].quote.header.vendor_id == "939a7233f79c4ca9940a0db3957f0607"
+
+      # Check OVMF code hash
+      input["tdx"].quote.body.mr_td in query_reference_value("mr_td")
+
+      # Check TCB status (covers quote.body.tcb_svn claim check)
+      input["tdx"].tcb_status == "UpToDate"
+
+      # Check collateral expiration status
+      input["tdx"].collateral_expiration_status == "0"
+    }
+
+    configuration := 2 if {
+      input["tdx"]
+
+      # Check the TD has the expected attributes (e.g., debug not enabled) and features.
+      input["tdx"].quote.body.td_attributes.debug == false
+      input["tdx"].quote.body.xfam in query_reference_value("xfam")
+    }
+
+    # Fallback: enforce debug disabled even without xfam reference values
+    else := 3 if {
+      input["tdx"]
+
+      input["tdx"].quote.body.td_attributes.debug == false
+
+      # CoCo pattern: init_data check (runtime configuration hash)
+      input.init_data in query_reference_value("init_data")
     }
 
+    ##### Bare Metal SNP
+    # CoCo pattern extension: uses init_data for runtime config verification
     executables := 3 if {
       input["snp"]
-      input["gpu"]
+
+      # Check the launch measurement
+      input["snp"].measurement in query_reference_value("snp_launch_measurement")
+
+      # CoCo pattern: init_data check (runtime configuration hash)
       input.init_data in query_reference_value("init_data")
     }
 
+    hardware := 2 if {
+      input["snp"]
+
+      # Check the reported TCB to validate the ASP FW
+      input["snp"].reported_tcb_bootloader in query_reference_value("snp_bootloader")
+      input["snp"].reported_tcb_microcode in query_reference_value("snp_microcode")
+      input["snp"].reported_tcb_snp in query_reference_value("snp_snp_svn")
+      input["snp"].reported_tcb_tee in query_reference_value("snp_tee_svn")
+    }
+
+    # For the 'configuration' trust claim 2 stands for
+    # "The configuration is a known and approved config."
+    #
+    # For this, we compare all the configuration fields.
     configuration := 2 if {
       input["snp"]
-      input["gpu"]
+
+      input["snp"].policy_debug_allowed == false
+      input["snp"].policy_migrate_ma == false
+      input["snp"].platform_smt_enabled == query_reference_value("snp_smt_enabled")
+      input["snp"].platform_tsme_enabled == query_reference_value("snp_tsme_enabled")
+      input["snp"].policy_abi_major == query_reference_value("snp_guest_abi_major")
+      input["snp"].policy_abi_minor == query_reference_value("snp_guest_abi_minor")
+      input["snp"].policy_single_socket == query_reference_value("snp_single_socket")
+      input["snp"].policy_smt_allowed == query_reference_value("snp_smt_allowed")
+    }
+
+    # For the `configuration` trust claim 3 stands for
+    # "The configuration includes or exposes no known
+    #  vulnerabilities."
+    #
+    # In this check, we do not specifically check every
+    # configuration value, but we make sure that some key
+    # configurations (like debug_allowed) are set correctly.
+    else := 3 if {
+      input["snp"]
+
+      input["snp"].policy_debug_allowed == false
+      input["snp"].policy_migrate_ma == false
+
+      # CoCo pattern: init_data check (runtime configuration hash)
+      input.init_data in query_reference_value("init_data")
     }
-    {{- end }}
 {{- if .Values.kbs.gpu.enabled }}
   default_gpu.rego: |
     package policy
@@ -98,33 +322,102 @@ data:
     default hardware := 97
     default executables := 33
     default configuration := 36
+    default file_system := 0
+    default instance_identity := 0
+    default runtime_opaque := 0
+    default storage_opaque := 0
+    default sourced_data := 0
 
     trust_claims := {
       "executables": executables,
       "hardware": hardware,
       "configuration": configuration,
+      "file-system": file_system,
+      "instance-identity": instance_identity,
+      "runtime-opaque": runtime_opaque,
+      "storage-opaque": storage_opaque,
+      "sourced-data": sourced_data,
     }
 
+    extensions := [
+      {"name": "ear.trustee.identifiers",
+        "key": -18,
+        "value": {
+          "validated": validated_identifiers
+        }
+      }
+    ]
+
+    # Validated identifiers are information that describes a workload
+    # that are bound to the hardware evidence via attestation
+    # and bound to the workload by the guest runtime.
+    validated_identifiers := object.union_n([
+        container_images_id,
+        container_uids_id,
+    ])
+
+    # Use list comprehension to parse all of the images specified in the policy.
+    container_images := [img |
+        container := input["init_data_claims"]["agent_policy_claims"]["containers"][_]
+        img := container["OCI"]["Annotations"]["io.kubernetes.cri.image-name"]
+    ]
+
+    container_images_id := {"container_images": container_images} if {
+        count(container_images) > 0
+    } else := {}
+
+    # UIDs
+    container_uids := [uid |
+        container := input["init_data_claims"]["agent_policy_claims"]["containers"][_]
+        uid := container["OCI"]["Process"]["User"]["UID"]
+    ]
+
+    container_uids_id := {"container_uids": container_uids} if {
+        count(container_uids) > 0
+    } else := {}
+
+    # GPUs verified by NRAS
     hardware := 2 if {
-      input.nvidia
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-cert-chain"]["x-nvidia-cert-status"] == "valid"
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-parsed"]
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-signature-verified"]
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-arch-check"]
+      input["nvidia"]
+
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-cert-chain"]["x-nvidia-cert-ocsp-status"] == "good"
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-cert-chain"]["x-nvidia-cert-status"] == "valid"
+
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-cert-chain-fwid-match"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-parsed"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-attestation-report-signature-verified"]
+
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-arch-check"]
     }
 
     configuration := 2 if {
-      input.nvidia.secboot
-      input.nvidia.dbgstat == "disabled"
+      input["nvidia"].secboot
+      input["nvidia"].dbgstat == "disabled"
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-version"] in query_reference_value("allowed_vbios_versions")
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-version"] in query_reference_value("allowed_driver_versions")
+    }
+
+    else := 3 if {
+      input["nvidia"].secboot
+      input["nvidia"].dbgstat == "disabled"
     }
 
     executables := 3 if {
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-fetched"]
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-schema-validated"]
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-signature-verified"]
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-fetched"]
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-schema-validated"]
-      input.nvidia["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-signature-verified"]
-      input.nvidia.measres == "success"
-    }
-{{- end }}
\ No newline at end of file
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-cert-chain"]["x-nvidia-cert-ocsp-status"] == "good"
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-cert-chain"]["x-nvidia-cert-status"] == "valid"
+
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-fetched"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-measurements-available"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-schema-validated"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-signature-verified"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-driver-rim-version-match"]
+
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-fetched"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-measurements-available"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-schema-validated"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-signature-verified"]
+      input["nvidia"]["x-nvidia-gpu-vbios-rim-version-match"]
+
+      input["nvidia"].measres == "success"
+    }
+{{- end }}
diff --git a/templates/resource-policy.yaml b/templates/resource-policy.yaml
index 47c7f2a..3c2b583 100644
--- a/templates/resource-policy.yaml
+++ b/templates/resource-policy.yaml
@@ -11,14 +11,41 @@ data:
     import rego.v1
 
     default allow = false
+    default hardware_failing = false
 
     allow if {
-        not any_not_affirming
         count(input.submods) > 0
+        not executable_failing
+        not configuration_failing
+        not hardware_failing
+    }
 
+    executable_failing if {
+        some _, submod in input.submods
+        executables := submod["ear.trustworthiness-vector"]["executables"]
+        not in_affirming_range(executables)
     }
 
-    any_not_affirming if {
+    configuration_failing if {
         some _, submod in input.submods
-        submod["ear.status"] != "affirming"
+        configuration := submod["ear.trustworthiness-vector"]["configuration"]
+        not in_affirming_range(configuration)
+    }
+
+    # Hardware trust claims are enforced by default. For TDX, no additional
+    # RVPS values are needed. For SNP, you must provide hardware-specific
+    # RVPS values (tcb_bootloader, tcb_microcode, tcb_snp, tcb_tee) from
+    # your environment. If these values are not available, you can disable
+    # hardware enforcement by setting kbs.resourcePolicy.enforceHardware: false
+{{- if .Values.kbs.resourcePolicy.enforceHardware }}
+    hardware_failing if {
+       some _, submod in input.submods
+       hardware := submod["ear.trustworthiness-vector"]["hardware"]
+       not in_affirming_range(hardware)
+    }
+{{- end }}
+
+    in_affirming_range(val) if {
+        val >= 2
+        val <= 31
     }
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/values.yaml b/values.yaml
index bb40e6c..e6d06be 100644
--- a/values.yaml
+++ b/values.yaml
@@ -77,6 +77,15 @@ kbs:
     # See docs/firmware-reference-values.md in coco-pattern for collection workflow
     enabled: false
 
+  # Resource policy configuration
+  resourcePolicy:
+    # Enforce hardware trust claims in resource policy
+    # When true: requires hardware claim >= 2 (affirming range)
+    # When false: allows resource access even if hardware claim fails
+    # Note: For SNP, hardware enforcement requires TCB reference values
+    # (tcb_bootloader, tcb_microcode, tcb_snp, tcb_tee) in RVPS
+    enforceHardware: true
+
 # Attestation token certificate configuration
 # Used when secretStore.backend is "none" (cert-manager generates certs)
 attestation: