diff --git a/.project/chat-bridge-plan.md b/.project/chat-bridge-plan.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d192ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/.project/chat-bridge-plan.md @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +# Chat Bridge Plan + +## Problem + +CodeCome currently launches OpenCode through `opencode run --format json` and renders its event stream in `tools/run-agent.py`. + +The current Textual chat prototype has two blockers: + +1. `opencode run --port` does not expose a usable HTTP server for the non-attach `run` path, so direct HTTP `POST /session/{id}/message` fails with `Connection refused`. +2. Falling back to launching a fresh `opencode run` for every chat message would make the chat path too slow. + +There are also two UI issues: + +1. The initial `Starting interactive chat harness` message appears too late because chat startup currently blocks on model-resolution and probe work before printing it. +2. `Ctrl+C` should open a confirmation modal instead of silently failing or requiring the command palette. + +## Findings + +Upstream `opencode` source confirms that plain `opencode run` does not start a network listener in the non-attach path. + +In `packages/opencode/src/cli/cmd/run.ts`, the non-attach execution path builds an SDK client with: + +- `baseUrl: "http://opencode.internal"` +- a custom in-process `fetch` that calls `Server.Default().app.fetch(request)` + +This means: + +- the normal `run` path talks to OpenCode in-process, +- `args.port` is not consumed there, +- the HTTP routes like `/session/{sessionID}/message` and `/tui/append-prompt` exist on the server HTTP API, but are not exposed by the plain `run` path. + +The upstream plugin API exposes: + +- `client` +- `serverUrl` +- hooks such as `chat.message` + +The SDK client supports low-latency session prompting through `client.session.prompt(...)`. + +## Solution + +Implement a local plugin-backed chat bridge that keeps the existing `opencode run --format json` launch model, but gives the Textual UI a low-latency way to inject new user prompts into the active session. + +### Bridge Architecture + +1. Add a new local OpenCode plugin under `.opencode/plugins/`. +2. When loaded, the plugin starts a tiny localhost bridge server bound to `127.0.0.1` on a random port. +3. The plugin generates a random auth token. +4. The plugin emits a JSON line to stdout announcing readiness, for example: + - `type: "chat.bridge.ready"` + - `properties.port` + - `properties.token` +5. `tools/run-agent.py` captures that event and stores the bridge connection info. +6. The Textual chat input sends messages to that bridge over localhost HTTP. +7. The plugin receives the request and calls `client.session.prompt(...)` against the active session. +8. OpenCode continues emitting its normal JSON event stream to stdout, so the existing renderer path remains the source of truth for the upper panel. + +This avoids: + +- switching the main launcher to `opencode serve`, +- spawning a full extra `opencode run` per chat message, +- adding polling hacks or a second event protocol. + +### Session Handling + +Support only one active session at a time. + +The bridge should maintain a single active `sessionID`, learned from `run-agent.py` as soon as the main JSON stream exposes it. + +Recommended behavior: + +1. `run-agent.py` learns the current `sessionID` from streamed events. +2. `run-agent.py` sends that `sessionID` to the plugin bridge once it is known, or includes it in the first `/message` request. +3. The plugin stores it as the only accepted active session. +4. Any attempt to prompt a different session should fail fast. + +This keeps the bridge state simple and matches the current Textual UI model. + +### Transport + +Use localhost HTTP on `127.0.0.1` with a random token. + +Reasoning: + +- simpler to implement than Unix sockets, +- easy for Python `urllib` or `http.client`, +- acceptable for now when bound to loopback and protected by a random token. + +Suggested request: + +- `POST /message` +- header: `Authorization: Bearer ` +- body: + - `text` + +Suggested optional request: + +- `POST /session` +- header: `Authorization: Bearer ` +- body: + - `sessionID` + +Suggested response: + +- `{"ok": true}` or structured error JSON + +### Plugin Responsibilities + +The plugin should: + +1. Start the bridge server at initialization. +2. Emit `chat.bridge.ready` once listening. +3. Accept authenticated POST requests. +4. Track exactly one active session. +5. Call `client.session.prompt({ path: { id: sessionID }, body: { parts: [{ type: "text", text }] } })`. +6. Return success or failure quickly. +7. Close the bridge server during shutdown if possible. + +If bridge submission fails, the plugin should emit a stdout event such as `chat.bridge.error` with a human-readable message so `run-agent.py` can surface it in the upper panel. + +## Textual UI Changes + +### Startup Feedback + +Move the `Starting interactive chat harness` message to immediately after console creation and before model-resolution and runtime-probe work. + +This ensures the user sees feedback instantly on `make chat`. + +### Ctrl+C Confirm Modal + +Override `ctrl+c` in the Textual app. + +Add a `ModalScreen` with: + +- message: `Are you sure you want to quit?` +- buttons: + - `Quit` + - `Cancel` + +If confirmed: + +- terminate the main `opencode` process group, +- exit the TUI cleanly. + +### Layout + +Keep the current fix that removes bottom docking from the chat input so the footer does not overlap it. + +## `run-agent.py` Integration Plan + +1. Extend chat-mode startup to wait for `chat.bridge.ready`. +2. Store: + - `bridge_port` + - `bridge_token` +3. Track one active `sessionID` from the main JSON stream. +4. On chat submit: + - reject submission if bridge is not ready, + - reject submission if active `sessionID` is not known yet, + - POST to the local bridge with the message text, + - do not spawn a separate `opencode run`. +5. Keep all upper-panel rendering driven exclusively by the original JSON stdout stream. +6. Render bridge failures in the upper panel until a better UX exists. +7. Add quit-confirm modal and process cleanup. + +## Suggested New Files + +- `.opencode/plugins/chat-bridge.ts` +- `.project/chat-bridge-plan.md` + +## Validation Plan + +1. Run `make chat`. +2. Confirm the startup message appears immediately. +3. Confirm the TUI opens with no footer/input overlap. +4. Confirm the plugin emits `chat.bridge.ready`. +5. Confirm the bridge learns exactly one active session. +6. Type a prompt in the lower panel. +7. Confirm: + - no `Connection refused`, + - no extra `opencode run` spawn, + - low-latency model response, + - upper panel receives standard JSON-rendered output. +8. Trigger a bridge failure and confirm it appears in the upper panel. +9. Press `Ctrl+C`. +10. Confirm the quit modal appears. +11. Confirm quitting tears down the process cleanly. + +## Decisions + +1. Support only one active session at a time. +2. Show bridge failures on the upper panel until a better UX exists. +3. Use localhost transport for now. diff --git a/.project/e2e-testing-plan.md b/.project/e2e-testing-plan.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fd2402 --- /dev/null +++ b/.project/e2e-testing-plan.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +# E2E Testing Plan with Docker & aimock + +## 1. Provider Configuration (`opencode.json`) +Add the local Docker mock server to `opencode.json`. +```json + "provider": { + "aimock": { + "type": "openai", + "baseURL": "http://127.0.0.1:4010/v1", + "apiKey": "mocked-key" + } + } +``` + +## 2. Makefile Fix (`CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER=0` bug) +Fix the Makefile so that `OPENCODE_ARGS` are passed down when the wrapper is bypassed. +```makefile +# Before +opencode run --agent recon "$$(cat prompts/phase-1-recon.md)"; +# After +opencode run $$OPENCODE_ARGS --agent recon "$$(cat prompts/phase-1-recon.md)"; +``` + +## 3. Makefile E2E Targets +Add targets to orchestrate the mock server and test executions: + +* `e2e-server-start`: Runs `aimock` in standard replay mode using the CopilotKit Docker image. +* `e2e-server-stop`: Stops and removes the `aimock` container. +* `e2e-record`: Starts `aimock` in record mode, pointing to a configurable upstream (default OpenRouter), runs the target phases forcing JSON output, and saves the baseline. +* `test-e2e`: Resets the workspace, starts `aimock` in replay mode, and executes the Python verification script. + +## 4. Verification Script (`tools/test-e2e.py`) +Creates a script that: +* Invokes the test run via `CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER=0 OPENCODE_ARGS="--format json" CODECOME_MODEL=aimock/$(MODEL) make phase-X`. +* Captures live stdout (JSON sequence) and compares the agent events (`agent_message`, `tool_call`, `tool_response`) with the recorded baseline. +* Asserts file artifacts (`itemdb/notes/*.md`, `itemdb/findings/**/*.md`) match the deterministic outputs exactly. diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 2278c32..f6eb802 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ venv-check: phase-1: venv-check @$(PYTHON) tools/gate-check.py 1 @if [ "$$CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER" = "0" ]; then \ - opencode run --agent recon "$$(cat prompts/phase-1-recon.md)"; \ + opencode run $$OPENCODE_ARGS --agent recon "$$(cat prompts/phase-1-recon.md)"; \ else \ $(PYTHON) tools/run-agent.py --phase 1 --label "Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap" --agent recon --prompt-file prompts/phase-1-recon.md; \ fi @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ phase-2: venv-check printf "Or override (not recommended): CODECOME_ALLOW_NO_SANDBOX=1 make phase-2\n\n" ; \ exit 1 ) @if [ "$$CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER" = "0" ]; then \ - opencode run --agent auditor "$$(cat prompts/phase-2-audit.md)"; \ + opencode run $$OPENCODE_ARGS --agent auditor "$$(cat prompts/phase-2-audit.md)"; \ else \ $(PYTHON) tools/run-agent.py --phase 2 --label "Hypothesis Generation" --agent auditor --prompt-file prompts/phase-2-audit.md; \ fi @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ phase-2: venv-check phase-3: venv-check @$(PYTHON) tools/gate-check.py 3 @if [ "$$CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER" = "0" ]; then \ - opencode run --agent reviewer "$$(cat prompts/phase-3-review.md)"; \ + opencode run $$OPENCODE_ARGS --agent reviewer "$$(cat prompts/phase-3-review.md)"; \ else \ $(PYTHON) tools/run-agent.py --phase 3 --label "Counter-analysis" --agent reviewer --prompt-file prompts/phase-3-review.md; \ fi @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ phase-4: venv-check @test -n "$(FINDING)" || (printf "\n$(BOLD)$(RED)[FAIL]$(RESET) Missing required FINDING argument for Phase 4 (Validation).\n\nSpecify which finding you want to validate:\n\n $(BOLD)make phase-4 FINDING=CC-0001$(RESET)\n\nTo list available pending findings: $(BOLD)make findings STATUS=PENDING$(RESET)\n\n" && exit 1) @$(PYTHON) tools/gate-check.py 4 $(FINDING) @if [ "$$CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER" = "0" ]; then \ - opencode run --agent validator "$$(sed 's#FINDING_PATH_OR_ID#$(FINDING)#g' prompts/phase-4-validate.md)"; \ + opencode run $$OPENCODE_ARGS --agent validator "$$(sed 's#FINDING_PATH_OR_ID#$(FINDING)#g' prompts/phase-4-validate.md)"; \ else \ $(PYTHON) tools/run-agent.py --phase 4 --label "Validation" --agent validator --prompt-file prompts/phase-4-validate.md --finding "$(FINDING)"; \ fi @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ phase-5: venv-check @test -n "$(FINDING)" || (printf "\n$(BOLD)$(RED)[FAIL]$(RESET) Missing required FINDING argument for Phase 5 (Exploitation).\n\nSpecify which finding you want to exploit:\n\n $(BOLD)make phase-5 FINDING=CC-0001$(RESET)\n\nTo list available confirmed findings: $(BOLD)make findings STATUS=CONFIRMED$(RESET)\n\n" && exit 1) @$(PYTHON) tools/gate-check.py 5 $(FINDING) @if [ "$$CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER" = "0" ]; then \ - opencode run --agent exploiter "$$(sed 's#FINDING_PATH_OR_ID#$(FINDING)#g' prompts/phase-5-exploit.md)"; \ + opencode run $$OPENCODE_ARGS --agent exploiter "$$(sed 's#FINDING_PATH_OR_ID#$(FINDING)#g' prompts/phase-5-exploit.md)"; \ else \ $(PYTHON) tools/run-agent.py --phase 5 --label "Exploit Development" --agent exploiter --prompt-file prompts/phase-5-exploit.md --finding "$(FINDING)"; \ fi @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ phase-5: venv-check phase-6: venv-check @$(PYTHON) tools/gate-check.py 6 @if [ "$$CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER" = "0" ]; then \ - opencode run --agent reporter "$$(cat prompts/phase-6-report.md)"; \ + opencode run $$OPENCODE_ARGS --agent reporter "$$(cat prompts/phase-6-report.md)"; \ else \ $(PYTHON) tools/run-agent.py --phase 6 --label "Reporting" --agent reporter --prompt-file prompts/phase-6-report.md; \ fi @@ -375,3 +375,46 @@ sandbox-status: venv-check # make show-model AGENT=auditor show-model: venv-check @$(PYTHON) tools/run-agent.py --show-model --agent $(or $(AGENT),recon) + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# E2E Mocking & Testing +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +.PHONY: e2e-server-start e2e-server-stop e2e-record test-e2e + +AIMOCK_PORT ?= 4010 +AIMOCK_API_KEY ?= +AIMOCK_CONTAINER ?= codecome-aimock-server +AIMOCK_FIXTURES := $(CURDIR)/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks +AIMOCK_MODEL ?= minimax/minimax-m2.5:free +AIMOCK_UPSTREAM_URL ?= https://openrouter.ai/api + +e2e-server-start: + @echo "Starting aimock container..." + @mkdir -p "$(AIMOCK_FIXTURES)" tmp + @docker run -d --name "$(AIMOCK_CONTAINER)" -p $(AIMOCK_PORT):4010 -v "$(AIMOCK_FIXTURES):/fixtures" ghcr.io/copilotkit/aimock -f /fixtures -h 0.0.0.0 > /dev/null + @sleep 2 + +e2e-server-stop: + @echo "Stopping aimock container..." + @docker stop "$(AIMOCK_CONTAINER)" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + @docker rm "$(AIMOCK_CONTAINER)" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + +e2e-record: e2e-server-stop + @test -n "$(AIMOCK_API_KEY)" || (echo "Please set AIMOCK_API_KEY (your OpenRouter key) to run recording" && exit 1) + @echo "Starting aimock in RECORD mode against $(AIMOCK_UPSTREAM_URL)..." + @mkdir -p "$(AIMOCK_FIXTURES)" tests/fixtures/recordings tmp + @docker run -d --name "$(AIMOCK_CONTAINER)" \ + -p $(AIMOCK_PORT):4010 \ + -v "$(AIMOCK_FIXTURES):/fixtures" \ + ghcr.io/copilotkit/aimock \ + --log-level debug \ + --record --provider-openai $(AIMOCK_UPSTREAM_URL) -f /fixtures -p 4010 -h 0.0.0.0 + @sleep 2 + @echo "Running Phase 1 and dumping raw JSON to tests/fixtures/recordings/phase-1.json..." + @CODECOME_MODEL="aimock/$(AIMOCK_MODEL)" CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER=0 OPENCODE_ARGS="--format json -m $(CODECOME_MODEL)" $(MAKE) phase-1 > tests/fixtures/recordings/phase-1.json + @echo "Recording finished." + @$(MAKE) e2e-server-stop + +e2e-test: venv-check + @AIMOCK_MODEL=$(AIMOCK_MODEL) $(PYTHON) tools/test-e2e.py diff --git a/opencode.json b/opencode.json index 054d77a..fe09998 100644 --- a/opencode.json +++ b/opencode.json @@ -16,5 +16,24 @@ "sandbox/.env": "allow", "*/sandbox/.env": "allow" } + }, + "provider": { + "aimock": { + "type": "openai", + "options": { + "baseURL": "http://127.0.0.1:4010/v1", + "apiKey": "{env:AIMOCK_API_KEY}" + }, + "models": { + "minimax/minimax-m2.5": {}, + "minimax/minimax-m2.5:free": {} + } + } + }, + "agent": { + "test": { + "temperature": 0, + "top_p": 1 + } } } diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-32-51-777Z-3682c0bd.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-32-51-777Z-3682c0bd.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a167cec --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-32-51-777Z-3682c0bd.json @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 0, + "hasToolResult": false + }, + "response": { + "content": "I'll start by reading the required files to understand the methodology, then explore the target source tree.\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/AGENTS.md\"}", + "id": "call_bab621327fa46823" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/codecome.yml\"}", + "id": "call_2c78d1635d51f0c1" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/templates/target-recon.md\"}", + "id": "call_a9147156a21b4600" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/templates/file-risk-index.yml\"}", + "id": "call_74aebdd64dec532f" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-00-850Z-8c4de210.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-00-850Z-8c4de210.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7faa4f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-00-850Z-8c4de210.json @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 1, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "Now let me read the skill files and agent definitions:\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/agents/recon.md\"}", + "id": "call_9377f1df927487dc" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md\"}", + "id": "call_f317f8e542754973" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md\"}", + "id": "call_dc45a0387574d31a" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-07-102Z-e5f9dbf7.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-07-102Z-e5f9dbf7.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b89c5da --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-07-102Z-e5f9dbf7.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 2, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "Now I have all the required reading. Let me explore the target source tree to perform Phase 1a reconnaissance.\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "glob", + "arguments": "{\"pattern\": \"src/**/*\"}", + "id": "call_faaf5911e75217b4" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-13-308Z-c96a789f.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-13-308Z-c96a789f.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34c56d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-13-308Z-c96a789f.json @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 3, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/README.md\"}", + "id": "call_351b57b79fbdfe34" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/Makefile\"}", + "id": "call_377519e0cef48d04" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/main.c\"}", + "id": "call_157a0afbd5f4f024" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-19-613Z-4b7a2b78.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-19-613Z-4b7a2b78.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0eb13a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-19-613Z-4b7a2b78.json @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 4, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/greet.c\"}", + "id": "call_b2ef7e53cc151f86" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/util.c\"}", + "id": "call_370f9e12bd9b0921" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/greet.h\"}", + "id": "call_fdb478687886aee3" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/util.h\"}", + "id": "call_e27f29761101bdc4" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/tests/smoke.sh\"}", + "id": "call_44318020d023d261" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-24-085Z-1cb2e5e7.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-24-085Z-1cb2e5e7.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f155a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-24-085Z-1cb2e5e7.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 5, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "glob", + "arguments": "{\"pattern\": \"itemdb/**/*\"}", + "id": "call_39fe9cf33dde931c" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-46-078Z-fe976798.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-46-078Z-fe976798.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..306c535 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-33-46-078Z-fe976798.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 6, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "Now I'll create all the required Phase 1a reconnaissance notes. Let me start:\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/target-profile.md\", \"content\": \"# Target Profile\\n\\nDate: 2026-05-17 \\nPhase: reconnaissance \\nTarget path: `./src`\\n\\n## Executive Summary\\n\\nThe target is a **simple C CLI tool** used for CodeCome workflow testing. It is intentionally small and provides basic commands: `greet`, `echo`, and `remove`. The project serves as a test harness for the vulnerability research workflow.\\n\\n## Detected Target Type\\n\\n**Type**: CLI tool (library/binary) \\n**Confidence**: HIGH\\n\\nThis is a standalone C program compiled to a CLI executable.\\n\\n## Languages\\n\\n- **C** \\u2014 Primary language, used for all source code\\n\\n## Frameworks and Technologies\\n\\n- **C standard library** \\u2014 `stdio.h`, `stdlib.h`, `string.h`\\n- **Make** \\u2014 Build system via `Makefile`\\n- **No external dependencies** \\u2014 Pure C with standard library only\\n\\n## Repository Structure\\n\\n```\\nsrc/\\n\\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 README.md # Project documentation\\n\\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 Makefile # Build configuration\\n\\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 src/\\n\\u2502 \\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 main.c # CLI entrypoint\\n\\u2502 \\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 greet.c # Greeting and file operations\\n\\u2502 \\u2514\\u2500\\u2500 util.c # Utility functions\\n\\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 include/\\n\\u2502 \\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 greet.h # Public API headers\\n\\u2502 \\u2514\\u2500\\u2500 util.h # Utility headers\\n\\u251c\\u2500\\u2500 tests/\\n\\u2502 \\u2514\\u2500\\u2500 smoke.sh # Smoke test script\\n\\u2514\\u2500\\u2500 bin/ # Build output (generated)\\n \\u2514\\u2500\\u2500 sample-c-cli # Compiled binary\\n```\\n\\n## Important Manifests or Build Files\\n\\n- `src/Makefile` \\u2014 Standard C build with `cc` compiler, `-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -O2` flags\\n\\n## Target-Specific Observations\\n\\n1. The target is a **tiny CLI tool** designed for CodeCome workflow testing\\n2. No network exposure, no database, no external services\\n3. Simple command-line argument parsing with no sophisticated input handling\\n4. Contains intentional security-relevant patterns for testing:\\n - `remove` command uses `system()` with user-provided path (shell injection risk)\\n - `echo_message` uses `printf` with user input directly (format string risk)\\n - `greet_user` uses manual buffer handling with `memcpy`\\n\\n## Recommended Phase 2 Focus\\n\\nGiven this is a test corpus, Phase 2 should focus on:\\n1. Shell command injection in `remove_file()` function\\n2. Format string vulnerability in `echo_message()` function\\n3. Buffer handling in `greet_user()` function\"}", + "id": "call_e2d95ccec9ee0153" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-11-422Z-6d68e2e7.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-11-422Z-6d68e2e7.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..847f133 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-11-422Z-6d68e2e7.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 7, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md\", \"content\": \"# Attack Surface\\n\\n## Overview\\n\\nThe target is a simple C CLI tool with limited attack surface. As a CLI tool, all input comes from command-line arguments. The primary attack surfaces are:\\n\\n1. **CLI arguments** \\u2014 All user input flows through `argv`\\n2. **File paths** \\u2014 The `remove` command accepts a file path argument\\n3. **String inputs** \\u2014 Both `greet` and `echo` commands accept string arguments\\n\\n## Attack Surfaces\\n\\n### 1. CLI Argument Parser (main.c)\\n\\n| Attribute | Value |\\n|-----------|-------|\\n| **Name** | CLI Argument Parser |\\n| **Type** | CLI argument parsing |\\n| **Entrypoint** | `main()` function, lines 13-39 |\\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[1]`, `argv[2]` |\\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over command and arguments when invoking the CLI |\\n| **Trust Boundary** | External user input \\u2192 CLI application |\\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/main.c` |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | N/A \\u2014 Simple argument dispatching |\\n\\n### 2. Greet Command (greet.c)\\n\\n| Attribute | Value |\\n|-----------|-------|\\n| **Name** | Greet Command |\\n| **Type** | String handling |\\n| **Entrypoint** | `greet_user()` function, line 8 |\\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[2]` from CLI |\\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over name argument |\\n| **Trust Boundary** | CLI user input \\u2192 greeting output |\\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/greet.c`, `src/util.c` |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Buffer handling issues, buffer overflow |\\n\\n### 3. Echo Command (greet.c)\\n\\n| Attribute | Value |\\n|-----------|-------|\\n| **Name** | Echo Command |\\n| **Type** | String output |\\n| **Entrypoint** | `echo_message()` function, line 18 |\\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[2]` from CLI |\\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over message argument |\\n| **Trust Boundary** | CLI user input \\u2192 stdout output |\\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/greet.c` |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Format string vulnerability |\\n\\n### 4. Remove Command (greet.c)\\n\\n| Attribute | Value |\\n|-----------|-------|\\n| **Name** | Remove Command |\\n| **Type** | Shell command execution |\\n| **Entrypoint** | `remove_file()` function, line 23 |\\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[2]` from CLI |\\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over path argument |\\n| **Trust Boundary** | CLI user input \\u2192 shell execution |\\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/greet.c` |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | OS command injection, path traversal |\\n\\n## Network Exposure\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 This is a local CLI tool with no network capabilities\\n- No HTTP handlers, no RPC methods, no listening ports\\n\\n## File-Based Inputs\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 The tool does not read from files\\n- The `remove` command writes/operates on the filesystem\\n\\n## Summary\\n\\n| Surface | Type | Risk Level |\\n|---------|------|------------|\\n| CLI arguments | Input | Low |\\n| `greet` command | String handling | Medium |\\n| `echo` command | Format string | High |\\n| `remove` command | Shell execution | Critical |\"}", + "id": "call_a7310108ad8ac2fd" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-24-752Z-b96e0140.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-24-752Z-b96e0140.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83de7cd --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-24-752Z-b96e0140.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 8, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/build-model.md\", \"content\": \"# Build Model\\n\\n## Build System\\n\\n**Type**: GNU Make \\n**Build File**: `src/Makefile`\\n\\n## Build Commands\\n\\n### Standard Build\\n\\n```bash\\ncd src && make\\n```\\n\\nThis produces:\\n- `src/bin/sample-c-cli` \\u2014 The compiled executable\\n\\n### Individual Steps\\n\\n```bash\\n# Compile object files\\nmake build/\\n\\n# Link executable\\nmake bin/sample-c-cli\\n```\\n\\n### Clean\\n\\n```bash\\nmake clean\\n```\\n\\nRemoves `build/` and `bin/` directories.\\n\\n### Test\\n\\n```bash\\nmake test\\n```\\n\\nRuns `tests/smoke.sh`.\\n\\n## Build Configuration\\n\\n| Setting | Value |\\n|---------|-------|\\n| Compiler | `cc` (configurable via `CC` variable) |\\n| Flags | `-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -O2 -Iinclude` |\\n| Output Directory | `bin/` |\\n| Object Directory | `build/` |\\n\\n## Dependencies\\n\\n- **C standard library** \\u2014 No external dependencies\\n- **C compiler** \\u2014 Any `cc` compatible compiler (gcc, clang)\\n\\n## Generated Artifacts\\n\\n- `src/bin/sample-c-cli` \\u2014 Compiled binary\\n- `src/build/*.o` \\u2014 Object files\\n\\n## Build Assumptions\\n\\n- Requires a C compiler (`cc`, `gcc`, or `clang`)\\n- No special system libraries required\\n- Should build on any POSIX system\\n\\n## Sandbox Changes Needed\\n\\n- Need a container with a C compiler (gcc or clang)\\n- Standard build tools (make, cc)\\n- No additional libraries or packages required\\n\\n## Known Blockers\\n\\n- **None identified** \\u2014 Simple C project with no external dependencies\"}", + "id": "call_cb811fb53d7b339c" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-49-053Z-6ea5eea2.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-49-053Z-6ea5eea2.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..faf584f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-34-49-053Z-6ea5eea2.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 9, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/execution-model.md\", \"content\": \"# Execution Model\\n\\n## Overview\\n\\nThe target is a standalone CLI executable with no persistent runtime. It processes command-line arguments and exits.\\n\\n## Entrypoint\\n\\n- **Binary**: `bin/sample-c-cli`\\n- **Entry function**: `main()` in `src/main.c`\\n\\n## Runtime Invocation\\n\\n```bash\\n./bin/sample-c-cli [--help|greet |echo |remove ]\\n```\\n\\n## Commands\\n\\n### Help\\n\\n```bash\\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help\\n```\\n\\nPrints help text and exits.\\n\\n### Greet\\n\\n```bash\\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet \\n```\\n\\nPrints \\\"Hello, \\\" to stdout.\\n\\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli greet Alice` outputs `Hello, Alice`\\n\\n### Echo\\n\\n```bash\\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo \\n```\\n\\nPrints the message to stdout.\\n\\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello` outputs `hello`\\n\\n### Remove\\n\\n```bash\\n./bin/sample-c-cli remove \\n```\\n\\nExecutes `rm -f ` via shell.\\n\\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli remove /tmp/testfile` deletes the file\\n\\n## Runtime Dependencies\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 Pure C with standard library only\\n- No database, no network, no external services\\n\\n## Configuration Files\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No configuration files used\\n\\n## Environment Variables\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No environment variables affect behavior\\n\\n## Ports\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No network ports used\\n\\n## Test Harness\\n\\nThe test script `tests/smoke.sh` runs:\\n\\n```bash\\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help >/dev/null\\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet tester >/dev/null\\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello >/dev/null\\n```\\n\\n## Runtime Model Summary\\n\\n| Aspect | Value |\\n|--------|-------|\\n| Type | CLI executable |\\n| Persistence | None \\u2014 one-shot execution |\\n| User session | None |\\n| State | Stateless |\\n| Network | None |\"}", + "id": "call_fe6d59f006d8ea15" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-35-12-247Z-2781acd3.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-35-12-247Z-2781acd3.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..924f292 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-35-12-247Z-2781acd3.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 10, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md\", \"content\": \"# Trust Boundaries\\n\\n## Overview\\n\\nThis document identifies where lower-trust data or actors affect higher-trust behavior.\\n\\n## Trust Boundaries\\n\\n### 1. CLI User Input \\u2192 Application\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Boundary** | External CLI user input \\u2192 CLI application |\\n| **Direction** | Untrusted \\u2192 Trusted |\\n| **Input** | `argv[1]`, `argv[2]` |\\n| **Processing** | Command dispatch in `main()` |\\n| **Risk** | Attacker controls command and arguments |\\n\\n**Example**: User provides `./bin/sample-c-cli remove /etc/passwd`\\n\\n### 2. User String \\u2192 Greeting Output\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled string \\u2192 stdout |\\n| **Direction** | Untrusted \\u2192 Trusted output |\\n| **Input** | `name` argument to `greet_user()` |\\n| **Processing** | Buffer copy in `greet_user()` |\\n| **Risk** | Buffer overflow if name exceeds buffer size |\\n\\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli greet AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA`\\n\\n### 3. User String \\u2192 Format String\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled string \\u2192 printf format string |\\n| **Direction** | Untrusted \\u2192 Trusted output function |\\n| **Input** | `message` argument to `echo_message()` |\\n| **Processing** | Direct `printf(message)` call |\\n| **Risk** | Format string vulnerability allows memory read |\\n\\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli echo %s%s%s%s`\\n\\n### 4. User String \\u2192 Shell Command\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled path \\u2192 shell command execution |\\n| **Direction** | Untrusted \\u2192 Trusted shell execution |\\n| **Input** | `path` argument to `remove_file()` |\\n| **Processing** | `system(\\\"rm -f \\\" + path)` |\\n| **Risk** | OS command injection |\\n\\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli remove \\\"/etc/passwd; cat /etc/shadow\\\"`\\n\\n### 5. User Path \\u2192 Filesystem Operation\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled path \\u2192 filesystem delete operation |\\n| **Direction** | Untrusted \\u2192 Trusted filesystem |\\n| **Input** | `path` argument to `remove_file()` |\\n| **Processing** | `rm -f` shell command |\\n| **Risk** | Arbitrary file deletion |\\n\\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli remove \\\"~/.ssh/authorized_keys\\\"`\\n\\n## Summary\\n\\n| Boundary | From | To | Risk Level |\\n|----------|------|-----|-------------|\\n| CLI args \\u2192 App | User input | CLI execution | Low |\\n| String \\u2192 Greeting | User string | Buffer copy | Medium |\\n| String \\u2192 Format | User string | printf format | High |\\n| String \\u2192 Shell | User string | system() call | Critical |\\n| Path \\u2192 Filesystem | User path | rm command | Critical |\\n\\n## Security Impact\\n\\nThe `remove` command boundary is the most critical \\u2014 it allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a crafted path argument. The `echo` command is also high-risk due to format string vulnerability.\"}", + "id": "call_66ce3d29a0a2d4c2" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-35-36-601Z-814f101b.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-35-36-601Z-814f101b.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4fb4d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-35-36-601Z-814f101b.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 11, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/data-flow.md\", \"content\": \"# Data Flow Notes\\n\\n## Overview\\n\\nThis document summarizes security-relevant data flows in the target.\\n\\n## Key Data Flows\\n\\n### 1. CLI Argument \\u2192 Greet Command Flow\\n\\n```\\nargv[1] = \\\"greet\\\"\\nargv[2] = \\n |\\n v\\nmain() dispatches to greet_user(name)\\n |\\n v\\ngreet_user(name):\\n - clamp_copy_length(name, 32) -> copy_len\\n - memcpy(buffer, name, copy_len)\\n - buffer[copy_len] = '\\\\0'\\n - printf(\\\"Hello, %s\\\\n\\\", buffer)\\n```\\n\\n**Security Relevance**: Manual buffer management with memcpy \\u2014 potential for buffer overflow if name length is not properly handled.\\n\\n### 2. CLI Argument \\u2192 Echo Command Flow\\n\\n```\\nargv[1] = \\\"echo\\\"\\nargv[2] = \\n |\\n v\\nmain() dispatches to echo_message(message)\\n |\\n v\\necho_message(message):\\n - printf(message)\\n - putchar('\\\\n')\\n```\\n\\n**Security Relevance**: Direct user input passed to printf \\u2014 format string vulnerability that can read arbitrary memory.\\n\\n### 3. CLI Argument \\u2192 Remove Command Flow\\n\\n```\\nargv[1] = \\\"remove\\\"\\nargv[2] = \\n |\\n v\\nmain() dispatches to remove_file(path)\\n |\\n v\\nremove_file(path):\\n - snprintf(command, 256, \\\"rm -f %s\\\", path)\\n - system(command)\\n```\\n\\n**Security Relevance**: User input directly interpolated into shell command \\u2014 OS command injection vulnerability.\\n\\n## Untrusted Input Sources\\n\\n| Source | Type | Control Level |\\n|--------|------|---------------|\\n| `argv[1]` | Command name | Full (user chooses) |\\n| `argv[2]` | Argument value | Full (user provides) |\\n\\n## Dangerous Sinks\\n\\n| Sink | Location | Danger |\\n|------|----------|--------|\\n| `memcpy` | `greet.c:12` | Buffer overflow |\\n| `printf(message)` | `greet.c:19` | Format string |\\n| `system(command)` | `greet.c:27` | Command injection |\\n\\n## Authentication / Authorization\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No authentication or authorization in this CLI tool\\n- Any user who can execute the binary has full control\\n\\n## Tenant Isolation\\n\\n- **N/A** \\u2014 Single-tenant CLI tool\\n\\n## Secret Handling\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No secrets are handled by this tool\\n\\n## File Paths\\n\\n- The `remove` command accepts a user-controlled path\\n- Path is passed directly to `rm -f` shell command without validation\\n\\n## External Commands\\n\\n- `system()` call in `remove_file()` is the primary external command sink\\n- No other command execution\\n\\n## Parsers\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No data parsing in this tool\\n\\n## Serialization\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No serialization\\n\\n## Cryptography\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No cryptographic operations\\n\\n## Network Calls\\n\\n- **None** \\u2014 No network operations\\n\\n## Memory Unsafe Operations\\n\\n- `memcpy` with user-controlled length in `greet_user()` (via clamp_copy_length)\\n- Fixed-size buffer stack allocation: `char buffer[32]`\"}", + "id": "call_12dd8bfb16763c8c" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-03-722Z-1544c7c1.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-03-722Z-1544c7c1.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f8d25f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-03-722Z-1544c7c1.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 12, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/validation-model.md\", \"content\": \"# Validation Model\\n\\n## Overview\\n\\nThis document explains how findings can be validated for the target.\\n\\n## Target Build Capability\\n\\n**Can the target be built?** Yes\\n\\n```bash\\ncd src && make\\n```\\n\\nThe target builds cleanly with no errors using standard C compiler.\\n\\n## Target Execution Capability\\n\\n**Can the target be run locally?** Yes\\n\\nThe target is a standalone CLI executable:\\n\\n```bash\\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help\\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet Alice\\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello\\n./bin/sample-c-cli remove \\n```\\n\\n## Sandbox Suitability\\n\\n**Is Docker sufficient?** Yes\\n\\nA simple Docker container with a C compiler (gcc) and make is sufficient to build and test the target. No complex runtime dependencies required.\\n\\n## Useful Validation Commands\\n\\n### Build\\n\\n```bash\\ncd /workspace/src && make\\n```\\n\\n### Test\\n\\n```bash\\ncd /workspace/src && make test\\n```\\n\\n### Manual Testing\\n\\n```bash\\n# Format string test\\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo \\\"%x %x %x %x\\\"\\n\\n# Command injection test \\n./bin/sample-c-cli remove \\\"/tmp; echo pwned > /tmp/pwned\\\"\\n\\n# Buffer overflow test (long input)\\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet $(python3 -c 'print(\\\"A\\\"*100)')\\n```\\n\\n## Useful Sanitizer/Debugger Strategy\\n\\n### AddressSanitizer (ASAN)\\n\\nBuild with ASAN to detect memory safety issues:\\n\\n```bash\\nCFLAGS=\\\"-fsanitize=address -g\\\" make clean && make\\n```\\n\\nThis would detect buffer overflows in `greet_user()`.\\n\\n### Valgrind\\n\\nRun with valgrind to detect memory issues:\\n\\n```bash\\nvalgrind ./bin/sample-c-cli greet AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\\n```\\n\\n## Test Strategy\\n\\n- **Unit tests**: Not applicable (no unit test framework)\\n- **Integration tests**: `tests/smoke.sh` provides basic smoke tests\\n- **Functional tests**: Manual CLI invocation for each command\\n\\n## Evidence to Capture\\n\\nFor each finding, capture:\\n\\n1. **Reproduction command** \\u2014 Exact CLI invocation\\n2. **Expected output** \\u2014 What should happen\\n3. **Actual output** \\u2014 What actually happens\\n4. **Exit code** \\u2014 Command exit status\\n5. **Evidence files** \\u2014 Any created files or output\\n\\n## Validation Limitations\\n\\n1. **No runtime debugging** \\u2014 Simple CLI, no complex debugging needed\\n2. **No network validation** \\u2014 Not applicable\\n3. **No database validation** \\u2014 Not applicable\\n4. **Manual test cases** \\u2014 Most validation is manual CLI testing\\n\\n## Blockers\\n\\n- **None identified** \\u2014 Simple C project with no blockers\\n\\n## Summary\\n\\n| Validation Aspect | Status | Approach |\\n|-------------------|--------|----------|\\n| Build | \\u2713 Available | `make` |\\n| Run | \\u2713 Available | CLI invocation |\\n| Test | \\u2713 Available | `make test` or smoke.sh |\\n| Sanitizers | \\u2713 Available | ASAN, Valgrind |\\n| Network | \\u2717 N/A | Not applicable |\\n| Database | \\u2717 N/A | Not applicable |\"}", + "id": "call_d3acd2fc8abe103d" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-30-627Z-6781e1f3.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-30-627Z-6781e1f3.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b907ff3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-30-627Z-6781e1f3.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 13, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md\", \"content\": \"# Interesting Files\\n\\n## Overview\\n\\nThis document lists files and directories worth reviewing during Phase 2 (hypothesis generation).\\n\\n## High-Interest Files\\n\\n### 1. src/greet.c\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Path** | `src/greet.c` |\\n| **Why Interesting** | Contains all three security-sensitive functions: `greet_user`, `echo_message`, `remove_file` |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Buffer overflow, format string, command injection |\\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Deep analysis of each function |\\n\\n**Key Functions**:\\n- `greet_user()` \\u2014 Buffer handling with memcpy\\n- `echo_message()` \\u2014 Format string vulnerability\\n- `remove_file()` \\u2014 Shell command injection\\n\\n### 2. src/main.c\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Path** | `src/main.c` |\\n| **Why Interesting** | CLI entrypoint and argument parsing |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Argument injection, command routing issues |\\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Review argument handling logic |\\n\\n**Key Functions**:\\n- `main()` \\u2014 Command dispatch based on argv\\n\\n### 3. src/util.c\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Path** | `src/util.c` |\\n| **Why Interesting** | Contains `clamp_copy_length` used in buffer operations |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Integer overflow, off-by-one |\\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Verify clamp logic is correct |\\n\\n**Key Functions**:\\n- `clamp_copy_length()` \\u2014 Length calculation for buffer copy\\n\\n## Medium-Interest Files\\n\\n### 4. include/greet.h\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Path** | `include/greet.h` |\\n| **Why Interesting** | Public API definitions |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None \\u2014 header only |\\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Verify API contracts |\\n\\n### 5. include/util.h\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Path** | `include/util.h` |\\n| **Why Interesting** | Utility function declarations |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None \\u2014 header only |\\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Verify API contracts |\\n\\n## Low-Interest Files\\n\\n### 6. src/Makefile\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Path** | `src/Makefile` |\\n| **Why Interesting** | Build configuration |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None \\u2014 build system |\\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | None required |\\n\\n### 7. tests/smoke.sh\\n\\n| Attribute | Details |\\n|-----------|---------|\\n| **Path** | `tests/smoke.sh` |\\n| **Why Interesting** | Test script |\\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None \\u2014 test file |\\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | None required |\\n\\n## Phase 2 Priority Order\\n\\n1. **src/greet.c** \\u2014 Primary target with three vulnerable functions\\n2. **src/util.c** \\u2014 Helper function with potential integer issues\\n3. **src/main.c** \\u2014 Entry point and command routing\\n4. Headers \\u2014 Verify API contracts\\n\\n## Summary\\n\\n| File | Interest Level | Priority |\\n|------|----------------|----------|\\n| src/greet.c | High | 1 |\\n| src/util.c | High | 2 |\\n| src/main.c | High | 3 |\\n| include/greet.h | Medium | 4 |\\n| include/util.h | Medium | 5 |\\n| src/Makefile | Low | \\u2014 |\\n| tests/smoke.sh | Low | \\u2014 |\"}", + "id": "call_0d29619ece71ab9d" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-49-826Z-5a9c37db.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-49-826Z-5a9c37db.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cfdd73 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-36-49-826Z-5a9c37db.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 14, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md\", \"content\": \"# Security Assumptions\\n\\n## Overview\\n\\nThis document lists assumptions made during reconnaissance, marked by confidence level.\\n\\n## Confirmed Assumptions\\n\\n- [confirmed] The target contains C source files.\\n- [confirmed] The target is a CLI tool with no network capabilities.\\n- [confirmed] The build system uses Make.\\n- [confirmed] The target compiles with no errors using `make`.\\n\\n## Likely Assumptions\\n\\n- [likely] The target is intentionally designed as a test corpus with security vulnerabilities.\\n- [likely] The `remove` command uses `system()` for shell command execution.\\n- [likely] The `echo_message` function has a format string vulnerability.\\n- [likely] The `greet_user` function has potential buffer handling issues.\\n\\n## Unknown Assumptions\\n\\n- [unknown] Whether the project is meant to have vulnerabilities for testing or if they are accidental.\\n- [unknown] Whether there are additional hidden test cases or commands.\\n\\n## Risky Assumptions\\n\\n- [risky] The `remove_file` function appears to directly interpolate user input into a shell command.\\n- [risky] The `echo_message` function passes user input directly to printf.\\n- [risky] Buffer size is hardcoded to 32 bytes in `greet_user()` without validation.\\n\\n## Security Considerations\\n\\n| Aspect | Assessment | Risk Level |\\n|--------|------------|------------|\\n| Input validation | None apparent | High |\\n| Buffer handling | Manual with fixed size | Medium |\\n| Shell execution | Direct system() call | Critical |\\n| Format string | Direct printf of user input | High |\\n| Authentication | N/A | N/A |\\n| Authorization | N/A | N/A |\\n\\n## Notes\\n\\nThis appears to be a test corpus with intentional security vulnerabilities for CodeCome workflow testing. The vulnerabilities are straightforward and clearly exploitable:\\n\\n1. **Command injection** in `remove_file()` \\u2014 highest severity\\n2. **Format string** in `echo_message()` \\u2014 high severity\\n3. **Buffer handling** in `greet_user()` \\u2014 medium severity\\n\\nThe assumptions above should be validated through Phase 2 hypothesis generation and Phase 4 validation.\"}", + "id": "call_04ba6aedfab6076b" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-04-274Z-3b5718ee.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-04-274Z-3b5718ee.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e4202a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-04-274Z-3b5718ee.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 15, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml\", \"content\": \"# CodeCome file risk index\\n#\\n# Generated during Phase 1 and consumed by optional file-by-file Phase 2 sweeps.\\n# Scores are intentionally coarse so agents can prioritize attention without\\n# pretending the ranking is precise.\\n\\nschema_version: 1\\ngenerated_by: \\\"phase-1-recon\\\"\\ngenerated_at: \\\"2026-05-17T00:00:00Z\\\"\\ntarget: \\\"sample-c-cli\\\"\\nscoring_scale:\\n min: 1\\n max: 5\\n meaning:\\n \\\"1\\\": \\\"Low security interest; unlikely to cross a trust boundary or reach a dangerous sink.\\\"\\n \\\"2\\\": \\\"Some security relevance, but weak attacker control or low impact.\\\"\\n \\\"3\\\": \\\"Moderate interest; plausible source, sink, or security decision.\\\"\\n \\\"4\\\": \\\"High interest; likely attack surface, trust boundary, parser, authz/authn, or dangerous sink.\\\"\\n \\\"5\\\": \\\"Very high interest; externally reachable, security-critical, complex parser, privileged operation, or historically bug-prone surface.\\\"\\n\\nscoring_dimensions:\\n - attacker_controlled_input\\n - externally_influenced_state\\n - trust_boundary_crossing\\n - security_decision\\n - dangerous_sink\\n - parser_complexity\\n - privilege_boundary\\n - asset_sensitivity\\n - historical_vulnerability_density\\n - validation_feasibility\\n\\nfiles:\\n - path: \\\"src/greet.c\\\"\\n score: 5\\n confidence: \\\"HIGH\\\"\\n target_area: \\\"Core CLI functionality - security-sensitive functions\\\"\\n reasons:\\n - \\\"Contains three security-critical functions: greet_user, echo_message, remove_file\\\"\\n - \\\"remove_file() uses system() with user-controlled path - OS command injection\\\"\\n - \\\"echo_message() passes user input directly to printf - format string vulnerability\\\"\\n - \\\"greet_user() uses manual buffer handling with memcpy\\\"\\n - \\\"Crosses trust boundary from CLI user input to shell execution\\\"\\n entry_points:\\n - \\\"CLI: ./bin/sample-c-cli remove \\\"\\n - \\\"CLI: ./bin/sample-c-cli echo \\\"\\n - \\\"CLI: ./bin/sample-c-cli greet \\\"\\n sources:\\n - \\\"argv[2] from main()\\\"\\n sinks:\\n - \\\"system() in remove_file()\\\"\\n - \\\"printf() in echo_message()\\\"\\n - \\\"memcpy() in greet_user()\\\"\\n trust_boundaries:\\n - \\\"CLI user input -> shell command execution\\\"\\n - \\\"CLI user input -> printf format string\\\"\\n - \\\"CLI user input -> buffer copy\\\"\\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\\n - \\\"OS command injection\\\"\\n - \\\"Format string vulnerability\\\"\\n - \\\"Buffer overflow\\\"\\n suggested_skills:\\n - \\\"c-cpp-security\\\"\\n suggested_validation_methods:\\n - \\\"static_proof\\\"\\n - \\\"cli_exploit\\\"\\n - \\\"sanitizer_detection\\\"\\n notes: \\\"Primary attack surface - contains highest risk vulnerabilities\\\"\\n\\n - path: \\\"src/util.c\\\"\\n score: 4\\n confidence: \\\"HIGH\\\"\\n target_area: \\\"Utility functions\\\"\\n reasons:\\n - \\\"Contains clamp_copy_length() used in buffer operations\\\"\\n - \\\"Integer handling in length calculations\\\"\\n - \\\"Called by greet_user() which handles user input\\\"\\n entry_points:\\n - \\\"Called from greet_user() in greet.c\\\"\\n sources:\\n - \\\"name parameter from greet_user()\\\"\\n sinks:\\n - \\\"strlen() result\\\"\\n trust_boundaries:\\n - \\\"User input -> length calculation\\\"\\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\\n - \\\"Integer overflow\\\"\\n - \\\"Off-by-one error\\\"\\n suggested_skills:\\n - \\\"c-cpp-security\\\"\\n suggested_validation_methods:\\n - \\\"static_proof\\\"\\n - \\\"sanitizer_detection\\\"\\n notes: \\\"Supporting function with potential integer issues\\\"\\n\\n - path: \\\"src/main.c\\\"\\n score: 3\\n confidence: \\\"HIGH\\\"\\n target_area: \\\"CLI entrypoint and command dispatch\\\"\\n reasons:\\n - \\\"Entry point for all user input\\\"\\n - \\\"Command routing to security-sensitive functions\\\"\\n - \\\"Basic argument validation only\\\"\\n entry_points:\\n - \\\"CLI invocation: ./bin/sample-c-cli [args]\\\"\\n sources:\\n - \\\"argv[] command-line arguments\\\"\\n sinks:\\n - \\\"Function dispatch based on argv[1]\\\"\\n trust_boundaries:\\n - \\\"External CLI input -> application\\\"\\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\\n - \\\"Argument injection\\\"\\n suggested_skills:\\n - \\\"c-cpp-security\\\"\\n suggested_validation_methods:\\n - \\\"static_proof\\\"\\n notes: \\\"Low interest due to simple dispatch logic\\\"\\n\\n - path: \\\"include/greet.h\\\"\\n score: 2\\n confidence: \\\"HIGH\\\"\\n target_area: \\\"Public API header\\\"\\n reasons:\\n - \\\"Declares public functions including remove_file\\\"\\n entry_points:\\n - \\\"N/A - header file\\\"\\n sources:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n sinks:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n trust_boundaries:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\\n - \\\"None\\\"\\n suggested_skills:\\n - \\\"c-cpp-security\\\"\\n suggested_validation_methods:\\n - \\\"static_proof\\\"\\n notes: \\\"Low interest - header only\\\"\\n\\n - path: \\\"include/util.h\\\"\\n score: 2\\n confidence: \\\"HIGH\\\"\\n target_area: \\\"Utility header\\\"\\n reasons:\\n - \\\"Declares clamp_copy_length\\\"\\n entry_points:\\n - \\\"N/A - header file\\\"\\n sources:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n sinks:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n trust_boundaries:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\\n - \\\"None\\\"\\n suggested_skills:\\n - \\\"c-cpp-security\\\"\\n suggested_validation_methods:\\n - \\\"static_proof\\\"\\n notes: \\\"Low interest - header only\\\"\\n\\n - path: \\\"src/Makefile\\\"\\n score: 1\\n confidence: \\\"HIGH\\\"\\n target_area: \\\"Build configuration\\\"\\n reasons:\\n - \\\"Standard Makefile - no security implications\\\"\\n entry_points:\\n - \\\"N/A - build file\\\"\\n sources:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n sinks:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n trust_boundaries:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\\n - \\\"None\\\"\\n suggested_skills:\\n - \\\"none\\\"\\n suggested_validation_methods:\\n - \\\"none\\\"\\n notes: \\\"Lowest interest - build system only\\\"\\n\\n - path: \\\"tests/smoke.sh\\\"\\n score: 1\\n confidence: \\\"HIGH\\\"\\n target_area: \\\"Test script\\\"\\n reasons:\\n - \\\"Simple smoke test - no security implications\\\"\\n entry_points:\\n - \\\"N/A - test file\\\"\\n sources:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n sinks:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n trust_boundaries:\\n - \\\"N/A\\\"\\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\\n - \\\"None\\\"\\n suggested_skills:\\n - \\\"none\\\"\\n suggested_validation_methods:\\n - \\\"none\\\"\\n notes: \\\"Lowest interest - test file only\\\"\"}", + "id": "call_80c2b08140e47a9f" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-09-495Z-2087f28e.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-09-495Z-2087f28e.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4482c5b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-09-495Z-2087f28e.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 16, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "Now let me verify the YAML syntax and check the existing notes:\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "bash", + "arguments": "{\"command\": \"make frontmatter\", \"description\": \"Validate YAML frontmatter\", \"workdir\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing\"}", + "id": "call_00ba79f77b610e9a" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-15-495Z-9f6295a8.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-15-495Z-9f6295a8.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64ea627 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-15-495Z-9f6295a8.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 17, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "Phase 1a is complete. Now let me proceed with Phase 1b: Sandbox Bootstrap.\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "bash", + "arguments": "{\"command\": \"make sandbox-status\", \"description\": \"Check sandbox status\", \"workdir\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing\"}", + "id": "call_ba3f82feb0303fd1" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-21-894Z-d9ee5cfc.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-21-894Z-d9ee5cfc.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4a7bcd --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-21-894Z-d9ee5cfc.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 18, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "glob", + "arguments": "{\"pattern\": \"sandbox/**/*\"}", + "id": "call_e8680166abdf0370" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-26-624Z-f4f16997.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-26-624Z-f4f16997.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34bcc9d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-26-624Z-f4f16997.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 19, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md\"}", + "id": "call_795829002aa5d15b" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-33-500Z-405f2825.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-33-500Z-405f2825.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea3abea --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-33-500Z-405f2825.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 20, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "The sandbox is already properly configured for this C target. Let me run the validation to confirm everything works:\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "bash", + "arguments": "{\"command\": \"make sandbox-validate\", \"description\": \"Run sandbox validation tiers\", \"workdir\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing\"}", + "id": "call_abe1050466d0df7f" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-42-540Z-ea12bf99.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-42-540Z-ea12bf99.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4950c45 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-38-42-540Z-ea12bf99.json @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 21, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/scripts/build.sh\"}", + "id": "call_82e8b0ba1d610f5a" + }, + { + "name": "read", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/scripts/test.sh\"}", + "id": "call_5c03c40b013488e7" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-26-179Z-9bca1f85.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-26-179Z-9bca1f85.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a129bbd --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-26-179Z-9bca1f85.json @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 22, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "Now let me create the sandbox-plan.md file:\n", + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "write", + "arguments": "{\"filePath\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md\", \"content\": \"# Sandbox Plan\\n\\nDate: 2026-05-17 \\nPhase: 1b (sandbox bootstrap)\\n\\n## Detected Stack\\n\\n| Aspect | Details |\\n|--------|---------|\\n| **Languages** | C |\\n| **Build System** | Make (Makefile) |\\n| **Target Type** | CLI executable |\\n| **Runtime Model** | build-only (CLI tool with no persistent runtime) |\\n\\n### Source Artifacts\\n\\n- `src/Makefile` \\u2014 Build configuration\\n- `src/src/*.c` \\u2014 C source files\\n- `src/include/*.h` \\u2014 Header files\\n- `src/tests/smoke.sh` \\u2014 Test script\\n\\n## Honoring Decision\\n\\n| Artifact | Decision | Reason |\\n|----------|----------|--------|\\n| `src/Makefile` | Honored | Used by `sandbox/scripts/build.sh` for building target |\\n| `src/tests/smoke.sh` | Honored | Used by `sandbox/scripts/test.sh` via `make test` |\\n| No `src/Dockerfile` | N/A | Not present \\u2014 target is C CLI, not containerized |\\n| No `src/docker-compose.yml` | N/A | Not present |\\n\\n**Summary**: The sandbox honors the existing Makefile and test infrastructure. The target is simple enough that no custom runtime services are needed.\\n\\n## Chosen Example(s)\\n\\n- **ID**: `c-cpp`\\n- **Display Name**: C / C++ project\\n- **Source Path**: `templates/sandboxes/c-cpp`\\n\\n## Marker Values Applied\\n\\n| Marker | Value | Source |\\n|--------|-------|--------|\\n| `DEBIAN_BASE_TAG` | `bookworm` | Default from template |\\n| `TARGET_NAME` | `sample-c-cli` | Derived from repository structure |\\n\\n## Runtime Model\\n\\n**Model**: `build-only`\\n\\n**Justification**: The target is a simple CLI tool that:\\n1. Has no network capabilities\\n2. Has no persistent runtime\\n3. Requires only compilation to build\\n4. No database, cache, or external services needed\\n5. Test execution is via `make test` which runs `tests/smoke.sh`\\n\\n## Services Started\\n\\n| Service | Status | Details |\\n|---------|--------|---------|\\n| `codecome-sandbox` | Started | Docker container with C toolchain (gcc, make) |\\n| Database | N/A | Not required |\\n| Cache | N/A | Not required |\\n| Queue | N/A | Not required |\\n| Web server | N/A | Not required |\\n\\n## Health / Smoke Checks\\n\\nThe validation uses these checks:\\n\\n1. **T1 Setup**: Build Docker image with C toolchain\\n2. **T2 Start**: Bring up container\\n3. **T3 Sanity**: Verify toolchain and workspace mounts\\n4. **T4 Build**: Run `make` in container to build target\\n5. **T5 Test**: Run `make test` to execute smoke tests\\n6. **T6 Stop**: Clean down container\\n\\n**Manual verification commands**:\\n\\n```bash\\n# Build target\\ncd src && make\\n\\n# Run tests\\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help\\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet tester\\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello\\n```\\n\\n## Known Runtime Gaps\\n\\n| Gap | Impact | Mitigation |\\n|------|--------|-------------|\\n| No runtime services needed | None | Target is CLI-only |\\n| No network exposure | None | No network vulnerabilities possible |\\n| No database | None | N/A |\\n| No external services | None | Target is self-contained |\\n\\n## Validation Matrix\\n\\n| Tier | Purpose | Outcome | Exit | Duration | Command |\\n|------|---------|---------|------|----------|---------|\\n| T1 | Sandbox setup | passed | 0 | 0.63s | `sandbox/scripts/setup.sh` |\\n| T2 | Environment start | passed | 0 | 0.28s | `sandbox/scripts/up.sh` |\\n| T3 | Sandbox sanity | passed | 0 | 0.38s | `sandbox/scripts/check.sh` |\\n| T4 | Target build | passed | 0 | 0.43s | `sandbox/scripts/build.sh` |\\n| T5 | Target test | passed | 0 | 0.29s | `sandbox/scripts/test.sh` |\\n| T6 | Environment stop | passed | 0 | 1.35s | `sandbox/scripts/down.sh` |\\n\\n## `validation_model`\\n\\n**Model**: `docker`\\n\\n**Justification**: The target is a C CLI tool that builds cleanly in a Docker container. This is the appropriate model because:\\n1. Target builds with Make in container\\n2. Tests run via make test in container\\n3. No complex runtime needed\\n4. Docker provides clean, isolated environment\\n\\n## Remediation Log\\n\\n| Attempt | Issue | Action | Outcome |\\n|---------|-------|--------|---------|\\n| 1 | Initial setup | Already configured in prior run | passed |\\n| 2 | Validation run | All tiers passed on first attempt | passed |\\n\\n**Note**: No remediation needed \\u2014 sandbox was already properly configured.\\n\\n## Open Questions for the User\\n\\nNone \\u2014 the sandbox is fully operational.\\n\\n## Halt Notice\\n\\n**Status**: NOT HALTED\\n\\nPhase 1b completed successfully. The sandbox is ready for Phase 2.\\n\\n## Summary\\n\\n- \\u2713 Target: C CLI tool (`sample-c-cli`)\\n- \\u2713 Sandbox: `c-cpp` example with Docker\\n- \\u2713 Validation: All 6 tiers passed\\n- \\u2713 Phase 2: Ready for hypothesis generation\"}", + "id": "call_a171d4b5ee5df418" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-30-043Z-6599eedf.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-30-043Z-6599eedf.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0fee65b --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-30-043Z-6599eedf.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 23, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "glob", + "arguments": "{\"pattern\": \"itemdb/notes/*.md\"}", + "id": "call_6cd8c491e084a332" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-33-617Z-84771a95.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-33-617Z-84771a95.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0dd92c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-33-617Z-84771a95.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 24, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "glob", + "arguments": "{\"pattern\": \"itemdb/notes/*\"}", + "id": "call_c1a4d26853f524b1" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-38-384Z-e99dc305.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-38-384Z-e99dc305.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b83f95c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-38-384Z-e99dc305.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 25, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "toolCalls": [ + { + "name": "bash", + "arguments": "{\"command\": \"make frontmatter\", \"description\": \"Validate YAML frontmatter\", \"workdir\": \"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing\"}", + "id": "call_f247e9f5534f5764" + } + ] + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-56-303Z-0595482d.json b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-56-303Z-0595482d.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f313765 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/llm-mocks/recorded/openai-2026-05-17T17-39-56-303Z-0595482d.json @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +{ + "fixtures": [ + { + "match": { + "userMessage": "\"# CodeCome Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + Sandbox Bootstrap\n\nYou are performing CodeCome **Phase 1**, which has two sub-stages:\n\n- **Phase 1a**: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n- **Phase 1b**: sandbox bootstrap, validation, and provenance.\n\nBoth sub-stages must complete in the same invocation. Phase 1b\ndepends on the recon notes produced by Phase 1a.\n\n## Required reading\n\nRead the following files (all paths are relative to the project/workspace root):\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`\n- `templates/target-recon.md`\n- `templates/file-risk-index.yml`\n- `.opencode/agents/recon.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n- `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n\nDo not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\ntree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\nskills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\nfinding generation. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as\n`sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve\nattack-surface terminology.\n\n## Target\n\nAnalyze the source tree under:\n\n ./src\n\n## Phase 1a: source reconnaissance\n\nBuild a target model by creating these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n\n- `target-profile.md`\n- `attack-surface.md`\n- `build-model.md`\n- `execution-model.md`\n- `trust-boundaries.md`\n- `data-flow.md`\n- `validation-model.md`\n- `interesting-files.md`\n- `file-risk-index.yml`\n- `security-assumptions.md`\n\nDocument:\n\n- target type,\n- languages and frameworks,\n- build system and execution model,\n- attack surfaces and entry points,\n- trust boundaries,\n- data flow paths,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- security assumptions,\n- interesting files for Phase 2,\n- validation strategy.\n\n### File risk index\n\nCreate `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml` using the schema in `templates/file-risk-index.yml`.\n\nThis is a structured, machine-readable companion to `interesting-files.md`. It is consumed by optional file-scoped Phase 2 sweeps.\n\nScore files from 1 to 5 using the scoring scale in the template:\n\n- `1`: low security interest,\n- `2`: weak or indirect security relevance,\n- `3`: moderate security interest,\n- `4`: high security interest,\n- `5`: very high security interest.\n\nPrioritize files that contain or strongly influence:\n\n- attacker-controlled or externally influenced input,\n- trust-boundary crossings,\n- authentication or authorization decisions,\n- dangerous sinks,\n- parsers and decoders,\n- file upload or archive handling,\n- cryptographic or secret-handling logic,\n- privilege boundaries,\n- tenant/account/resource isolation,\n- network-facing protocol handlers,\n- sandbox, policy, or permission enforcement.\n\nFor each high-risk file, include concrete reasons, likely entry points, sources, sinks, trust boundaries, suggested vulnerability classes, suggested skills, and suggested validation methods when inferable.\n\nDo not include every source file. Prefer a concise ranked set that Phase 2 can act on. For large projects, include at least the top 20–50 files if that many are plausibly security-relevant. For small projects, include all meaningful security-relevant files.\n\nKeep `interesting-files.md` human-readable, but make `file-risk-index.yml` the structured source for automated or semi-automated sweeps.\n\n## Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap\n\nAfter Phase 1a notes are durable, perform sandbox bootstrap.\n\nGoal: leave `sandbox/` in a state where Phase 2 can run.\n\nRequired output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\nWorkflow:\n\n1. Inspect current sandbox state:\n\n make sandbox-status\n\n2. Inspect target runtime artifacts under `src/`. At minimum\n consider:\n\n src/Dockerfile\n src/docker-compose.yml\n src/docker-compose.yaml\n src/compose.yml\n src/compose.yaml\n src/Makefile\n src/scripts/\n src/README*\n src/INSTALL*\n src/CONTRIBUTING*\n src/RUN*\n src/docs/\n\n Decide what to honor. Document the decision in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n3. Detect candidates:\n\n make sandbox-detect\n\n4. Inspect the chosen example:\n\n make sandbox-inspect ID=\n\n5. Apply the example:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n Or, for a preview without writing:\n\n BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--dry-run --var KEY=VAL' \\\n make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n\n `apply` refuses to overwrite a user-managed `sandbox/` (one\n without `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`). If the user has accepted the\n loss, re-run with `--force` and the prior content is moved to\n `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n\n5b. Implement the required sandbox capabilities.\n\n Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes. Each\n `templates/sandboxes//` ships only `Dockerfile`,\n `docker-compose.yml`, a starter `build.sh`, and a\n starter `test.sh`. After `apply`, the agent must\n leave `sandbox/` with working mechanisms for:\n\n sandbox setup\n sandbox start\n sandbox sanity\n target build\n target test\n sandbox stop\n\n Prefer helper scripts under `sandbox/scripts/` such as:\n\n setup.sh up.sh check.sh build.sh test.sh\n\n Add operational helpers when they make sense for the target:\n\n down.sh shell.sh logs.sh clean.sh reset.sh\n\n Prefer a realistic runtime environment when it is reasonably\n derivable from the repository. For web apps, APIs, and other\n services, Phase 1b should attempt to start the real application\n stack, not just compile it. If the target appears to need a\n database, cache, queue, reverse proxy, migrations, seed data,\n or health checks, include those when the source tree or docs\n make them inferable.\n\n Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when\n later Phase 4 or Phase 5 validation would realistically require\n a running application. If full runtime is not feasible,\n document the closest achievable runtime model and the blocker in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n\n Adapt `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the actual\n project layout (the source may be nested under\n `src//`, not directly under `src/`). Author additional\n scripts when they help the target (sanitizer build, fuzzing\n harness, debugger attach, target-specific reset, etc.).\n Make every script executable. Document any extras in\n `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \\\"Extra scripts authored\\\".\n\n Do not record any validation tier as `skipped` because the\n required capability is missing. Either implement the helper and\n run the tier, or accept the `failed` outcome the validator emits.\n\n Do not replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual\n spot-check. Manual checks do not survive future runs.\n\n See `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for\n authoring conventions and the sandbox capability contract.\n\n6. Validate:\n\n make sandbox-validate\n\n Use `BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going'` to run all tiers even after\n a failure, or `--scripts-only` / `--docker-only` to constrain\n which mode is used.\n\n `validate` appends a \\\"Validation run \\\" table to\n `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` and returns JSON with\n `--format json`. Capture per-tier outcomes (passed / failed /\n skipped, exit code, last 50 lines of stderr) into the validation\n matrix in `sandbox-plan.md`. A missing required capability makes\n the tier `failed`; that means you still need to complete step 5b.\n\n7. If validation fails, attempt automatic remediations within the\n retry budget (`CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`, default 3). Each\n attempt must be logged in `sandbox-plan.md`. When the budget is\n exhausted, write the halt protocol in `sandbox-plan.md` and\n stop Phase 1b.\n\n8. Special validation models:\n\n - `static-only`: requires explicit justification in\n `sandbox-plan.md`.\n - `nested-virt`: requires explicit justification and arch\n declaration.\n\n## Important rules\n\n- Do not assume the target is a web application.\n- Do not assume the target can be built.\n- Do not assume the target can be executed.\n- Do not modify files under `src/`.\n- Do not generate low-confidence vulnerability findings during\n reconnaissance.\n- Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n- Do not silently overwrite a `sandbox/` that lacks\n `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`. Validate first; if it works, move on; if\n it does not, halt with the halt protocol.\n- Be explicit about uncertainty.\n- Prefer useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n- Focus on what later phases need.\n- Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad\n mapping is complete.\n- Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope when a reasonable default can\n be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document\n secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n- Do not phrase optional preferences as \\\"User input requested\\\". Use\n \\\"Optional follow-up\\\" unless Phase 1 halted.\n- Reading `.env` files is allowed only in two places during reconnaissance:\n target inputs under `src/**` and CodeCome-generated sandbox metadata in\n `sandbox/.env`. Avoid unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n\n## Final response\n\nAt the end, summarize:\n\n- target type,\n- most important attack surfaces,\n- recommended Phase 2 focus,\n- highest-risk files from `file-risk-index.yml`,\n- files created or updated (Phase 1a + Phase 1b),\n- chosen sandbox example and `validation_model`,\n- validation outcome (`passed`, `passed-with-warnings`, `halted`),\n- key limitations,\n- halt requirements if Phase 1 is blocked,\n- optional follow-up scope controls users may pass via `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\nRun `make frontmatter` to ensure the generated file risk index has valid YAML and fix any reported errors before finishing.\"", + "model": "minimax/minimax-m2.5", + "turnIndex": 26, + "hasToolResult": true + }, + "response": { + "content": "## Phase 1 Complete\n\n### Summary\n\n**Target Type**: C CLI tool (`sample-c-cli`)\n\n**Most Important Attack Surfaces**:\n1. **Remove command** - Shell command injection via `system()`\n2. **Echo command** - Format string vulnerability via `printf`\n3. **Greet command** - Buffer handling issues via `memcpy`\n\n**Recommended Phase 2 Focus**: \n- Hypothesis generation on the three vulnerable functions in `src/greet.c`\n- OS command injection, format string, and buffer overflow vulnerabilities\n\n**Highest-Risk Files from `file-risk-index.yml`**:\n1. `src/greet.c` — Score 5 (command injection, format string, buffer handling)\n2. `src/util.c` — Score 4 (integer handling in buffer operations)\n3. `src/main.c` — Score 3 (CLI entrypoint)\n\n### Files Created/Updated\n\n**Phase 1a (Reconnaissance Notes)**:\n- `itemdb/notes/target-profile.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/build-model.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/execution-model.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/data-flow.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/validation-model.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml`\n\n**Phase 1b (Sandbox Bootstrap)**:\n- `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`\n- `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` (already existed, validation updated)\n\n### Sandbox Details\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| **Chosen Example** | `c-cpp` |\n| **Validation Model** | `docker` |\n| **Validation Outcome** | `passed` (all 6 tiers) |\n\n### Key Limitations\n\n- No network vulnerabilities possible (CLI tool has no network capabilities)\n- No database or external service dependencies\n- Simple build-only runtime model is appropriate for this target\n\n### Validation Status\n\n```\n✓ Phase 1a complete (10 notes created)\n✓ Phase 1b complete (sandbox-plan.md created)\n✓ All validation tiers passed\n✓ Frontmatter validation passed\n```\n\n**Phase 2 is ready for hypothesis generation.**" + }, + "metadata": { + "systemHash": "a552cd6a", + "toolsHash": "50026d33" + } + } + ] +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/recordings/phase-1.json b/tests/fixtures/recordings/phase-1.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..346bfb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/recordings/phase-1.json @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +Phase 1: Target Reconnaissance + +[OK] src/ contains source files. + +[OK] Ready to run Phase 1. +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039156048,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ff374c001lHsPMwaoipbpv3","messageID":"msg_e36ff3000001wcz7905lcImUAZ","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"231137d157d43121820ed8a41c183aafa20ae04e","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039171656,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_bab621327fa46823","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/AGENTS.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/AGENTS.md\nfile\n\n1: # CodeCome Agent Instructions\n2: \n3: You are working inside a CodeCome vulnerability research workspace.\n4: \n5: CodeCome is an AI-assisted vulnerability research workflow. Its purpose is to help inspect source code, identify attack surfaces, create structured vulnerability hypotheses, perform counter-analysis, validate findings inside a sandbox, and produce reviewable Markdown reports.\n6: \n7: ## Prime directive\n8: \n9: Produce durable artifacts.\n10: \n11: Important security claims must be written to files under `itemdb/`, not left only in chat history or transient run output.\n12: \n13: ## Workspace layout\n14: \n15: - `codecome.yml`: project configuration and audit settings.\n16: - `src/`: target source code to audit.\n17: - `sandbox/`: sandboxed execution and validation environment.\n18: - `itemdb/`: file-based finding database, notes, reports, and evidence.\n19: - `itemdb/notes/`: reconnaissance notes and target model.\n20: - `itemdb/findings/PENDING/`: candidate findings requiring validation.\n21: - `itemdb/findings/CONFIRMED/`: validated findings with evidence.\n22: - `itemdb/findings/EXPLOITED/`: confirmed findings with demonstrated real-world impact.\n23: - `itemdb/findings/REJECTED/`: disproven or non-actionable findings.\n24: - `itemdb/findings/DUPLICATE/`: duplicate findings.\n25: - `itemdb/evidence/`: validation evidence, grouped by finding id.\n26: - `itemdb/reports/`: generated Markdown reports.\n27: - `runs/`: run prompts, summaries, and transcripts when available.\n28: - `templates/`: required Markdown templates.\n29: - `tools/`: helper scripts.\n30: - `.opencode/agents/`: specialized agent definitions.\n31: - `.opencode/skills/`: reusable skills.\n32: \n33: ## General rules\n34: \n35: 1. Do not modify target source code under `src/` unless explicitly instructed.\n36: 2. **Never modify project orchestration or configuration files (`codecome.yml`, `AGENTS.md`, Makefile, `.opencode/` configs, etc.) unless explicitly instructed. Your role is to audit or validate the target, not to reconfigure the project.**\n37: 3. Prefer reading and analyzing before writing.\n38: 3. Do not create vague findings.\n39: 4. Do not mark a finding as confirmed without evidence.\n40: 5. Always distinguish hypothesis from confirmed vulnerability.\n41: 6. Always include counter-analysis for every finding.\n42: 7. Always include a validation plan for every finding.\n43: 8. Store validation evidence under `itemdb/evidence//`.\n44: 9. Keep findings reviewable by humans.\n45: 10. Use precise file paths, function names, symbols, routes, commands, or configuration keys whenever possible.\n46: 11. If a target-specific skill applies, use it, but keep the core workflow target-agnostic.\n47: 12. Do not rely only on filenames, comments, benchmark labels, or directory names to claim a vulnerability.\n48: 13. NEVER use the absolute path `/tmp/` for any temporary files, downloads, or operations. The sandbox will reject `/tmp/`. Always use the workspace-relative `tmp/` directory.\n49: \n50: ## Local quality gate (no CI)\n51: \n52: This repository currently relies on local developer checks instead of CI.\n53: \n54: Before committing or pushing changes, run:\n55: \n56: make tests\n57: \n58: This command runs `pytest` for `tests/` and then validates finding frontmatter using `tools/check-frontmatter.py`.\n59: \n60: ## Allowed write locations\n61: \n62: Unless explicitly instructed otherwise, write only under:\n63: \n64: - `itemdb/`\n65: - `runs/`\n66: - `sandbox/`\n67: - `templates/`\n68: - `tools/`\n69: - `tmp/`\n70: - `.opencode/`\n71: \n72: **IMPORTANT SANDBOX RULE:** Never use the absolute path `/tmp/` in any tool or shell command, as it will be rejected by the OpenCode sandbox. Instead, always use the workspace-relative `tmp/` directory for temporary files, downloads, or scratch space.\n73: \n74: Do not write into `src/` except for temporary instrumentation when explicitly authorized.\n75: \n76: ## Target-agnostic mindset\n77: \n78: The target under `src/` may be:\n79: \n80: - a web application,\n81: - a backend service,\n82: - a CLI tool,\n83: - a library,\n84: - a benchmark corpus,\n85: - infrastructure-as-code,\n86: - a mobile project,\n87: - a desktop app,\n88: - a firmware tree,\n89: - or a mixed repository.\n90: \n91: During reconnaissance, infer the target model before reporting vulnerabilities.\n92: \n93: ## Core phases\n94: \n95: ### Phase 1: Target reconnaissance\n96: \n97: Goal: understand the target.\n98: \n99: Create or update these files:\n100: \n101: - `itemdb/notes/target-profile.md`\n102: - `itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md`\n103: - `itemdb/notes/build-model.md`\n104: - `itemdb/notes/execution-model.md`\n105: - `itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md`\n106: - `itemdb/notes/data-flow.md`\n107: - `itemdb/notes/validation-model.md`\n108: - `itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md`\n109: - `itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md`\n110: \n111: Do not create findings during reconnaissance unless there is an extremely obvious, high-confidence, security-relevant issue.\n112: \n113: ### Phase 2: Hypothesis generation\n114: \n115: Goal: create precise candidate findings.\n116: \n117: Write findings under:\n118: \n119: - `itemdb/findings/PENDING/`\n120: \n121: Each finding must:\n122: \n123: - use the template from `templates/finding.md` when available,\n124: - have a stable id,\n125: - identify affected code,\n126: - describe source-to-sink or trust-boundary reasoning,\n127: - explain attackability,\n128: - explain impact,\n129: - include validation plan,\n130: - include counter-analysis placeholder,\n131: - avoid generic claims.\n132: \n133: ### Phase 3: Counter-analysis\n134: \n135: Goal: disprove weak findings.\n136: \n137: For each finding under `PENDING`:\n138: \n139: - look for existing mitigations,\n140: - check reachability,\n141: - check attacker control,\n142: - check trust boundaries,\n143: - check framework protections,\n144: - check whether assumptions are false,\n145: - check for duplicates,\n146: - lower confidence when needed,\n147: - move clearly invalid findings to `REJECTED`,\n148: - move duplicates to `DUPLICATE`.\n149: \n150: ### Phase 4: Validation\n151: \n152: Goal: prove or disprove one finding at a time.\n153: \n154: Use `sandbox/` as the sandbox.\n155: \n156: Validation may use:\n157: \n158: - static proof,\n159: - unit test,\n160: - integration test,\n161: - runtime reproduction,\n162: - sanitizer output,\n163: - crash reproduction,\n164: - HTTP exploit,\n165: - CLI exploit,\n166: - crafted input file,\n167: - config-based trigger,\n168: - log evidence,\n169: - database evidence,\n170: - debugger trace,\n171: - benchmark oracle comparison.\n172: \n173: A finding may be marked `CONFIRMED` only when the evidence is clear and reproducible enough.\n174: \n175: Benchmark labels alone are not enough for `CONFIRMED`.\n176: \n177: ### Phase 5: Exploit development\n178: \n179: Goal: demonstrate real-world impact of confirmed vulnerabilities.\n180: \n181: For selected `CONFIRMED` findings, develop proof-of-concept exploits that show what an attacker can actually achieve. This phase answers the question developers always ask: \"So what? What can an attacker actually do with this?\"\n182: \n183: The exploiter agent:\n184: \n185: - starts from existing validation evidence,\n186: - escalates impact (crash to code execution, read to secret exfiltration, bypass to full admin access),\n187: - produces self-contained, reproducible PoC scripts,\n188: - writes clear impact narratives,\n189: - adjusts severity based on demonstrated impact,\n190: - stores exploitation artifacts under `itemdb/evidence//exploits/`.\n191: \n192: A finding may be moved to `EXPLOITED` only when a working proof-of-concept demonstrates concrete impact beyond the initial validation.\n193: \n194: If exploitation is not feasible within the sandbox, the finding stays in `CONFIRMED` with a documented explanation.\n195: \n196: ### Phase 6: Reporting\n197: \n198: Goal: produce Markdown reports.\n199: \n200: Reports should include:\n201: \n202: - executive summary,\n203: - target summary,\n204: - methodology,\n205: - exploited findings (with demonstrated impact),\n206: - confirmed findings,\n207: - rejected/duplicate summary if useful,\n208: - evidence references,\n209: - limitations,\n210: - recommended next steps.\n211: \n212: ## Finding quality bar\n213: \n214: A valid finding must answer:\n215: \n216: - What is the vulnerable component?\n217: - Where is the affected code?\n218: - What is the attacker-controlled input?\n219: - What trust boundary is crossed?\n220: - What dangerous sink or security decision is reached?\n221: - Why existing controls are insufficient?\n222: - What is the impact?\n223: - How can it be validated?\n224: - What evidence confirms or rejects it?\n225: \n226: Do not create findings like:\n227: \n228: > Potential SQL injection may exist because the project uses SQL.\n229: \n230: Create findings like:\n231: \n232: > User-controlled `sort` reaches raw SQL `ORDER BY` construction in `SearchRepository.BuildQuery()` without allowlist validation.\n233: \n234: ## Confidence levels\n235: \n236: Use these confidence levels:\n237: \n238: - `LOW`: plausible but weak; assumptions are significant.\n239: - `MEDIUM`: credible source-to-sink or trust-boundary path exists.\n240: - `HIGH`: strong static evidence exists, but runtime validation is still pending.\n241: - `CONFIRMED`: validated with evidence.\n242: \n243: ## Severity levels\n244: \n245: Use these severity levels:\n246: \n247: - `CRITICAL`\n248: - `HIGH`\n249: - `MEDIUM`\n250: - `LOW`\n251: - `INFO`\n252: \n253: Do not over-focus on CVSS in the PoC. Prefer clear technical impact.\n254: \n255: ## Status values\n256: \n257: Use only these status values:\n258: \n259: - `PENDING`\n260: - `CONFIRMED`\n261: - `EXPLOITED`\n262: - `REJECTED`\n263: - `DUPLICATE`\n264: \n265: ## Evidence rules\n266: \n267: For each confirmed or exploited finding, create:\n268: \n269: - `itemdb/evidence//README.md`\n270: \n271: Add relevant artifacts when available:\n272: \n273: - requests,\n274: - responses,\n275: - logs,\n276: - screenshots,\n277: - terminal output,\n278: - exploit scripts,\n279: - generated inputs,\n280: - sanitizer reports,\n281: - crash dumps,\n282: - debugger notes,\n283: - database state,\n284: - test output.\n285: \n286: For exploited findings, also create:\n287: \n288: - `itemdb/evidence//exploits/README.md` (using `templates/exploit-readme.md`)\n289: \n290: With additional artifacts such as:\n291: \n292: - proof-of-concept exploit scripts,\n293: - crafted payloads,\n294: - captured output demonstrating impact,\n295: - impact logs.\n296: \n297: ## Validation safety rules\n298: \n299: The validator may freely experiment inside the sandbox environment under `sandbox/`.\n300: \n301: The validator may install packages, build code, run tools, reset test data, and execute proof-of-concept inputs inside the sandbox.\n302: \n303: The validator must not attack third-party systems.\n304: \n305: The validator must not exfiltrate secrets.\n306: \n307: The validator must not modify production systems.\n308: \n309: The validator must not perform destructive actions outside the local sandbox.\n310: \n311: ## Target-specific behavior\n312: \n313: Target-specific logic belongs in skills.\n314: \n315: Examples:\n316: \n317: - `.opencode/skills/c-cpp-security/`\n318: - `.opencode/skills/web-security/`\n319: - `.opencode/skills/dotnet-security/`\n320: - `.opencode/skills/php-security/`\n321: - `.opencode/skills/sql-injection/`\n322: - `.opencode/skills/juliet-benchmark/`\n323: - `.opencode/skills/iac-security/`\n324: \n325: If the target appears to match a skill, apply the skill, but do not hardcode the whole workflow around a single target type.\n326: \n327: ## Phase handoff protocol\n328: \n329: CodeCome phases are executed sequentially and orchestrated by the user via `make` commands.\n330: \n331: Each phase has readiness gates that must be satisfied before it can run:\n332: \n333: ### Phase 1 readiness\n334: \n335: - `src/` must contain target source code.\n336: - No other prerequisites.\n337: \n338: ### Phase 2 readiness\n339: \n340: - `itemdb/notes/target-profile.md` must exist.\n341: - `itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md` must exist.\n342: - At least one reconnaissance note file must exist under `itemdb/notes/`.\n343: \n344: ### Phase 3 readiness\n345: \n346: - At least one finding must exist under `itemdb/findings/PENDING/`.\n347: \n348: ### Phase 4 readiness\n349: \n350: - A specific finding ID must be provided (e.g., `CC-0001`).\n351: - The finding must be in `PENDING` status.\n352: \n353: ### Phase 5 readiness\n354: \n355: - A specific finding ID must be provided (e.g., `CC-0001`).\n356: - The finding must be in `CONFIRMED` status.\n357: - Validation evidence must exist under `itemdb/evidence//`.\n358: \n359: ### Phase 6 readiness\n360: \n361: - At least one finding must exist in any status directory.\n362: \n363: ### Orchestration model\n364: \n365: The user drives phase transitions by running:\n366: \n367: make phase-1 # Reconnaissance\n368: make phase-2 # Hypothesis generation\n369: make phase-3 # Counter-analysis\n370: make phase-4 FINDING=CC-0001 # Validate one finding\n371: make phase-5 FINDING=CC-0001 # Develop exploit for one finding\n372: make phase-6 # Reporting\n373: \n374: Each `make` target checks readiness gates before invoking the corresponding agent.\n375: \n376: Phase 4 is invoked once per finding, not as a batch.\n377: Phase 5 is invoked once per finding, not as a batch.\n378: \n379: For convenience, `make validate-all` iterates over all `PENDING` findings sequentially.\n380: For convenience, `make exploit-all` iterates over all `CONFIRMED` findings sequentially.\n381: \n382: No automatic handoff occurs between phases. The user decides when to advance.\n383: \n384: ## Run summaries\n385: \n386: When practical, write a short run summary under `runs/`.\n387: \n388: Use the template: `templates/run-summary.md`\n389: \n390: A run summary should include:\n391: \n392: - date,\n393: - phase,\n394: - prompt or goal,\n395: - files read,\n396: - files created or modified,\n397: - findings created,\n398: - findings moved,\n399: - important assumptions,\n400: - next recommended step.\n401: \n402: ## License\n403: \n404: CodeCome is dual-licensed under your choice of:\n405: \n406: - GNU General Public License version 3 or later (`GPL-3.0-or-later`), or\n407: - GNU Affero General Public License version 3 or later (`AGPL-3.0-or-later`).\n408: \n409: SPDX expression: `GPL-3.0-or-later OR AGPL-3.0-or-later`.\n410: \n411: The files under `templates/sandboxes/` are an exception: they are\n412: licensed under the **MIT License** so they can be copied into user\n413: workspaces without imposing copyleft obligations on those user\n414: projects.\n415: \n416: See `LICENSE`, `AGPL-LICENSE`, `templates/sandboxes/LICENSE`, and\n417: `NOTICE`. Contributions are accepted under the terms described in\n418: `CONTRIBUTING.md`.\n419: \n420: Copyright (C) 2025-2026 Pablo Ruiz García <pablo.ruiz@gmail.com>.\n\n(End of file - total 420 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# CodeCome Agent Instructions\n\nYou are working inside a CodeCome vulnerability research workspace.\n\nCodeCome is an AI-assisted vulnerability research workflow. Its purpose is to help inspect source code, identify attack surfaces, create structured vulnerability hypotheses, perform counter-analysis, validate findings inside a sandbox, and produce reviewable Markdown reports.\n\n## Prime directive\n\nProduce durable artifacts.\n\nImportant security claims must be written to files under `itemdb/`, not left only in chat history or transient run output.\n\n## Workspace layout\n\n- `codecome.yml`: project configuration and audit settings.\n- `src/`: target source code to audit.\n- `sandbox/`: sandboxed execution and validation environment.\n- `itemdb/`: file-based finding database, notes, reports, and evidence.\n- `itemdb/notes/`: reconnaissance notes and target model.\n- `itemdb/findings/PENDING/`: candidate findings requiring validation.","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"AGENTS.md","time":{"start":1779039171640,"end":1779039171653}},"id":"prt_e36ff7434001MSrpijejKB6wM2","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff3000001wcz7905lcImUAZ"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039171656,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_2c78d1635d51f0c1","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/codecome.yml"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/codecome.yml\nfile\n\n1: project:\n2: name: \"codecome-target\"\n3: source_path: \"./src\"\n4: profile: \"auto\"\n5: languages:\n6: - \"auto\"\n7: \n8: target:\n9: description: \"Source code to be audited by CodeCome.\"\n10: assumptions:\n11: - \"The agent must infer the target type during reconnaissance.\"\n12: - \"The source may be a web app, service, CLI tool, library, benchmark corpus, infrastructure repository, firmware tree, or mixed project.\"\n13: - \"Target-specific logic must live in skills, notes, or adapters, not in the core workflow.\"\n14: \n15: audit:\n16: mode: \"sequential\"\n17: \n18: phases:\n19: - reconnaissance\n20: - hypothesis_generation\n21: - counter_analysis\n22: - validation\n23: - exploit_development\n24: - reporting\n25: \n26: semantic_deduplication:\n27: enabled: true\n28: phase: \"counter_analysis\"\n29: compare_fields:\n30: - \"category\"\n31: - \"target_area\"\n32: - \"files\"\n33: - \"symbols\"\n34: - \"entry_points\"\n35: - \"sources\"\n36: - \"sinks\"\n37: - \"trust_boundary\"\n38: - \"assets_at_risk\"\n39: \n40: # Per-phase extra instructions appended to the phase prompt.\n41: # These are persistent and always applied when the phase runs.\n42: # See also: PROMPT_EXTRA and PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE env vars for ad-hoc use.\n43: #\n44: # extra_prompts:\n45: # reconnaissance: |\n46: # Focus sandbox on ASAN builds.\n47: # Skip fuzzing harness for now.\n48: # hypothesis_generation: |\n49: # Prioritize memory safety issues over logic bugs.\n50: \n51: scope:\n52: include:\n53: - \"src/**\"\n54: exclude:\n55: - \"src/**/.git/**\"\n56: - \"src/**/.svn/**\"\n57: - \"src/**/.hg/**\"\n58: - \"src/**/node_modules/**\"\n59: - \"src/**/vendor/**\"\n60: - \"src/**/packages/**\"\n61: - \"src/**/bin/**\"\n62: - \"src/**/obj/**\"\n63: - \"src/**/target/**\"\n64: - \"src/**/build/**\"\n65: - \"src/**/dist/**\"\n66: - \"src/**/.next/**\"\n67: - \"src/**/.gradle/**\"\n68: - \"src/**/.idea/**\"\n69: - \"src/**/.vscode/**\"\n70: \n71: focus:\n72: - \"Authentication and authorization flaws\"\n73: - \"Injection vulnerabilities\"\n74: - \"Memory safety issues\"\n75: - \"Path traversal\"\n76: - \"Unsafe deserialization\"\n77: - \"Cryptographic misuse\"\n78: - \"Secrets exposure\"\n79: - \"Business logic vulnerabilities\"\n80: - \"Supply chain risks\"\n81: - \"Insecure configuration\"\n82: - \"Improper input validation\"\n83: - \"Server-side request forgery\"\n84: - \"File upload vulnerabilities\"\n85: - \"Race conditions\"\n86: - \"Privilege escalation\"\n87: \n88: environment:\n89: type: \"sandbox\"\n90: path: \"./sandbox\"\n91: startup_command: \"./sandbox/scripts/up.sh\"\n92: shell_command: \"./sandbox/scripts/shell.sh\"\n93: reset_command: \"./sandbox/scripts/reset.sh\"\n94: logs_command: \"./sandbox/scripts/logs.sh\"\n95: clean_command: \"./sandbox/scripts/clean.sh\"\n96: \n97: validation:\n98: worker_count: 1\n99: allow_destructive_actions_inside_sandbox: true\n100: allow_source_modification: false\n101: \n102: allowed_write_paths:\n103: - \"./itemdb\"\n104: - \"./runs\"\n105: - \"./sandbox\"\n106: - \"./tmp\"\n107: - \"/workspace/itemdb\"\n108: - \"/workspace/runs\"\n109: - \"/workspace/sandbox\"\n110: - \"/workspace/tmp\"\n111: \n112: methods:\n113: - \"static_proof\"\n114: - \"unit_test\"\n115: - \"integration_test\"\n116: - \"runtime_reproduction\"\n117: - \"sanitizer_detection\"\n118: - \"crash_reproduction\"\n119: - \"http_exploit\"\n120: - \"cli_exploit\"\n121: - \"file_based_trigger\"\n122: - \"config_based_trigger\"\n123: - \"symbolic_or_manual_trace\"\n124: - \"benchmark_oracle_comparison\"\n125: \n126: confirmation_policy:\n127: - \"A finding may only be marked CONFIRMED when clear evidence exists.\"\n128: - \"Benchmark labels alone are not enough to mark a finding CONFIRMED.\"\n129: - \"If runtime validation is not practical, a strong static proof may be acceptable, but the limitation must be documented.\"\n130: - \"If assumptions cannot be validated, keep the finding in PENDING or move it to REJECTED.\"\n131: \n132: reporting:\n133: format: \"markdown\"\n134: findings_dir: \"./itemdb/findings\"\n135: evidence_dir: \"./itemdb/evidence\"\n136: reports_dir: \"./itemdb/reports\"\n137: default_status: \"PENDING\"\n138: \n139: finding:\n140: id_prefix: \"CC\"\n141: template: \"./templates/finding.md\"\n142: \n143: statuses:\n144: - \"PENDING\"\n145: - \"CONFIRMED\"\n146: - \"EXPLOITED\"\n147: - \"REJECTED\"\n148: - \"DUPLICATE\"\n149: \n150: severities:\n151: - \"CRITICAL\"\n152: - \"HIGH\"\n153: - \"MEDIUM\"\n154: - \"LOW\"\n155: - \"INFO\"\n156: \n157: confidences:\n158: - \"LOW\"\n159: - \"MEDIUM\"\n160: - \"HIGH\"\n161: - \"CONFIRMED\"\n162: \n163: skills:\n164: directory: \"./.opencode/skills\"\n165: selection_policy:\n166: - \"Use generic skills by default.\"\n167: - \"Use target-specific skills only when the target profile, language, or framework matches.\"\n168: - \"Do not hardcode the workflow around a single target type.\"\n169: \n170: agents:\n171: directory: \"./.opencode/agents\"\n172: default_mode: \"single_agent_sequential\"\n173: \n174: # Optional per-agent model and variant pinning consumed by\n175: # tools/run-agent.py (the wrapper used by `make phase-*`).\n176: # Resolution priority: OPENCODE_ARGS > env (CODECOME_MODEL,\n177: # CODECOME_MODEL_VARIANT) > codecome.yml > unknown.\n178: #\n179: # Uncomment and adjust to pin specific models per phase:\n180: #\n181: # recon:\n182: # model: \"anthropic/claude-opus-4-7\"\n183: # variant: \"high\"\n184: # auditor:\n185: # model: \"anthropic/claude-opus-4-7\"\n186: # reviewer:\n187: # model: \"anthropic/claude-opus-4-7\"\n188: # validator:\n189: # model: \"anthropic/claude-opus-4-7\"\n190: # exploiter:\n191: # model: \"anthropic/claude-opus-4-7\"\n192: # reporter:\n193: # model: \"anthropic/claude-opus-4-7\"\n194: \n\n(End of file - total 194 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"project:\n name: \"codecome-target\"\n source_path: \"./src\"\n profile: \"auto\"\n languages:\n - \"auto\"\n\ntarget:\n description: \"Source code to be audited by CodeCome.\"\n assumptions:\n - \"The agent must infer the target type during reconnaissance.\"\n - \"The source may be a web app, service, CLI tool, library, benchmark corpus, infrastructure repository, firmware tree, or mixed project.\"\n - \"Target-specific logic must live in skills, notes, or adapters, not in the core workflow.\"\n\naudit:\n mode: \"sequential\"\n\n phases:\n - reconnaissance\n - hypothesis_generation","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"codecome.yml","time":{"start":1779039171643,"end":1779039171654}},"id":"prt_e36ff743a001kmyAIC8133KEdU","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff3000001wcz7905lcImUAZ"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039171656,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_74aebdd64dec532f","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/templates/file-risk-index.yml"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/templates/file-risk-index.yml\nfile\n\n1: # CodeCome file risk index template\n2: #\n3: # Generated during Phase 1 and consumed by optional file-by-file Phase 2 sweeps.\n4: # Scores are intentionally coarse so agents can prioritize attention without\n5: # pretending the ranking is precise.\n6: \n7: schema_version: 1\n8: generated_by: \"phase-1-recon\"\n9: generated_at: \"YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ\"\n10: target: \"codecome-target\"\n11: scoring_scale:\n12: min: 1\n13: max: 5\n14: meaning:\n15: \"1\": \"Low security interest; unlikely to cross a trust boundary or reach a dangerous sink.\"\n16: \"2\": \"Some security relevance, but weak attacker control or low impact.\"\n17: \"3\": \"Moderate interest; plausible source, sink, or security decision.\"\n18: \"4\": \"High interest; likely attack surface, trust boundary, parser, authz/authn, or dangerous sink.\"\n19: \"5\": \"Very high interest; externally reachable, security-critical, complex parser, privileged operation, or historically bug-prone surface.\"\n20: \n21: scoring_dimensions:\n22: - attacker_controlled_input\n23: - externally_influenced_state\n24: - trust_boundary_crossing\n25: - security_decision\n26: - dangerous_sink\n27: - parser_complexity\n28: - privilege_boundary\n29: - asset_sensitivity\n30: - historical_vulnerability_density\n31: - validation_feasibility\n32: \n33: files:\n34: - path: \"src/example/path/to/file.ext\"\n35: score: 5\n36: confidence: \"MEDIUM\"\n37: target_area: \"example component or feature\"\n38: reasons:\n39: - \"Handles attacker-controlled input.\"\n40: - \"Crosses a trust boundary before reaching a security-sensitive operation.\"\n41: entry_points:\n42: - \"HTTP POST /example\"\n43: - \"CLI argument --example\"\n44: sources:\n45: - \"request.body.example\"\n46: sinks:\n47: - \"ExampleService.security_sensitive_operation\"\n48: trust_boundaries:\n49: - \"untrusted user -> server-side parser\"\n50: suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n51: - \"Injection vulnerabilities\"\n52: - \"Path traversal\"\n53: suggested_skills:\n54: - \"web-security\"\n55: suggested_validation_methods:\n56: - \"static_proof\"\n57: - \"http_exploit\"\n58: notes: \"Replace this example entry with target-specific ranked files.\"\n\n(End of file - total 58 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# CodeCome file risk index template\n#\n# Generated during Phase 1 and consumed by optional file-by-file Phase 2 sweeps.\n# Scores are intentionally coarse so agents can prioritize attention without\n# pretending the ranking is precise.\n\nschema_version: 1\ngenerated_by: \"phase-1-recon\"\ngenerated_at: \"YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ\"\ntarget: \"codecome-target\"\nscoring_scale:\n min: 1\n max: 5\n meaning:\n \"1\": \"Low security interest; unlikely to cross a trust boundary or reach a dangerous sink.\"\n \"2\": \"Some security relevance, but weak attacker control or low impact.\"\n \"3\": \"Moderate interest; plausible source, sink, or security decision.\"\n \"4\": \"High interest; likely attack surface, trust boundary, parser, authz/authn, or dangerous sink.\"\n \"5\": \"Very high interest; externally reachable, security-critical, complex parser, privileged operation, or historically bug-prone surface.\"\n","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"templates/file-risk-index.yml","time":{"start":1779039171646,"end":1779039171655}},"id":"prt_e36ff743d002mRUZkn92jWmw4i","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff3000001wcz7905lcImUAZ"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039171656,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_a9147156a21b4600","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/templates/target-recon.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/templates/target-recon.md\nfile\n\n1: # Target Reconnaissance Notes\n2: \n3: Date: YYYY-MM-DD \n4: Phase: reconnaissance \n5: Target path: `./src`\n6: \n7: # Executive summary\n8: \n9: Briefly summarize what the target appears to be.\n10: \n11: Include:\n12: \n13: - target type,\n14: - main languages,\n15: - main frameworks or technologies,\n16: - execution model,\n17: - most relevant attack surfaces,\n18: - most relevant validation approach.\n19: \n20: # Target profile\n21: \n22: ## Detected target type\n23: \n24: Examples:\n25: \n26: - web application,\n27: - backend service,\n28: - CLI tool,\n29: - library,\n30: - benchmark corpus,\n31: - infrastructure-as-code repository,\n32: - firmware tree,\n33: - desktop application,\n34: - mobile application,\n35: - mixed repository.\n36: \n37: Detected type:\n38: \n39: TBD\n40: \n41: Confidence:\n42: \n43: LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH\n44: \n45: ## Languages\n46: \n47: List detected languages and relevant file patterns.\n48: \n49: ## Frameworks and technologies\n50: \n51: List relevant frameworks, runtimes, package managers, build systems, and deployment technologies.\n52: \n53: ## Repository structure\n54: \n55: Describe the relevant directory layout.\n56: \n57: Focus on directories that matter for security review.\n58: \n59: # Build model\n60: \n61: Describe how the target appears to be built.\n62: \n63: Include:\n64: \n65: - build files,\n66: - package manifests,\n67: - compiler/interpreter requirements,\n68: - test commands,\n69: - generated artifacts,\n70: - build assumptions,\n71: - missing information.\n72: \n73: # Execution model\n74: \n75: Describe how the target appears to run.\n76: \n77: Examples:\n78: \n79: - HTTP service,\n80: - background worker,\n81: - CLI executable,\n82: - library imported by callers,\n83: - benchmark testcase,\n84: - firmware component,\n85: - IaC deployment.\n86: \n87: Include entrypoints and runtime dependencies.\n88: \n89: # Attack surface\n90: \n91: List the detected attack surfaces.\n92: \n93: For each surface, include:\n94: \n95: - name,\n96: - type,\n97: - entrypoints,\n98: - input sources,\n99: - likely attacker control,\n100: - relevant files,\n101: - initial risk notes.\n102: \n103: Example surface types:\n104: \n105: - HTTP route,\n106: - RPC method,\n107: - CLI argument,\n108: - config file,\n109: - environment variable,\n110: - input file parser,\n111: - public library API,\n112: - message queue consumer,\n113: - database migration,\n114: - template renderer,\n115: - authentication flow,\n116: - authorization decision,\n117: - file upload,\n118: - filesystem operation,\n119: - external command execution,\n120: - cryptographic operation,\n121: - deserialization boundary,\n122: - network listener,\n123: - infrastructure exposure.\n124: \n125: # Trust boundaries\n126: \n127: Describe where untrusted or lower-trust data crosses into higher-trust components.\n128: \n129: Examples:\n130: \n131: - anonymous user to authenticated area,\n132: - authenticated user to admin function,\n133: - tenant A to tenant B,\n134: - external webhook to internal processing,\n135: - CLI user input to shell command,\n136: - input file to parser,\n137: - config file to privileged operation,\n138: - network packet to firmware parser,\n139: - user-controlled path to filesystem access.\n140: \n141: # Assets at risk\n142: \n143: List security-relevant assets.\n144: \n145: Examples:\n146: \n147: - user data,\n148: - tenant data,\n149: - credentials,\n150: - private keys,\n151: - tokens,\n152: - certificates,\n153: - filesystem contents,\n154: - database records,\n155: - admin functions,\n156: - signing operations,\n157: - internal network access,\n158: - service availability,\n159: - code execution context.\n160: \n161: # Dangerous sinks\n162: \n163: List security-sensitive sinks found or suspected.\n164: \n165: Examples:\n166: \n167: - raw SQL construction,\n168: - shell command execution,\n169: - filesystem reads/writes,\n170: - path joins,\n171: - template rendering,\n172: - unsafe deserialization,\n173: - memory copy operations,\n174: - pointer arithmetic,\n175: - cryptographic signing,\n176: - token validation,\n177: - authorization checks,\n178: - SSRF-capable HTTP clients,\n179: - XML parsers,\n180: - archive extraction,\n181: - dynamic code loading,\n182: - eval-like behavior,\n183: - privileged API calls.\n184: \n185: # Data flow notes\n186: \n187: Summarize important data flows.\n188: \n189: Focus on flows that may be security-relevant.\n190: \n191: # Security assumptions\n192: \n193: List assumptions made during reconnaissance.\n194: \n195: Mark each as:\n196: \n197: - confirmed,\n198: - likely,\n199: - unknown,\n200: - risky.\n201: \n202: # Interesting files\n203: \n204: List files or directories that should be reviewed during hypothesis generation.\n205: \n206: For each item, explain why it is interesting.\n207: \n208: # Recommended audit focus\n209: \n210: List the vulnerability classes that appear most relevant for this target.\n211: \n212: # Validation model\n213: \n214: Describe how findings should be validated for this target.\n215: \n216: Include:\n217: \n218: - whether the target can be built,\n219: - whether it can be run locally,\n220: - whether Docker is sufficient,\n221: - whether tests exist,\n222: - whether sanitizers/debuggers are useful,\n223: - whether HTTP/CLI/file-based validation applies,\n224: - what evidence should be captured.\n225: \n226: # Limitations\n227: \n228: List what could not be determined during reconnaissance.\n229: \n230: # Next steps\n231: \n232: Concrete recommendations for phase 2.\n\n(End of file - total 232 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# Target Reconnaissance Notes\n\nDate: YYYY-MM-DD \nPhase: reconnaissance \nTarget path: `./src`\n\n# Executive summary\n\nBriefly summarize what the target appears to be.\n\nInclude:\n\n- target type,\n- main languages,\n- main frameworks or technologies,\n- execution model,\n- most relevant attack surfaces,\n- most relevant validation approach.\n\n# Target profile","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"templates/target-recon.md","time":{"start":1779039171645,"end":1779039171655}},"id":"prt_e36ff743c001o1gt8jafoxbVbL","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff3000001wcz7905lcImUAZ"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039171776,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ff55000013Z6bwOX2jZh6ns","messageID":"msg_e36ff3000001wcz7905lcImUAZ","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"I'll start by reading the required files to understand the methodology, then explore the target source tree.\n","time":{"start":1779039163648,"end":1779039171773}}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039171866,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ff75190012lWxm1RYCagUY1","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"5560dab1d209f62bfdaaadcae0b2d9d9b24d3cdf","messageID":"msg_e36ff3000001wcz7905lcImUAZ","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":26278,"input":25890,"output":172,"reasoning":152,"cache":{"write":0,"read":64}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039173160,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ff7a2700104tYjD12k84k0k","messageID":"msg_e36ff7576001STkwn1Fu87q0ip","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"7ecdea398c6993a9962c79b4cc1612d497ba6509","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039180861,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ff7e5d0019HLVW1zu5bEXMb","messageID":"msg_e36ff7576001STkwn1Fu87q0ip","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"Now let me read the skill files and agent definitions:\n","time":{"start":1779039174237,"end":1779039180855}}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039180865,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_9377f1df927487dc","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/agents/recon.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/agents/recon.md\nfile\n\n1: # CodeCome Recon Agent\n2: \n3: You are the CodeCome Recon Agent.\n4: \n5: Your role is to perform target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n6: \n7: You do not create vulnerability findings unless explicitly instructed or unless an issue is extremely obvious, high-confidence, and security-relevant.\n8: \n9: **You must NEVER modify `codecome.yml`, `AGENTS.md`, Makefile, or any other project orchestration or configuration file. Your role is to perform reconnaissance on the target, not to reconfigure the project.**\n10: \n11: Your main output is a target model under:\n12: \n13: itemdb/notes/\n14: \n15: ## Required reading\n16: \n17: Before starting reconnaissance, read:\n18: \n19: - `AGENTS.md`\n20: - `codecome.yml`\n21: - `templates/target-recon.md`\n22: - `.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md`\n23: - `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`\n24: \n25: Also reference when writing run summaries:\n26: \n27: - `templates/run-summary.md`\n28: \n29: Do not load target-specific security skills before first mapping the source\n30: tree broadly. After broad structural mapping, you may consult target-specific\n31: skills only for reconnaissance checklists, not for vulnerability deep dives or\n32: finding generation.\n33: \n34: ## Mission\n35: \n36: Analyze the target under:\n37: \n38: src/\n39: \n40: **Important Pathing Rule**: Your absolute workspace root is in your `` block (`Workspace root folder`). Always prepend this to relative paths when using tools like `read`, `write`, or `edit`. Do NOT guess or hallucinate the root directory name.\n41: \n42: Infer:\n43: \n44: - target type,\n45: - languages,\n46: - frameworks and technologies,\n47: - repository structure,\n48: - build model,\n49: - execution model,\n50: - attack surfaces,\n51: - trust boundaries,\n52: - assets at risk,\n53: - dangerous sinks,\n54: - important data flows,\n55: - security assumptions,\n56: - interesting files,\n57: - validation model.\n58: \n59: ## Output files\n60: \n61: Phase 1 has two sub-stages:\n62: \n63: - Phase 1a: source reconnaissance.\n64: - Phase 1b: sandbox bootstrap.\n65: \n66: Both sub-stages must produce durable artifacts under `itemdb/notes/`.\n67: \n68: ### Phase 1a (recon notes)\n69: \n70: Create or update these required files:\n71: \n72: itemdb/notes/target-profile.md\n73: itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md\n74: itemdb/notes/build-model.md\n75: itemdb/notes/execution-model.md\n76: itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md\n77: itemdb/notes/data-flow.md\n78: itemdb/notes/validation-model.md\n79: itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md\n80: itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md\n81: \n82: Optional target-specific notes may also be created when useful:\n83: \n84: itemdb/notes/auth-model.md\n85: itemdb/notes/web-routes.md\n86: itemdb/notes/cli-commands.md\n87: itemdb/notes/public-api.md\n88: itemdb/notes/cwe-map.md\n89: itemdb/notes/benchmark-notes.md\n90: itemdb/notes/crypto-usage.md\n91: itemdb/notes/iac-resources.md\n92: \n93: ### Phase 1b (sandbox bootstrap)\n94: \n95: Required:\n96: \n97: itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md\n98: \n99: Optional but expected when bootstrap actually runs:\n100: \n101: sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md\n102: sandbox//>\n103: \n104: Phase 1b must run after Phase 1a in the same `make phase-1`\n105: invocation. Use `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md` for the\n106: detailed decision flow, the manual fallback, the validation tiers,\n107: and the halt protocol.\n108: \n109: ## Reconnaissance rules\n110: \n111: 1. Do not assume the target is a web application.\n112: 2. Do not assume the target can be built or executed.\n113: 3. Do not assume the target type before inspecting the source tree.\n114: 4. Do not modify `src/`.\n115: 5. Do not create low-confidence vulnerability findings during reconnaissance.\n116: 6. Do not rely only on filenames, comments, or labels.\n117: 7. Be explicit about uncertainty.\n118: 8. Prefer concise, useful notes over exhaustive dumps.\n119: 9. Identify what later agents should review.\n120: 10. Identify how later validators can prove or disprove findings.\n121: 11. Do not load vulnerability-family-specific skills such as `sql-injection` during reconnaissance unless needed only to improve attack-surface terminology. Do not let any target-specific skill narrow the target model before broad mapping is complete.\n122: 12. Do not ask the user to choose Phase 2 scope during reconnaissance when a reasonable default can be inferred. Pick the primary target from repository evidence, document secondary surfaces as optional follow-up, and continue.\n123: 13. NEVER use the absolute path `/tmp/` for any files, downloads, or tool arguments. Always use workspace-relative `tmp/`.\n124: \n125: ## Target profile\n126: \n127: In `itemdb/notes/target-profile.md`, document:\n128: \n129: - detected target type,\n130: - confidence,\n131: - languages,\n132: - frameworks and technologies,\n133: - repository structure,\n134: - important manifests or build files,\n135: - target-specific observations.\n136: \n137: Possible target types:\n138: \n139: - web application,\n140: - backend service,\n141: - CLI tool,\n142: - library,\n143: - benchmark corpus,\n144: - infrastructure-as-code repository,\n145: - firmware tree,\n146: - desktop application,\n147: - mobile application,\n148: - mixed repository,\n149: - unknown.\n150: \n151: ## Attack surface\n152: \n153: In `itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md`, document detected attack surfaces.\n154: \n155: For each surface, include:\n156: \n157: - name,\n158: - type,\n159: - entrypoint,\n160: - input sources,\n161: - likely attacker control,\n162: - trust boundary,\n163: - relevant files,\n164: - likely vulnerability classes,\n165: - recommended follow-up.\n166: \n167: Examples of surfaces:\n168: \n169: - HTTP routes,\n170: - RPC methods,\n171: - CLI arguments,\n172: - stdin,\n173: - input files,\n174: - config files,\n175: - environment variables,\n176: - public library APIs,\n177: - message consumers,\n178: - webhooks,\n179: - file uploads,\n180: - archive extraction,\n181: - XML/YAML/JSON parsing,\n182: - template rendering,\n183: - shell command wrappers,\n184: - filesystem operations,\n185: - dynamic code loading,\n186: - authentication flows,\n187: - authorization decisions,\n188: - cryptographic operations,\n189: - network listeners,\n190: - benchmark testcase entrypoints.\n191: \n192: ## Build model\n193: \n194: In `itemdb/notes/build-model.md`, document:\n195: \n196: - build system,\n197: - build files,\n198: - likely build commands,\n199: - dependencies,\n200: - compiler/interpreter/runtime,\n201: - generated artifacts,\n202: - known blockers,\n203: - sandbox changes needed.\n204: \n205: ## Execution model\n206: \n207: In `itemdb/notes/execution-model.md`, document:\n208: \n209: - how the target appears to run,\n210: - entrypoints,\n211: - runtime dependencies,\n212: - config files,\n213: - environment variables,\n214: - ports,\n215: - databases,\n216: - queues,\n217: - external services,\n218: - test or benchmark harnesses.\n219: \n220: ## Trust boundaries\n221: \n222: In `itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md`, document places where lower-trust data or actors affect higher-trust behavior.\n223: \n224: Examples:\n225: \n226: - anonymous user to application,\n227: - authenticated user to tenant data,\n228: - regular user to admin function,\n229: - external webhook to internal job,\n230: - CLI user input to privileged operation,\n231: - input file to parser,\n232: - config file to service behavior,\n233: - user-controlled path to filesystem,\n234: - untrusted archive to extraction,\n235: - external identity provider to local session,\n236: - code to cryptographic signing operation.\n237: \n238: ## Data flow\n239: \n240: In `itemdb/notes/data-flow.md`, summarize security-relevant flows.\n241: \n242: Focus on:\n243: \n244: - untrusted input,\n245: - authentication,\n246: - authorization,\n247: - tenant isolation,\n248: - secret handling,\n249: - file paths,\n250: - external commands,\n251: - parsers,\n252: - serialization,\n253: - cryptography,\n254: - network calls,\n255: - memory unsafe operations.\n256: \n257: ## Validation model\n258: \n259: In `itemdb/notes/validation-model.md`, explain how findings can be validated.\n260: \n261: Include:\n262: \n263: - whether target can be built,\n264: - whether target can be run,\n265: - whether sandbox is sufficient,\n266: - useful commands,\n267: - useful test strategy,\n268: - useful sanitizer/debugger strategy,\n269: - what evidence should be captured,\n270: - blockers.\n271: \n272: ## Interesting files\n273: \n274: In `itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md`, list files and directories worth reviewing in Phase 2.\n275: \n276: For each item, include:\n277: \n278: - path,\n279: - reason,\n280: - likely vulnerability classes,\n281: - recommended follow-up.\n282: \n283: ## Security assumptions\n284: \n285: In `itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md`, list assumptions using labels:\n286: \n287: - `confirmed`\n288: - `likely`\n289: - `unknown`\n290: - `risky`\n291: \n292: Example:\n293: \n294: - [confirmed] The target contains C and C++ source files.\n295: - [likely] Some testcases can be compiled independently.\n296: - [unknown] The target has no complete documented build command yet.\n297: - [risky] Several parser-like files perform manual buffer management.\n298: \n299: ## Phase 1b: Sandbox bootstrap\n300: \n301: After Phase 1a notes are complete, run Phase 1b in the same\n302: invocation. Goal: ensure `sandbox/` is a working validation\n303: environment for the target under `src/`.\n304: \n305: Mandatory output: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n306: \n307: Steps (full detail in `.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md`):\n308: \n309: 1. Inspect `sandbox/` state via `make sandbox-status` (or\n310: `.venv/bin/python3 tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py status`).\n311: 2. Inspect existing `src/` runtime artifacts: `Dockerfile`,\n312: `docker-compose.yml`, `Makefile`, `scripts/`, `README*`,\n313: `INSTALL*`, `RUN*`, `docs/`. Decide what to honor.\n314: 3. Run `make sandbox-detect` to see ranked candidates from\n315: `templates/sandboxes/`.\n316: 4. Choose one (or `multi-service-compose` if the target spans\n317: several services).\n318: 5. If the `apply` and `validate` subcommands of\n319: `tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py` are available, use them. If they\n320: are not yet implemented (CLI exits with code 64), use the manual\n321: fallback documented in the skill.\n322: 6. Substitute markers (`__VARNAME__`) using values from recon\n323: notes and target documentation.\n324: 7. Run validation tiers (T1 sandbox setup, T2 sandbox start, T3\n325: sandbox sanity, T4 target build, T5 target test, T6 sandbox\n326: stop).\n327: 8. Write `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` with provenance.\n328: 9. Update `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` with the validation\n329: matrix, honoring decision, marker values, and any halt notice.\n330: \n331: If validation fails and remediation cannot succeed within the retry\n332: budget (default 3, configurable via\n333: `CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`), halt and document the halt\n334: protocol in `sandbox-plan.md`.\n335: \n336: The default `validation_model` is `docker`. Use `static-only` or\n337: `nested-virt` only with explicit justification in `sandbox-plan.md`.\n338: \n339: ## Completion checklist\n340: \n341: Before finishing:\n342: \n343: Phase 1a:\n344: \n345: - all required notes exist,\n346: - target type is stated with confidence,\n347: - attack surfaces are listed,\n348: - build and execution model are documented,\n349: - validation model is documented,\n350: - interesting files are listed,\n351: - uncertainty is documented,\n352: - no low-quality findings were created,\n353: - a run summary is written when practical.\n354: \n355: Phase 1b:\n356: \n357: - `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` exists,\n358: - honoring decision is documented,\n359: - chosen example id is recorded,\n360: - marker values are listed,\n361: - validation matrix is filled in,\n362: - `validation_model` is stated,\n363: - if bootstrap halted, halt notice and required user inputs are\n364: documented,\n365: - if bootstrap succeeded, `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` exists\n366: with provenance.\n367: \n368: Only describe user input as required when Phase 1b is blocked. For\n369: non-blocking preferences, use \"optional follow-up\" language and explain how\n370: the user can override the default with `PROMPT_EXTRA` or\n371: `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE` on a later run.\n\n(End of file - total 371 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# CodeCome Recon Agent\n\nYou are the CodeCome Recon Agent.\n\nYour role is to perform target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n\nYou do not create vulnerability findings unless explicitly instructed or unless an issue is extremely obvious, high-confidence, and security-relevant.\n\n**You must NEVER modify `codecome.yml`, `AGENTS.md`, Makefile, or any other project orchestration or configuration file. Your role is to perform reconnaissance on the target, not to reconfigure the project.**\n\nYour main output is a target model under:\n\n itemdb/notes/\n\n## Required reading\n\nBefore starting reconnaissance, read:\n\n- `AGENTS.md`\n- `codecome.yml`","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":".opencode/agents/recon.md","time":{"start":1779039180840,"end":1779039180863}},"id":"prt_e36ff9820001SyC5jA2FQ7pFgs","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff7576001STkwn1Fu87q0ip"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039180865,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_f317f8e542754973","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md\nfile\n\n1: # Source Reconnaissance Skill\n2: \n3: Use this skill during CodeCome Phase 1: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n4: \n5: The goal of reconnaissance is to understand the target before creating vulnerability findings.\n6: \n7: Do not rush into reporting bugs. First build a useful target model.\n8: \n9: ## Purpose\n10: \n11: Reconnaissance should answer:\n12: \n13: - What kind of target is this?\n14: - What languages and frameworks are used?\n15: - How is it built?\n16: - How is it executed?\n17: - What are the attack surfaces?\n18: - Where are the trust boundaries?\n19: - What assets are at risk?\n20: - What dangerous sinks exist?\n21: - How can findings be validated later?\n22: \n23: ## Output files\n24: \n25: Create or update these files under `itemdb/notes/`:\n26: \n27: itemdb/notes/target-profile.md\n28: itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md\n29: itemdb/notes/build-model.md\n30: itemdb/notes/execution-model.md\n31: itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md\n32: itemdb/notes/data-flow.md\n33: itemdb/notes/validation-model.md\n34: itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md\n35: itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md\n36: \n37: If the target has a specific nature, optional additional notes may be created.\n38: \n39: Examples:\n40: \n41: itemdb/notes/web-routes.md\n42: itemdb/notes/cli-commands.md\n43: itemdb/notes/public-api.md\n44: itemdb/notes/cwe-map.md\n45: itemdb/notes/benchmark-notes.md\n46: itemdb/notes/iac-resources.md\n47: itemdb/notes/crypto-usage.md\n48: itemdb/notes/auth-model.md\n49: \n50: ## Reconnaissance rules\n51: \n52: 1. Do not create findings during reconnaissance unless the issue is extremely obvious and high confidence.\n53: 2. Prefer broad understanding over deep analysis of one bug.\n54: 3. Identify what should be reviewed in later phases.\n55: 4. Be explicit about uncertainty.\n56: 5. Do not assume the target is a web application.\n57: 6. Do not assume the target can be executed.\n58: 7. Do not assume filenames or comments are reliable vulnerability evidence.\n59: 8. Do not modify source code.\n60: 9. Keep notes concise but useful.\n61: 10. Write notes as Markdown artifacts.\n62: \n63: ## Target type detection\n64: \n65: Infer the target type.\n66: \n67: Possible target types include:\n68: \n69: - web application,\n70: - backend service,\n71: - CLI tool,\n72: - library,\n73: - benchmark corpus,\n74: - infrastructure-as-code repository,\n75: - firmware tree,\n76: - desktop application,\n77: - mobile application,\n78: - mixed repository,\n79: - unknown.\n80: \n81: Use evidence such as:\n82: \n83: - repository structure,\n84: - manifest files,\n85: - build files,\n86: - routes/controllers,\n87: - command definitions,\n88: - package metadata,\n89: - Docker files,\n90: - CI configuration,\n91: - tests,\n92: - documentation,\n93: - source file extensions,\n94: - framework imports,\n95: - binary/build artifacts.\n96: \n97: ## Language and framework detection\n98: \n99: Identify relevant languages and technologies.\n100: \n101: Examples:\n102: \n103: - C/C++: Makefile, CMakeLists.txt, `.c`, `.cpp`, `.h`, `.hpp`\n104: - .NET: `.csproj`, `.sln`, ASP.NET controllers, `Program.cs`\n105: - Java: `pom.xml`, `build.gradle`, Spring annotations\n106: - Node: `package.json`, Express/Nest/Next files\n107: - Python: `pyproject.toml`, `requirements.txt`, Flask/FastAPI/Django\n108: - Go: `go.mod`, `cmd/`, `internal/`\n109: - PHP: `composer.json`, Laravel/Symfony structure\n110: - IaC: Terraform, Kubernetes YAML, Helm, Ansible, Salt, Nomad, Docker Compose\n111: \n112: ## Build model\n113: \n114: Document how the target appears to be built.\n115: \n116: Look for:\n117: \n118: - Makefiles,\n119: - CMake,\n120: - Gradle,\n121: - Maven,\n122: - npm/yarn/pnpm,\n123: - dotnet CLI,\n124: - Python packaging,\n125: - Go modules,\n126: - Dockerfiles,\n127: - CI scripts,\n128: - build documentation.\n129: \n130: Record:\n131: \n132: - likely build command,\n133: - required dependencies,\n134: - generated artifacts,\n135: - missing dependencies,\n136: - build uncertainty,\n137: - whether the sandbox needs adaptation.\n138: \n139: ## Execution model\n140: \n141: Document how the target appears to run.\n142: \n143: Examples:\n144: \n145: - HTTP server,\n146: - background worker,\n147: - CLI executable,\n148: - library imported by another program,\n149: - test harness,\n150: - benchmark testcase,\n151: - firmware image,\n152: - IaC deployment,\n153: - scheduled job,\n154: - message queue consumer.\n155: \n156: Record:\n157: \n158: - entrypoints,\n159: - runtime dependencies,\n160: - config files,\n161: - required environment variables,\n162: - ports,\n163: - local services,\n164: - databases,\n165: - queues,\n166: - external dependencies,\n167: - test commands.\n168: \n169: ## Attack surface recognition\n170: \n171: Identify attack surfaces.\n172: \n173: An attack surface is any externally influenced way to reach code, configuration, state, or behavior.\n174: \n175: Examples:\n176: \n177: - HTTP routes,\n178: - RPC methods,\n179: - GraphQL operations,\n180: - WebSocket handlers,\n181: - CLI arguments,\n182: - stdin,\n183: - input files,\n184: - uploaded files,\n185: - config files,\n186: - environment variables,\n187: - public library APIs,\n188: - message consumers,\n189: - webhooks,\n190: - scheduled jobs,\n191: - database migrations,\n192: - template rendering,\n193: - archive extraction,\n194: - XML parsing,\n195: - JSON/YAML deserialization,\n196: - filesystem paths,\n197: - external command invocation,\n198: - dynamic code loading,\n199: - authentication flows,\n200: - authorization decisions,\n201: - cryptographic operations,\n202: - signing operations,\n203: - network listeners,\n204: - IaC resources.\n205: \n206: For each attack surface, document:\n207: \n208: - name,\n209: - type,\n210: - entrypoints,\n211: - input sources,\n212: - likely attacker control,\n213: - relevant files,\n214: - trust boundary,\n215: - likely vulnerability classes.\n216: \n217: ## Trust boundaries\n218: \n219: Identify where data or control crosses from lower trust to higher trust.\n220: \n221: Examples:\n222: \n223: - anonymous user to application,\n224: - authenticated user to tenant data,\n225: - tenant A to tenant B,\n226: - regular user to admin operation,\n227: - external webhook to internal processing,\n228: - CLI argument to privileged operation,\n229: - input file to parser,\n230: - config file to service behavior,\n231: - network packet to parser,\n232: - user-controlled path to filesystem,\n233: - untrusted archive to extraction path,\n234: - untrusted template to renderer,\n235: - external identity provider to local session,\n236: - local code to HSM/signing operation.\n237: \n238: ## Assets at risk\n239: \n240: Identify assets that matter.\n241: \n242: Examples:\n243: \n244: - user data,\n245: - tenant data,\n246: - credentials,\n247: - API tokens,\n248: - private keys,\n249: - certificates,\n250: - signing keys,\n251: - session cookies,\n252: - database records,\n253: - filesystem contents,\n254: - generated documents,\n255: - audit logs,\n256: - admin actions,\n257: - internal network access,\n258: - compute resources,\n259: - service availability,\n260: - code execution context.\n261: \n262: ## Dangerous sinks\n263: \n264: Identify security-sensitive sinks.\n265: \n266: Examples:\n267: \n268: - SQL query construction,\n269: - shell command execution,\n270: - filesystem read/write/delete,\n271: - path normalization/joining,\n272: - archive extraction,\n273: - XML parsing,\n274: - YAML/object deserialization,\n275: - template rendering,\n276: - eval/dynamic code execution,\n277: - dynamic imports,\n278: - memory copy functions,\n279: - pointer arithmetic,\n280: - integer-size calculations,\n281: - cryptographic signing,\n282: - token validation,\n283: - password verification,\n284: - authorization decisions,\n285: - SSRF-capable HTTP clients,\n286: - LDAP queries,\n287: - XPath queries,\n288: - logging of secrets,\n289: - file upload storage,\n290: - privilege-changing operations.\n291: \n292: ## Data flow notes\n293: \n294: Capture important flows.\n295: \n296: Prioritize flows involving:\n297: \n298: - untrusted input,\n299: - authentication,\n300: - authorization,\n301: - tenant isolation,\n302: - secret handling,\n303: - file paths,\n304: - external commands,\n305: - parsers,\n306: - serialization,\n307: - crypto,\n308: - network calls,\n309: - memory unsafe operations.\n310: \n311: Do not attempt full formal data-flow analysis in Phase 1. Create useful notes for Phase 2.\n312: \n313: ## Security assumptions\n314: \n315: Record assumptions explicitly.\n316: \n317: Use these labels:\n318: \n319: - `confirmed`\n320: - `likely`\n321: - `unknown`\n322: - `risky`\n323: \n324: Examples:\n325: \n326: - [likely] The service is intended to be exposed over HTTP.\n327: - [unknown] It is unclear whether file paths come from authenticated users.\n328: - [risky] Several shell command wrappers appear to accept string arguments.\n329: - [confirmed] The target contains C code compiled with Make.\n330: \n331: ## Interesting files\n332: \n333: Create `itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md`.\n334: \n335: Include files that deserve deeper review.\n336: \n337: For each file or directory, record:\n338: \n339: - path,\n340: - why it is interesting,\n341: - likely vulnerability classes,\n342: - recommended follow-up.\n343: \n344: ## Validation model\n345: \n346: Create `itemdb/notes/validation-model.md`.\n347: \n348: Explain how findings can be validated.\n349: \n350: Examples:\n351: \n352: - build and run locally,\n353: - run unit tests,\n354: - create integration tests,\n355: - send HTTP requests,\n356: - call CLI commands,\n357: - craft input files,\n358: - run with sanitizers,\n359: - run under debugger,\n360: - compare benchmark oracle,\n361: - inspect generated configuration,\n362: - use static proof only.\n363: \n364: Include limitations and sandbox changes needed.\n365: \n366: ## Recommended phase 2 focus\n367: \n368: At the end of reconnaissance, provide a prioritized list of areas for hypothesis generation.\n369: \n370: Example:\n371: \n372: 1. Review authorization checks around document access.\n373: 2. Review file upload and archive extraction paths.\n374: 3. Review shell command wrappers.\n375: 4. Review XML parsing and deserialization.\n376: 5. Review C/C++ buffer handling in parser module.\n377: \n378: ## Completion checklist\n379: \n380: Before finishing reconnaissance, ensure that:\n381: \n382: - `target-profile.md` exists.\n383: - `attack-surface.md` exists.\n384: - `build-model.md` exists.\n385: - `execution-model.md` exists.\n386: - `trust-boundaries.md` exists.\n387: - `data-flow.md` exists.\n388: - `validation-model.md` exists.\n389: - `interesting-files.md` exists.\n390: - `security-assumptions.md` exists.\n391: - no low-quality findings were created prematurely.\n\n(End of file - total 391 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# Source Reconnaissance Skill\n\nUse this skill during CodeCome Phase 1: target reconnaissance and attack surface recognition.\n\nThe goal of reconnaissance is to understand the target before creating vulnerability findings.\n\nDo not rush into reporting bugs. First build a useful target model.\n\n## Purpose\n\nReconnaissance should answer:\n\n- What kind of target is this?\n- What languages and frameworks are used?\n- How is it built?\n- How is it executed?\n- What are the attack surfaces?\n- Where are the trust boundaries?\n- What assets are at risk?\n- What dangerous sinks exist?","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":".opencode/skills/source-recon/SKILL.md","time":{"start":1779039180847,"end":1779039180864}},"id":"prt_e36ff982c001EkE4Pd2QR4xNCB","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff7576001STkwn1Fu87q0ip"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039180868,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_dc45a0387574d31a","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/.opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md\nfile\n\n1: # Sandbox Bootstrap Skill\n2: \n3: Use this skill during CodeCome **Phase 1b: Sandbox bootstrap**.\n4: \n5: Phase 1b runs immediately after Phase 1a (source reconnaissance) in\n6: the same `make phase-1` invocation. The goal is to ensure that\n7: `sandbox/` contains a working validation environment for the target\n8: under `src/`, so Phase 2 can rely on it.\n9: \n10: ## Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes\n11: \n12: Every directory under `templates/sandboxes//` is a **seed**.\n13: Each seed ships only `Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml`, a starter\n14: `scripts/build.sh`, and a starter `scripts/test.sh`.\n15: \n16: That is on purpose. The agent is expected to extend the seed into a\n17: fully functional sandbox tailored to the specific target. Treating\n18: a seed as a finished sandbox is a workflow violation.\n19: \n20: You **must**:\n21: \n22: - implement the required sandbox capabilities (see \"Sandbox\n23: capability contract\" below), preferably via helpers under\n24: `sandbox/scripts/`,\n25: - adapt the starter `build.sh` and `test.sh` to the\n26: real project layout (some targets nest their build under a\n27: subdirectory of `src/`, not `src/` directly; many real targets do similar),\n28: - add target-specific scripts when they help (sanitizer builds,\n29: fuzzing harnesses, debugger attach helpers, etc.),\n30: - make every script executable,\n31: - document every authored or adapted script in\n32: `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`.\n33: \n34: You **must not**:\n35: \n36: - record a validation tier as `skipped` because its script is\n37: absent,\n38: - replace authoring a script with an in-chat manual spot-check\n39: (manual checks are not durable and do not survive the next\n40: `make phase-1` run),\n41: - assume that \"the template ships only X\" means \"only X is\n42: expected to exist\".\n43: \n44: ## Sandbox capability contract\n45: \n46: Phase 1b does not require one universal fixed script set. Different\n47: targets need different mechanics. What matters is that the resulting\n48: `sandbox/` exposes a coherent set of capabilities.\n49: \n50: Required capabilities for a Phase 2-ready sandbox:\n51: \n52: | Capability | Preferred helper | Purpose |\n53: |---|---|---|\n54: | sandbox setup | `sandbox/scripts/setup.sh` | Set up the sandbox environment in a repeatable way. This may build a container image, prepare a VM image, assemble a firmware bundle, or perform equivalent environment preparation. |\n55: | sandbox start | `sandbox/scripts/up.sh` | Bring the sandbox environment up when runtime startup is distinct from setup. |\n56: | sandbox sanity | `sandbox/scripts/check.sh` | Verify mounts, toolchain/runtime availability, and basic health. |\n57: | target build | `sandbox/scripts/build.sh` | Build the target inside the sandbox when applicable. |\n58: | target test | `sandbox/scripts/test.sh` | Run the target tests inside the sandbox when applicable. |\n59: | sandbox stop | `sandbox/scripts/down.sh` | Tear the sandbox environment down cleanly. |\n60: \n61: ## Realistic runtime model\n62: \n63: Phase 1b should aim for the most realistic local runtime environment\n64: that is reasonably derivable from the repository, not merely a\n65: toolchain container that can build the source.\n66: \n67: What \"realistic\" means depends on target type:\n68: \n69: - **Web application / API / backend service** — prefer a sandbox that\n70: starts the real application process and any inferable dependencies\n71: (database, cache, queue, reverse proxy) rather than only compiling\n72: the code.\n73: - **DB-backed app** — when docs/manifests show a database is required,\n74: prefer including the database service, schema setup, migrations,\n75: and minimal seed data when they are reasonably available.\n76: - **Queue / worker system** — include the worker and broker only when\n77: they materially affect the reachable attack surface.\n78: - **CLI / library / static target** — do not invent a web server just\n79: to look realistic; the closest faithful runtime may still be a\n80: build-and-run CLI sandbox or `static-only`.\n81: - **Targets with cloud-only or third-party dependencies** — stub or\n82: mock them only when a local replacement is straightforward and the\n83: behavior is relevant to validation. Otherwise document the gap.\n84: \n85: When deciding whether to include a dependency, prefer source-backed\n86: signals such as:\n87: \n88: - `src/docker-compose.yml` / `src/compose.yml`,\n89: - framework config files,\n90: - migration files,\n91: - `.env.example`,\n92: - `README*` / `docs/` runbooks,\n93: - manifests for services like PostgreSQL, MySQL, Redis, RabbitMQ,\n94: Nginx, Apache, PHP-FPM, etc.\n95: \n96: Do not stop at a toolchain-only or build-only sandbox when Phase 4 or\n97: Phase 5 validation would realistically need a running app. If full\n98: runtime is not feasible, produce the closest faithful approximation\n99: and document why in `sandbox-plan.md`.\n100: \n101: Recommended helper scripts when a realistic runtime model applies:\n102: \n103: - `migrate.sh` — apply schema migrations or other one-time DB\n104: setup.\n105: - `seed.sh` — load minimal fixture data needed for realistic\n106: validation.\n107: - `healthcheck.sh` — verify that the real app is serving,\n108: connected, and usable (HTTP health route, root page, CLI smoke\n109: command, DB ping, etc.).\n110: - `run.sh` — drive the target with a representative runtime\n111: invocation when the standard test suite is not enough.\n112: \n113: Recommended helper capabilities when the target/runtime model makes\n114: them useful (these are not part of the Phase 2 gate, but are\n115: strongly encouraged):\n116: \n117: | Capability | Preferred helper | Purpose |\n118: |---|---|---|\n119: | sandbox shell | `sandbox/scripts/shell.sh` | Open a shell in the sandbox. |\n120: | sandbox logs | `sandbox/scripts/logs.sh` | Inspect runtime logs. |\n121: | sandbox clean | `sandbox/scripts/clean.sh` | Remove containers, volumes, and tmp produced by validation. |\n122: | sandbox reset | `sandbox/scripts/reset.sh` | Recreate the environment from a clean state. |\n123: \n124: If a recommended helper does not apply, say so explicitly in\n125: `sandbox-plan.md`. Do not silently omit it.\n126: \n127: Add additional scripts whenever the target benefits, for example:\n128: \n129: - `run.sh` — drive the target with a sample input.\n130: - `build-asan.sh` — build with AddressSanitizer + UBSan.\n131: - `fuzz.sh` — seed a fuzzing corpus or drive a fuzzer.\n132: - `attach-debugger.sh` — attach gdb / lldb to a running container.\n133: \n134: Naming convention for extras:\n135: \n136: - prefer single-word names when the meaning is unambiguous (`migrate`,\n137: `seed`, `healthcheck`, `run`, `fuzz`),\n138: - use `-.sh` for build flavors (e.g. `build-asan.sh`,\n139: `build-ubsan.sh`) so the canonical `build.sh` keeps its meaning,\n140: - use a descriptive multi-word name when no short form is unambiguous\n141: (e.g. `attach-debugger.sh`),\n142: - never reuse the canonical names (`setup`, `up`, `check`, `build`,\n143: `test`, `down`, `shell`, `logs`, `clean`, `reset`) for variants;\n144: use a prefix or suffix instead.\n145: \n146: Document any extras in `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md` under \"Extra\n147: scripts authored\", with one line per script explaining what it does\n148: and how to run it.\n149: \n150: ## Authoring conventions for helper scripts\n151: \n152: - All helper scripts are bash with `set -euo pipefail` at the top.\n153: - Path discipline: paths inside the container start with\n154: `/workspace/...`; paths on the host start with `sandbox/...`.\n155: - Idempotency: `down.sh`, `clean.sh`, and `reset.sh` should be safe\n156: to run repeatedly even when the stack is already down.\n157: - `check.sh` runs **inside the sandbox container**, exercising the\n158: toolchain (compiler versions, package manager versions, language\n159: runtime versions) and verifying the expected workspace mounts\n160: exist (`/workspace/src`, `/workspace/itemdb`, `/workspace/sandbox`,\n161: `/workspace/AGENTS.md`, `/workspace/codecome.yml`).\n162: - `setup.sh` should prepare the sandbox environment without implying\n163: the environment must be started. When Docker Compose is used, it\n164: should typically run `docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml\n165: build`.\n166: - `up.sh` runs `docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml up -d\n167: --build` (or the multi-service variant) when the sandbox needs a\n168: long-lived environment. If the target does not need a persistent\n169: started stack, explain that in `sandbox-plan.md`.\n170: - `shell.sh` runs `docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml\n171: exec bash` or `docker compose run --rm \n172: bash`.\n173: - `logs.sh` runs `docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml\n174: logs -f`.\n175: - `clean.sh` runs `docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml\n176: down -v` and removes any `tmp/` artifacts produced by the\n177: sandbox.\n178: - `reset.sh` is `clean.sh` followed by `up.sh`, or a tighter\n179: per-target reset when faster.\n180: \n181: ## T1/T2/T3/T4/T5/T6 reporting rules\n182: \n183: - T1 must never be recorded as `skipped` because the sandbox setup\n184: mechanism is missing. Prefer `setup.sh`; `docker compose\n185: -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml build` is an acceptable fallback.\n186: - T2 must never be recorded as `skipped` because the sandbox start\n187: mechanism is missing when the sandbox requires startup. Prefer\n188: `up.sh`.\n189: - T3 must never be recorded as `skipped` because the sandbox sanity\n190: mechanism is missing. Prefer `check.sh`.\n191: - T4/T5 may legitimately be `skipped` only when the target\n192: genuinely has no build or test step. The reason must be in\n193: `sandbox-plan.md` (`static-only`, pre-built firmware, header-only\n194: library, etc.).\n195: - T6 must never be recorded as `skipped` because the sandbox stop /\n196: teardown mechanism is missing. Prefer `down.sh`.\n197: - A manual in-chat toolchain check is not a substitute for\n198: `check.sh`.\n199: \n200: `tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py validate` enforces these rules for the\n201: required Phase 2 capabilities: a missing setup, start, check,\n202: build, test, or stop mechanism is reported as **failed** (not\n203: skipped). The Phase 2 gate blocks on `failed`.\n204: \n205: ## Purpose\n206: \n207: Phase 1b answers:\n208: \n209: - Does `sandbox/` already work for this target?\n210: - If not, which curated example under `templates/sandboxes//` is\n211: the best starting point?\n212: - Does the target ship its own `Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml`,\n213: or runbooks under `src/` that should be honored?\n214: - What marker values are correct for this target (versions, ports,\n215: target name)?\n216: - Did the validation tiers actually pass?\n217: - If not, what does the user need to do to unblock Phase 2?\n218: \n219: ## Required output\n220: \n221: Write or update:\n222: \n223: itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md\n224: \n225: This is the durable artifact. Do not leave Phase 1b decisions only\n226: in chat history.\n227: \n228: Mandatory sections in `sandbox-plan.md`:\n229: \n230: 1. **Detected stack** — languages, manifests, and runtime services\n231: inferred from Phase 1a notes.\n232: 2. **Honoring decision** — what `src/` artifacts were honored,\n233: wrapped, or ignored, and why. Mandatory even when nothing is\n234: honored (\"nothing to honor\").\n235: 3. **Chosen example(s)** — id from `templates/sandboxes/`.\n236: 4. **Marker values applied** — table of `__VARNAME__` → value.\n237: 5. **Runtime model** — one of: `full-runtime`, `partial-runtime`,\n238: `build-only`, `static-only`, `nested-virt`. Explain why this is\n239: the closest faithful runtime model for the target.\n240: 6. **Services started** — app, web server, database, cache, queue,\n241: broker, reverse proxy, or other runtime services that the sandbox\n242: actually starts. If a service was expected but omitted, say so and\n243: explain why.\n244: 7. **Health / smoke checks** — the exact commands or requests used to\n245: verify the target is actually runnable (HTTP request, root page,\n246: CLI smoke command, DB ping, migration status, etc.).\n247: 8. **Known runtime gaps** — secrets, external services, cloud-only\n248: dependencies, hardware, or other blockers that prevent a more\n249: realistic local stack.\n250: 9. **Validation matrix** — for each tier (T1 sandbox setup, T2\n251: sandbox start, T3 sandbox sanity, T4 target build, T5 target\n252: test, T6 sandbox stop): pass/fail/skipped, last command, exit\n253: code, last 50 lines of stderr.\n254: 10. **`validation_model`** — one of: `docker`, `static-only`,\n255: `nested-virt`. Justification mandatory for the last two.\n256: 11. **Remediation log** — each automatic remediation attempt with its\n257: rationale and outcome.\n258: 12. **Open questions for the user** — optional, only if input is\n259: needed.\n260: 13. **Halt notice** — only when bootstrap could not finish.\n261: \n262: ## Tooling\n263: \n264: The bootstrap CLI lives at `tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py` and is also\n265: exposed via Make targets:\n266: \n267: | CLI subcommand | Make target | Status |\n268: |---|---|---|\n269: | `list` | `make sandbox-list` | available |\n270: | `inspect ` | `make sandbox-inspect ID=` | available |\n271: | `detect` | `make sandbox-detect` | available |\n272: | `status [--gate]` | `make sandbox-status` | available |\n273: | `apply ` | `make sandbox-bootstrap ID=` | available |\n274: | `regenerate` | `make sandbox-regenerate` | available |\n275: | `validate` | `make sandbox-validate` | available |\n276: \n277: When a subcommand is \"not yet implemented\" the CLI exits with code\n278: `64`. All Phase 1b subcommands are now implemented; if you ever\n279: hit code 64, refer to `.project/auto-sandbox-bootstrap-plan.md`.\n280: \n281: Always invoke the CLI through the project's virtualenv:\n282: \n283: .venv/bin/python3 tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py \n284: \n285: Or via the Make targets when running from the project root.\n286: \n287: ## Decision flow\n288: \n289: ```\n290: Phase 1a complete\n291: |\n292: v\n293: read itemdb/notes/* for stack hints\n294: |\n295: v\n296: inspect sandbox/ state\n297: | | |\n298: empty tracked user-managed\n299: | | |\n300: | v v\n301: | try-validate-existing\n302: | | |\n303: | passes fails\n304: | | |\n305: v v v\n306: choose example -> apply -> validate -> done\n307: |\n308: on failure\n309: |\n310: remediate\n311: |\n312: within retry budget?\n313: |\n314: yes/no\n315: |\n316: v\n317: halt + sandbox-plan.md\n318: ```\n319: \n320: ## Inputs to consult before choosing\n321: \n322: Always read these files before deciding:\n323: \n324: - `itemdb/notes/target-profile.md`\n325: - `itemdb/notes/build-model.md`\n326: - `itemdb/notes/execution-model.md`\n327: - `itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md`\n328: - `itemdb/notes/validation-model.md`\n329: - `src/Dockerfile`\n330: - `src/docker-compose.yml` and `src/docker-compose.yaml`\n331: - `src/compose.yml` and `src/compose.yaml`\n332: - `src/Makefile`\n333: - `src/scripts/`\n334: - `src/README*`\n335: - `src/CONTRIBUTING*`\n336: - `src/INSTALL*`\n337: - `src/RUN*`\n338: - `src/docs/`\n339: \n340: ## Honoring `src/` artifacts\n341: \n342: If `src/` contains usable runtime definitions, honor them. The\n343: `multi-service-compose` example is built around this case: its build\n344: and test scripts pass `src/docker-compose.yml` as a second `-f`\n345: argument so the user's compose remains authoritative.\n346: \n347: Honoring rules:\n348: \n349: 1. If `src/Dockerfile` defines the runtime, use it via the\n350: `multi-service-compose` example or by referencing it from a\n351: thin sandbox wrapper. Do not duplicate it.\n352: 2. If `src/docker-compose.yml` is present and runnable, prefer\n353: layering on top of it via `multi-service-compose`.\n354: 3. If `src/Makefile` describes the build, the language-specific\n355: example's `scripts/build.sh` should call it instead of\n356: re-implementing build logic.\n357: 4. If `src/README*` or `src/docs/` describe ports, environment\n358: variables, or run commands, capture those values into marker\n359: substitutions or directly into the generated `sandbox/` files.\n360: 5. If `src/` artifacts exist but are clearly inappropriate\n361: (production secrets, cloud-only behavior, build-time-only\n362: helpers), document the reason in `sandbox-plan.md` under\n363: \"Honoring decision\" and proceed with the curated example.\n364: \n365: ## Build-time vs runtime stacks\n366: \n367: A repository can contain build-time helpers (e.g. a Node.js layer\n368: that produces static assets consumed by a Python runtime). Those\n369: helpers should not be expressed as runtime services in the sandbox.\n370: Treat them as multi-stage build steps inside the runtime example's\n371: `Dockerfile`, or as one-off `docker compose run` invocations rather\n372: than always-on services.\n373: \n374: ## Marker substitution\n375: \n376: Examples use `__VARNAME__` markers. The agent fills the values from:\n377: \n378: 1. recon notes (e.g. exact Python version from `build-model.md`),\n379: 2. target documentation in `src/`,\n380: 3. sensible defaults if nothing else is known.\n381: \n382: Two ways to substitute markers:\n383: \n384: - Pass `--var KEY=VAL` to `tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py apply` once\n385: it is implemented.\n386: - Edit the copied files in `sandbox/` directly. This is the\n387: manual fallback below.\n388: \n389: Do not invent variables that are not defined in `manifest.yml`.\n390: \n391: ## Preferred flow (using the CLI)\n392: \n393: 1. Run `make sandbox-detect` to see ranked candidates.\n394: 2. Run `make sandbox-inspect ID=` to see the\n395: manifest, file list, and markers.\n396: 3. Run `make sandbox-status` to see if `sandbox/` is empty,\n397: user-managed, or generated.\n398: 4. If `sandbox/` is user-managed (no `CODECOME-GENERATED.md`) and\n399: Phase 2 will run, attempt validation against the existing\n400: scripts first. If it passes, capture the result in\n401: `sandbox-plan.md` and move on. If it fails, halt with the halt\n402: protocol and request user guidance — do not silently overwrite\n403: user-managed content.\n404: 5. To bootstrap a fresh sandbox, prefer:\n405: \n406: BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2' \\\n407: make sandbox-bootstrap ID=\n408: \n409: Or, if invoking the CLI directly:\n410: \n411: .venv/bin/python3 tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py apply \\\n412: --var KEY1=VAL1 --var KEY2=VAL2\n413: \n414: Use `--dry-run` first to preview which files would be written\n415: and which markers are still unfilled. Use `--force` only when\n416: `sandbox/` has user-managed content that the user has accepted\n417: to lose (the prior content will be moved to\n418: `sandbox/.backup-/`).\n419: \n420: 6. To re-apply after a manifest update or a marker change:\n421: \n422: make sandbox-regenerate\n423: # or with overrides:\n424: BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--var PYTHON_VERSION=3.13' make sandbox-regenerate\n425: \n426: Regenerate reads `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` for the source\n427: example id and the previous markers. CLI overrides win. The\n428: prior sandbox content is always moved to a fresh\n429: `sandbox/.backup-/`.\n430: \n431: 7. Run validation tiers:\n432: \n433: make sandbox-validate\n434: \n435: Or with options:\n436: \n437: BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--keep-going' make sandbox-validate\n438: BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--scripts-only' make sandbox-validate\n439: BOOTSTRAP_ARGS='--docker-only' make sandbox-validate\n440: \n441: `validate` writes a \"Validation run \" Markdown table at the\n442: end of `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` so each run is auditable.\n443: Use the JSON output (`--format json`) when scripting the agent\n444: loop:\n445: \n446: .venv/bin/python3 tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py --format json \\\n447: validate --keep-going\n448: \n449: ## Validation tiers\n450: \n451: | Tier | Purpose | Preferred helper | Fallback |\n452: |---|---|---|---|\n453: | T1 | Sandbox setup | `sandbox/scripts/setup.sh` | `docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml build` |\n454: | T2 | Sandbox start | `sandbox/scripts/up.sh` | none — implement it when startup is distinct from build |\n455: | T3 | Sanity | `sandbox/scripts/check.sh` | none — implement it |\n456: | T4 | Target build | `sandbox/scripts/build.sh` (template ships starter; adapt it) | none — implement it |\n457: | T5 | Target test | `sandbox/scripts/test.sh` (template ships starter; adapt it) | none — implement it |\n458: | T6 | Sandbox stop | `sandbox/scripts/down.sh` | none — implement it |\n459: \n460: For each tier capture: start time, exit code, last 50 lines of\n461: combined stdout+stderr, duration, outcome\n462: (`passed | failed | skipped`).\n463: \n464: A missing required capability causes the tier to record `failed`,\n465: **not** `skipped`. The Phase 2 gate blocks on `failed`.\n466: \n467: `skipped` is reserved for tiers that genuinely do not apply to the\n468: target (e.g. `static-only` builds with no executable). Such cases\n469: require a positive justification in `sandbox-plan.md`.\n470: \n471: Per-tier failures must be triaged. Do not move to the next tier on\n472: T1/T2/T3 failure unless the user explicitly asks for `--keep-going`.\n473: \n474: ## Auto-remediation\n475: \n476: The agent may attempt automatic remediations when validation fails.\n477: Default budget is 3 attempts; honor the `CODECOME_BOOTSTRAP_MAX_RETRIES`\n478: environment variable when present.\n479: \n480: Each attempt must:\n481: \n482: 1. State the failure cause hypothesis.\n483: 2. State what is being changed (file, line range, intent).\n484: 3. Re-run validation tiers from where the failure occurred.\n485: 4. Record the attempt in the remediation log of `sandbox-plan.md`.\n486: \n487: Common remediations:\n488: \n489: - Adjust the Debian or language base tag.\n490: - Add a missing native dev package to the Dockerfile.\n491: - Adjust an exposed port marker.\n492: - Replace a hard-coded build command with the one from\n493: `src/Makefile` or `build-model.md`.\n494: - Drop a useless `EXPOSE` directive when the target has no app\n495: port.\n496: \n497: Stop conditions:\n498: \n499: - Retry budget exhausted.\n500: - Failure requires user input that the agent does not have (secret,\n501: external service, hardware device).\n502: - Failure is outside the sandbox (Docker not installed on host,\n503: insufficient disk space, etc.).\n504: \n505: When stopping, write the halt notice to `sandbox-plan.md`.\n506: \n507: ## Halt protocol\n508: \n509: When bootstrap cannot finish, `sandbox-plan.md` must include:\n510: \n511: 1. **Attempts** — every remediation step with command and exit\n512: code.\n513: 2. **Root cause hypothesis** — concise diagnosis.\n514: 3. **What is needed from the user** — the exact missing input.\n515: 4. **Suggested next action** — copy-pasteable.\n516: 5. **Halt notice** — explicit \"Phase 2 blocked until this is\n517: resolved\" statement.\n518: 6. **Override hint** — mention `CODECOME_ALLOW_NO_SANDBOX=1` for\n519: users who want to proceed despite the missing sandbox.\n520: \n521: ## Special validation models\n522: \n523: Some targets cannot be exercised by Docker alone.\n524: \n525: ### `static-only`\n526: \n527: Use when the target cannot be executed in the local sandbox. Possible\n528: reasons: corpus too large to build, no executable artifacts, license\n529: restriction, cross-compiled firmware that the host cannot run, or a\n530: binary-only edge case where review is purely static.\n531: \n532: Required justification section in `sandbox-plan.md`:\n533: \n534: ## Justification: static-only\n535: \n536: - \n537: - \n538: \n539: Phase 2 gate honors `static-only` only when the justification is\n540: present.\n541: \n542: ### `nested-virt`\n543: \n544: Use when the target genuinely requires nested virtualization. Apply\n545: the `templates/sandboxes/nested-virt/` example. Document in\n546: `sandbox-plan.md`:\n547: \n548: ## Justification: nested-virt\n549: \n550: - \n551: - \n552: - \n553: \n554: ## Idempotency rules\n555: \n556: 1. Never overwrite a non-generated `sandbox/` silently. Detect by\n557: the absence of `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` plus tracked\n558: user content.\n559: 2. Always back up displaced files into\n560: `sandbox/.backup-/` before modifying.\n561: 3. The provenance file must reflect the latest applied example and\n562: its markers.\n563: \n564: ## Reading `.env` files\n565: \n566: - `sandbox/.env` is generated by CodeCome during bootstrap and may be read as\n567: runtime metadata (for example `COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME`).\n568: - `.env` and `.env.*` files under `src/**` are part of target input and may be\n569: read during audit/recon when relevant.\n570: - Do not read unrelated `.env` files elsewhere in the workspace.\n571: \n572: ## When to ask the user\n573: \n574: Ask only for blocking information. Do not ask for things that can be\n575: inferred from notes or `src/` artifacts. Do not ask for preferences when a\n576: safe default can be chosen and documented. For non-blocking preferences,\n577: choose a default, document the rationale in `sandbox-plan.md`, and mention\n578: that the user can override it with `PROMPT_EXTRA` or `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n579: \n580: Examples of legitimate blocking asks:\n581: \n582: - \"The repo references a private gem server. Should I skip those\n583: dependencies for review purposes, or do you have a `bundler`\n584: config to mount?\"\n585: - \"The target uses `qemu-system-arm`. Is KVM available on the host?\n586: If not, runtime validation will be slow.\"\n587: \n588: For non-blocking defaults, avoid \"User input requested\" language. Use\n589: \"Optional follow-up\" and keep Phase 1 moving.\n590: \n591: If the missing input blocks Phase 1b, write it in `sandbox-plan.md` using\n592: the halt protocol. The user reads the plan and can rerun with additional\n593: context through `PROMPT_EXTRA` or `PROMPT_EXTRA_FILE`.\n\n(End of file - total 593 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# Sandbox Bootstrap Skill\n\nUse this skill during CodeCome **Phase 1b: Sandbox bootstrap**.\n\nPhase 1b runs immediately after Phase 1a (source reconnaissance) in\nthe same `make phase-1` invocation. The goal is to ensure that\n`sandbox/` contains a working validation environment for the target\nunder `src/`, so Phase 2 can rely on it.\n\n## Templates are seeds, not finished sandboxes\n\nEvery directory under `templates/sandboxes//` is a **seed**.\nEach seed ships only `Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml`, a starter\n`scripts/build.sh`, and a starter `scripts/test.sh`.\n\nThat is on purpose. The agent is expected to extend the seed into a\nfully functional sandbox tailored to the specific target. Treating\na seed as a finished sandbox is a workflow violation.\n\nYou **must**:","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":".opencode/skills/sandbox-bootstrap/SKILL.md","time":{"start":1779039180852,"end":1779039180866}},"id":"prt_e36ff98300017JHiWs1u0WqLoZ","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff7576001STkwn1Fu87q0ip"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039180959,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ff989d001csmV1PQDcYN6U5","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"e32f24729aa148e1f3335159b751efa45bd25e32","messageID":"msg_e36ff7576001STkwn1Fu87q0ip","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":34259,"input":7812,"output":148,"reasoning":27,"cache":{"write":0,"read":26272}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039183764,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffa391001pspPL4RSAoSNjV","messageID":"msg_e36ff98f60014GY4teNHIeO3QB","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"c0bb97d79406e2c70951c96a7cd26348f261f8a4","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039187073,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"glob","callID":"call_faaf5911e75217b4","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"pattern":"src/**/*"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/main.c\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/greet.c\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/util.c\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/README.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/tests/smoke.sh\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/greet.h\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/util.h\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/Makefile","metadata":{"count":9,"truncated":false},"title":"","time":{"start":1779039187041,"end":1779039187072}},"id":"prt_e36ffb05b001JKy6172fxsneM5","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ff98f60014GY4teNHIeO3QB"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039187105,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffa9f2001nPG94Z1v53GTAz","messageID":"msg_e36ff98f60014GY4teNHIeO3QB","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"Now I have all the required reading. Let me explore the target source tree to perform Phase 1a reconnaissance.\n","time":{"start":1779039185394,"end":1779039187104}}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039187184,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffb0ee001vo1AQEzLo5Hsqr","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"5446d0d29f31bbd85c4bc04dfd6e81a34f5a0bd4","messageID":"msg_e36ff98f60014GY4teNHIeO3QB","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":47556,"input":13213,"output":39,"reasoning":64,"cache":{"write":0,"read":34240}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039188284,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffb539001tMlblnioVaBveH","messageID":"msg_e36ffb14c0011HD5Y8Qix1FjNd","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"514f091b42861d04287bead53f6acdc304072539","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039193310,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_377519e0cef48d04","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/Makefile"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/Makefile\nfile\n\n1: CC ?= cc\n2: CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -O2 -Iinclude\n3: LDFLAGS ?=\n4: \n5: BIN_DIR := bin\n6: SRC_DIR := src\n7: OBJ_DIR := build\n8: TARGET := $(BIN_DIR)/sample-c-cli\n9: \n10: SRCS := $(SRC_DIR)/main.c $(SRC_DIR)/greet.c $(SRC_DIR)/util.c\n11: OBJS := $(SRCS:$(SRC_DIR)/%.c=$(OBJ_DIR)/%.o)\n12: \n13: .PHONY: all clean test\n14: \n15: all: $(TARGET)\n16: \n17: $(TARGET): $(OBJS)\n18: \t@mkdir -p $(BIN_DIR)\n19: \t$(CC) $(OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@\n20: \n21: $(OBJ_DIR)/%.o: $(SRC_DIR)/%.c\n22: \t@mkdir -p $(OBJ_DIR)\n23: \t$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@\n24: \n25: test: $(TARGET)\n26: \t./tests/smoke.sh\n27: \n28: clean:\n29: \trm -rf $(OBJ_DIR) $(BIN_DIR)\n\n(End of file - total 29 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"CC ?= cc\nCFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -O2 -Iinclude\nLDFLAGS ?=\n\nBIN_DIR := bin\nSRC_DIR := src\nOBJ_DIR := build\nTARGET := $(BIN_DIR)/sample-c-cli\n\nSRCS := $(SRC_DIR)/main.c $(SRC_DIR)/greet.c $(SRC_DIR)/util.c\nOBJS := $(SRCS:$(SRC_DIR)/%.c=$(OBJ_DIR)/%.o)\n\n.PHONY: all clean test\n\nall: $(TARGET)\n\n$(TARGET): $(OBJS)\n\t@mkdir -p $(BIN_DIR)\n\t$(CC) $(OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@\n","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/Makefile","time":{"start":1779039193295,"end":1779039193309}},"id":"prt_e36ffc8cc001gwT7dR1PnFMZxu","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffb14c0011HD5Y8Qix1FjNd"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039193311,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_351b57b79fbdfe34","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/README.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/README.md\nfile\n\n1: # Sample C CLI\n2: \n3: `sample-c-cli` is a tiny command-line target used for CodeCome workflow testing.\n4: \n5: It is intentionally small so the workflow can be exercised quickly.\n6: \n7: ## Build\n8: \n9: make\n10: \n11: ## Run\n12: \n13: ./bin/sample-c-cli --help\n14: ./bin/sample-c-cli greet Alice\n15: ./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello\n16: \n17: ## Layout\n18: \n19: - `src/main.c` -- CLI entrypoint and argument parsing\n20: - `src/greet.c` -- greeting functionality\n21: - `src/util.c` -- helper functions\n22: - `include/` -- public headers\n23: - `tests/smoke.sh` -- tiny smoke test\n\n(End of file - total 23 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"# Sample C CLI\n\n`sample-c-cli` is a tiny command-line target used for CodeCome workflow testing.\n\nIt is intentionally small so the workflow can be exercised quickly.\n\n## Build\n\n make\n\n## Run\n\n ./bin/sample-c-cli --help\n ./bin/sample-c-cli greet Alice\n ./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello\n\n## Layout\n\n- `src/main.c` -- CLI entrypoint and argument parsing\n- `src/greet.c` -- greeting functionality","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/README.md","time":{"start":1779039193290,"end":1779039193310}},"id":"prt_e36ffc8c50013SrZvQiqN2vT4T","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffb14c0011HD5Y8Qix1FjNd"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039193312,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_157a0afbd5f4f024","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/main.c"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/main.c\nfile\n\n1: #include \n2: #include \n3: \n4: #include \"greet.h\"\n5: \n6: static void print_help(void) {\n7: puts(\"sample-c-cli commands:\");\n8: puts(\" greet \");\n9: puts(\" echo \");\n10: puts(\" remove \");\n11: }\n12: \n13: int main(int argc, char **argv) {\n14: if (argc < 2) {\n15: print_help();\n16: return 1;\n17: }\n18: \n19: if (strcmp(argv[1], \"--help\") == 0) {\n20: print_help();\n21: return 0;\n22: }\n23: \n24: if (strcmp(argv[1], \"greet\") == 0 && argc >= 3) {\n25: greet_user(argv[2]);\n26: return 0;\n27: }\n28: \n29: if (strcmp(argv[1], \"echo\") == 0 && argc >= 3) {\n30: echo_message(argv[2]);\n31: return 0;\n32: }\n33: \n34: if (strcmp(argv[1], \"remove\") == 0 && argc >= 3) {\n35: return remove_file(argv[2]);\n36: }\n37: \n38: print_help();\n39: return 1;\n40: }\n\n(End of file - total 40 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#include \n#include \n\n#include \"greet.h\"\n\nstatic void print_help(void) {\n puts(\"sample-c-cli commands:\");\n puts(\" greet \");\n puts(\" echo \");\n puts(\" remove \");\n}\n\nint main(int argc, char **argv) {\n if (argc < 2) {\n print_help();\n return 1;\n }\n\n if (strcmp(argv[1], \"--help\") == 0) {\n print_help();","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/src/main.c","time":{"start":1779039193298,"end":1779039193311}},"id":"prt_e36ffc8d1001034kaDB7Wfyfqw","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffb14c0011HD5Y8Qix1FjNd"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039193395,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffc9320011gFn6eIIQp5dhI","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"552ac9fa6cb2904a16dbdb679ac80d3245b4e941","messageID":"msg_e36ffb14c0011HD5Y8Qix1FjNd","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":47915,"input":211,"output":117,"reasoning":35,"cache":{"write":0,"read":47552}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039194729,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffce66001HG57OPvkGedM6k","messageID":"msg_e36ffc98b001fnXHHoncGqh3f9","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"96540265c0232e75f511794385ebd33e71ed3b41","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039199631,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_b2ef7e53cc151f86","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/greet.c"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/greet.c\nfile\n\n1: #include \n2: #include \n3: #include \n4: \n5: #include \"greet.h\"\n6: #include \"util.h\"\n7: \n8: void greet_user(const char *name) {\n9: char buffer[32];\n10: size_t copy_len = clamp_copy_length(name, sizeof(buffer));\n11: \n12: memcpy(buffer, name, copy_len);\n13: buffer[copy_len] = '\\0';\n14: \n15: printf(\"Hello, %s\\n\", buffer);\n16: }\n17: \n18: void echo_message(const char *message) {\n19: printf(message);\n20: putchar('\\n');\n21: }\n22: \n23: int remove_file(const char *path) {\n24: char command[256];\n25: \n26: snprintf(command, sizeof(command), \"rm -f %s\", path);\n27: return system(command);\n28: }\n\n(End of file - total 28 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#include \n#include \n#include \n\n#include \"greet.h\"\n#include \"util.h\"\n\nvoid greet_user(const char *name) {\n char buffer[32];\n size_t copy_len = clamp_copy_length(name, sizeof(buffer));\n\n memcpy(buffer, name, copy_len);\n buffer[copy_len] = '\\0';\n\n printf(\"Hello, %s\\n\", buffer);\n}\n\nvoid echo_message(const char *message) {\n printf(message);\n putchar('\\n');","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/src/greet.c","time":{"start":1779039199610,"end":1779039199630}},"id":"prt_e36ffe176001fC1k8Ng1n5PYFI","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffc98b001fnXHHoncGqh3f9"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039199637,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_370f9e12bd9b0921","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/util.c"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/src/util.c\nfile\n\n1: #include \n2: \n3: #include \"util.h\"\n4: \n5: size_t clamp_copy_length(const char *input, size_t max_len) {\n6: size_t length = strlen(input);\n7: \n8: if (length > max_len) {\n9: return max_len;\n10: }\n11: \n12: return length;\n13: }\n\n(End of file - total 13 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#include \n\n#include \"util.h\"\n\nsize_t clamp_copy_length(const char *input, size_t max_len) {\n size_t length = strlen(input);\n\n if (length > max_len) {\n return max_len;\n }\n\n return length;\n}","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/src/util.c","time":{"start":1779039199614,"end":1779039199632}},"id":"prt_e36ffe17c001Pvlh7q797I2ZWi","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffc98b001fnXHHoncGqh3f9"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039199637,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_fdb478687886aee3","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/greet.h"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/greet.h\nfile\n\n1: #ifndef SAMPLE_CLI_GREET_H\n2: #define SAMPLE_CLI_GREET_H\n3: \n4: void greet_user(const char *name);\n5: void echo_message(const char *message);\n6: int remove_file(const char *path);\n7: \n8: #endif\n\n(End of file - total 8 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#ifndef SAMPLE_CLI_GREET_H\n#define SAMPLE_CLI_GREET_H\n\nvoid greet_user(const char *name);\nvoid echo_message(const char *message);\nint remove_file(const char *path);\n\n#endif","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/include/greet.h","time":{"start":1779039199618,"end":1779039199633}},"id":"prt_e36ffe17f001nG1RwXTUofHf5r","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffc98b001fnXHHoncGqh3f9"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039199637,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_44318020d023d261","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/tests/smoke.sh"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/tests/smoke.sh\nfile\n\n1: #!/usr/bin/env bash\n2: set -euo pipefail\n3: \n4: ./bin/sample-c-cli --help >/dev/null\n5: ./bin/sample-c-cli greet tester >/dev/null\n6: ./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello >/dev/null\n\n(End of file - total 6 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help >/dev/null\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet tester >/dev/null\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello >/dev/null","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/tests/smoke.sh","time":{"start":1779039199623,"end":1779039199634}},"id":"prt_e36ffe1860010YFUoDpdCRA4zM","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffc98b001fnXHHoncGqh3f9"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039199637,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_e27f29761101bdc4","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/util.h"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/src/include/util.h\nfile\n\n1: #ifndef SAMPLE_CLI_UTIL_H\n2: #define SAMPLE_CLI_UTIL_H\n3: \n4: #include \n5: \n6: size_t clamp_copy_length(const char *input, size_t max_len);\n7: \n8: #endif\n\n(End of file - total 8 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#ifndef SAMPLE_CLI_UTIL_H\n#define SAMPLE_CLI_UTIL_H\n\n#include \n\nsize_t clamp_copy_length(const char *input, size_t max_len);\n\n#endif","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"src/include/util.h","time":{"start":1779039199621,"end":1779039199635}},"id":"prt_e36ffe183001xhljoSwGf3pvns","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffc98b001fnXHHoncGqh3f9"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039199737,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffe1f7001CRoZs4rTonza46","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"62f339504a16932233724bc8a19031308ecbbdc4","messageID":"msg_e36ffc98b001fnXHHoncGqh3f9","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":49086,"input":961,"output":198,"reasoning":23,"cache":{"write":0,"read":47904}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039201166,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36ffe78c001suIdIP61fg4fDy","messageID":"msg_e36ffe2690011OOFjtErBj6UwK","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"e2f4b87b4d4a32f15f77c5f3032da0d1578b05e7","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039204114,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"glob","callID":"call_39fe9cf33dde931c","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"pattern":"itemdb/**/*"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/index.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/findings/DUPLICATE/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/findings/REJECTED/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/findings/EXPLOITED/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/findings/CONFIRMED/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/findings/PENDING/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/reports/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/evidence/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/.gitkeep\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/README.md","metadata":{"count":11,"truncated":false},"title":"","time":{"start":1779039204010,"end":1779039204112}},"id":"prt_e36fff2a3001D8AC8K9fnBILSO","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36ffe2690011OOFjtErBj6UwK"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039204381,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36fff41b0011bpAaEvpNoGQnE","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"c3c165f102d20259646d34db5baac68d46cc1da1","messageID":"msg_e36ffe2690011OOFjtErBj6UwK","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":49928,"input":800,"output":23,"reasoning":49,"cache":{"write":0,"read":49056}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039205632,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36fff8fb001qIN0DWCtRQ6Ntq","messageID":"msg_e36fff4b1001124dDw3CHWUeAi","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"0f1f0bd95d71ea1ca9be8a168e80f5d6540e2684","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039226044,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_e2d95ccec9ee0153","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/target-profile.md","content":"# Target Profile\n\nDate: 2026-05-17 \nPhase: reconnaissance \nTarget path: `./src`\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThe target is a **simple C CLI tool** used for CodeCome workflow testing. It is intentionally small and provides basic commands: `greet`, `echo`, and `remove`. The project serves as a test harness for the vulnerability research workflow.\n\n## Detected Target Type\n\n**Type**: CLI tool (library/binary) \n**Confidence**: HIGH\n\nThis is a standalone C program compiled to a CLI executable.\n\n## Languages\n\n- **C** — Primary language, used for all source code\n\n## Frameworks and Technologies\n\n- **C standard library** — `stdio.h`, `stdlib.h`, `string.h`\n- **Make** — Build system via `Makefile`\n- **No external dependencies** — Pure C with standard library only\n\n## Repository Structure\n\n```\nsrc/\n├── README.md # Project documentation\n├── Makefile # Build configuration\n├── src/\n│ ├── main.c # CLI entrypoint\n│ ├── greet.c # Greeting and file operations\n│ └── util.c # Utility functions\n├── include/\n│ ├── greet.h # Public API headers\n│ └── util.h # Utility headers\n├── tests/\n│ └── smoke.sh # Smoke test script\n└── bin/ # Build output (generated)\n └── sample-c-cli # Compiled binary\n```\n\n## Important Manifests or Build Files\n\n- `src/Makefile` — Standard C build with `cc` compiler, `-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -O2` flags\n\n## Target-Specific Observations\n\n1. The target is a **tiny CLI tool** designed for CodeCome workflow testing\n2. No network exposure, no database, no external services\n3. Simple command-line argument parsing with no sophisticated input handling\n4. Contains intentional security-relevant patterns for testing:\n - `remove` command uses `system()` with user-provided path (shell injection risk)\n - `echo_message` uses `printf` with user input directly (format string risk)\n - `greet_user` uses manual buffer handling with `memcpy`\n\n## Recommended Phase 2 Focus\n\nGiven this is a test corpus, Phase 2 should focus on:\n1. Shell command injection in `remove_file()` function\n2. Format string vulnerability in `echo_message()` function\n3. Buffer handling in `greet_user()` function"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/target-profile.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/target-profile.md","time":{"start":1779039226030,"end":1779039226042}},"id":"prt_e370048a7001NLLLNBs0Xy39eP","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e36fff4b1001124dDw3CHWUeAi"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039226074,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e36fffc79001ZzOA1DUy8e67j8","messageID":"msg_e36fff4b1001124dDw3CHWUeAi","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"Now I'll create all the required Phase 1a reconnaissance notes. Let me start:\n","time":{"start":1779039206521,"end":1779039226072}}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039226178,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37004940001LReGZgGtV4TPP3","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"ce05de95319d7776c6158bd6d6bfd755d2224a36","messageID":"msg_e36fff4b1001124dDw3CHWUeAi","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":50844,"input":307,"output":583,"reasoning":34,"cache":{"write":0,"read":49920}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039228050,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3700508e0018MynLSjFDhIiuY","messageID":"msg_e370049a9001B56tQ69S6OJ20C","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"ac2f082118aa6d44ea43775c62ebbb12bd2d139b","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039251100,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_a7310108ad8ac2fd","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md","content":"# Attack Surface\n\n## Overview\n\nThe target is a simple C CLI tool with limited attack surface. As a CLI tool, all input comes from command-line arguments. The primary attack surfaces are:\n\n1. **CLI arguments** — All user input flows through `argv`\n2. **File paths** — The `remove` command accepts a file path argument\n3. **String inputs** — Both `greet` and `echo` commands accept string arguments\n\n## Attack Surfaces\n\n### 1. CLI Argument Parser (main.c)\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| **Name** | CLI Argument Parser |\n| **Type** | CLI argument parsing |\n| **Entrypoint** | `main()` function, lines 13-39 |\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[1]`, `argv[2]` |\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over command and arguments when invoking the CLI |\n| **Trust Boundary** | External user input → CLI application |\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/main.c` |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | N/A — Simple argument dispatching |\n\n### 2. Greet Command (greet.c)\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| **Name** | Greet Command |\n| **Type** | String handling |\n| **Entrypoint** | `greet_user()` function, line 8 |\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[2]` from CLI |\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over name argument |\n| **Trust Boundary** | CLI user input → greeting output |\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/greet.c`, `src/util.c` |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Buffer handling issues, buffer overflow |\n\n### 3. Echo Command (greet.c)\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| **Name** | Echo Command |\n| **Type** | String output |\n| **Entrypoint** | `echo_message()` function, line 18 |\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[2]` from CLI |\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over message argument |\n| **Trust Boundary** | CLI user input → stdout output |\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/greet.c` |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Format string vulnerability |\n\n### 4. Remove Command (greet.c)\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| **Name** | Remove Command |\n| **Type** | Shell command execution |\n| **Entrypoint** | `remove_file()` function, line 23 |\n| **Input Sources** | `argv[2]` from CLI |\n| **Likely Attacker Control** | Full control over path argument |\n| **Trust Boundary** | CLI user input → shell execution |\n| **Relevant Files** | `src/greet.c` |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | OS command injection, path traversal |\n\n## Network Exposure\n\n- **None** — This is a local CLI tool with no network capabilities\n- No HTTP handlers, no RPC methods, no listening ports\n\n## File-Based Inputs\n\n- **None** — The tool does not read from files\n- The `remove` command writes/operates on the filesystem\n\n## Summary\n\n| Surface | Type | Risk Level |\n|---------|------|------------|\n| CLI arguments | Input | Low |\n| `greet` command | String handling | Medium |\n| `echo` command | Format string | High |\n| `remove` command | Shell execution | Critical |"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md","time":{"start":1779039251092,"end":1779039251098}},"id":"prt_e3700aa8e001wlscpFIJ8HwJSV","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e370049a9001B56tQ69S6OJ20C"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039251518,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3700ac3d001o4NSqrZ9BkkVnW","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"c7151de7dded3fdc36eb34c19fded45c5d23cc08","messageID":"msg_e370049a9001B56tQ69S6OJ20C","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":51672,"input":48,"output":795,"reasoning":13,"cache":{"write":0,"read":50816}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039253220,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3700b2e1001cFcK6SwoTzOtLW","messageID":"msg_e3700ac960010DQNk8nyzvXvnu","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"b42f796f943bc1029034009fd070a4157ccc090a","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039264748,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_cb811fb53d7b339c","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/build-model.md","content":"# Build Model\n\n## Build System\n\n**Type**: GNU Make \n**Build File**: `src/Makefile`\n\n## Build Commands\n\n### Standard Build\n\n```bash\ncd src && make\n```\n\nThis produces:\n- `src/bin/sample-c-cli` — The compiled executable\n\n### Individual Steps\n\n```bash\n# Compile object files\nmake build/\n\n# Link executable\nmake bin/sample-c-cli\n```\n\n### Clean\n\n```bash\nmake clean\n```\n\nRemoves `build/` and `bin/` directories.\n\n### Test\n\n```bash\nmake test\n```\n\nRuns `tests/smoke.sh`.\n\n## Build Configuration\n\n| Setting | Value |\n|---------|-------|\n| Compiler | `cc` (configurable via `CC` variable) |\n| Flags | `-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic -O2 -Iinclude` |\n| Output Directory | `bin/` |\n| Object Directory | `build/` |\n\n## Dependencies\n\n- **C standard library** — No external dependencies\n- **C compiler** — Any `cc` compatible compiler (gcc, clang)\n\n## Generated Artifacts\n\n- `src/bin/sample-c-cli` — Compiled binary\n- `src/build/*.o` — Object files\n\n## Build Assumptions\n\n- Requires a C compiler (`cc`, `gcc`, or `clang`)\n- No special system libraries required\n- Should build on any POSIX system\n\n## Sandbox Changes Needed\n\n- Need a container with a C compiler (gcc or clang)\n- Standard build tools (make, cc)\n- No additional libraries or packages required\n\n## Known Blockers\n\n- **None identified** — Simple C project with no external dependencies"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/build-model.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/build-model.md","time":{"start":1779039264740,"end":1779039264746}},"id":"prt_e3700dfe100197Ym1Dy89b6Nz6","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3700ac960010DQNk8nyzvXvnu"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039264845,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3700e04b001s5Kl357ZCaEVff","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"057804f6f1d92e9d1ace5047a71049cf78633ffd","messageID":"msg_e3700ac960010DQNk8nyzvXvnu","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":52096,"input":45,"output":391,"reasoning":12,"cache":{"write":0,"read":51648}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039267782,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3700ebc300114QInePSjDR7FF","messageID":"msg_e3700e0ac001ZUd5Ky0l65WEgV","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"631223f4f7c99b35cde544f10bb0a97c3c1b419b","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039288989,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_fe6d59f006d8ea15","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/execution-model.md","content":"# Execution Model\n\n## Overview\n\nThe target is a standalone CLI executable with no persistent runtime. It processes command-line arguments and exits.\n\n## Entrypoint\n\n- **Binary**: `bin/sample-c-cli`\n- **Entry function**: `main()` in `src/main.c`\n\n## Runtime Invocation\n\n```bash\n./bin/sample-c-cli [--help|greet |echo |remove ]\n```\n\n## Commands\n\n### Help\n\n```bash\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help\n```\n\nPrints help text and exits.\n\n### Greet\n\n```bash\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet \n```\n\nPrints \"Hello, \" to stdout.\n\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli greet Alice` outputs `Hello, Alice`\n\n### Echo\n\n```bash\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo \n```\n\nPrints the message to stdout.\n\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello` outputs `hello`\n\n### Remove\n\n```bash\n./bin/sample-c-cli remove \n```\n\nExecutes `rm -f ` via shell.\n\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli remove /tmp/testfile` deletes the file\n\n## Runtime Dependencies\n\n- **None** — Pure C with standard library only\n- No database, no network, no external services\n\n## Configuration Files\n\n- **None** — No configuration files used\n\n## Environment Variables\n\n- **None** — No environment variables affect behavior\n\n## Ports\n\n- **None** — No network ports used\n\n## Test Harness\n\nThe test script `tests/smoke.sh` runs:\n\n```bash\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help >/dev/null\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet tester >/dev/null\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello >/dev/null\n```\n\n## Runtime Model Summary\n\n| Aspect | Value |\n|--------|-------|\n| Type | CLI executable |\n| Persistence | None — one-shot execution |\n| User session | None |\n| State | Stateless |\n| Network | None |"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/execution-model.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/execution-model.md","time":{"start":1779039288982,"end":1779039288988}},"id":"prt_e37013e93001cFnHj1OIUQn74u","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3700e0ac001ZUd5Ky0l65WEgV"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039289132,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37013f2b001ehMvGuv6w5xFoq","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"3df063f31b577344cd84e109ed500d408cd45aee","messageID":"msg_e3700e0ac001ZUd5Ky0l65WEgV","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":52593,"input":52053,"output":463,"reasoning":13,"cache":{"write":0,"read":64}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039291988,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37014a51001XYnpKBW2gCwVw5","messageID":"msg_e37013f88001vxWbI8WyzmwVOT","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"a4b25b4e0360c89bd5c252cdacad35488a115f6e","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039312252,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_66ce3d29a0a2d4c2","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md","content":"# Trust Boundaries\n\n## Overview\n\nThis document identifies where lower-trust data or actors affect higher-trust behavior.\n\n## Trust Boundaries\n\n### 1. CLI User Input → Application\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Boundary** | External CLI user input → CLI application |\n| **Direction** | Untrusted → Trusted |\n| **Input** | `argv[1]`, `argv[2]` |\n| **Processing** | Command dispatch in `main()` |\n| **Risk** | Attacker controls command and arguments |\n\n**Example**: User provides `./bin/sample-c-cli remove /etc/passwd`\n\n### 2. User String → Greeting Output\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled string → stdout |\n| **Direction** | Untrusted → Trusted output |\n| **Input** | `name` argument to `greet_user()` |\n| **Processing** | Buffer copy in `greet_user()` |\n| **Risk** | Buffer overflow if name exceeds buffer size |\n\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli greet AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA`\n\n### 3. User String → Format String\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled string → printf format string |\n| **Direction** | Untrusted → Trusted output function |\n| **Input** | `message` argument to `echo_message()` |\n| **Processing** | Direct `printf(message)` call |\n| **Risk** | Format string vulnerability allows memory read |\n\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli echo %s%s%s%s`\n\n### 4. User String → Shell Command\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled path → shell command execution |\n| **Direction** | Untrusted → Trusted shell execution |\n| **Input** | `path` argument to `remove_file()` |\n| **Processing** | `system(\"rm -f \" + path)` |\n| **Risk** | OS command injection |\n\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli remove \"/etc/passwd; cat /etc/shadow\"`\n\n### 5. User Path → Filesystem Operation\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Boundary** | User-controlled path → filesystem delete operation |\n| **Direction** | Untrusted → Trusted filesystem |\n| **Input** | `path` argument to `remove_file()` |\n| **Processing** | `rm -f` shell command |\n| **Risk** | Arbitrary file deletion |\n\n**Example**: `./bin/sample-c-cli remove \"~/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`\n\n## Summary\n\n| Boundary | From | To | Risk Level |\n|----------|------|-----|-------------|\n| CLI args → App | User input | CLI execution | Low |\n| String → Greeting | User string | Buffer copy | Medium |\n| String → Format | User string | printf format | High |\n| String → Shell | User string | system() call | Critical |\n| Path → Filesystem | User path | rm command | Critical |\n\n## Security Impact\n\nThe `remove` command boundary is the most critical — it allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a crafted path argument. The `echo` command is also high-risk due to format string vulnerability."},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md","time":{"start":1779039312241,"end":1779039312249}},"id":"prt_e3701996d001FvQiWVocTSXG6Y","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e37013f88001vxWbI8WyzmwVOT"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039312346,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370199d8001NwbzN3epDZAV6C","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"1256125af8fafbf60f00d5bb3c8004a2d39e9a44","messageID":"msg_e37013f88001vxWbI8WyzmwVOT","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":53345,"input":550,"output":718,"reasoning":13,"cache":{"write":0,"read":52064}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039313309,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37019d9b0010Ywe7ZqjLy3Zcn","messageID":"msg_e37019a35001OMEL5UxHhqWZW9","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"1355e396af3c66b3000528748774057543301588","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039336581,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_12dd8bfb16763c8c","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/data-flow.md","content":"# Data Flow Notes\n\n## Overview\n\nThis document summarizes security-relevant data flows in the target.\n\n## Key Data Flows\n\n### 1. CLI Argument → Greet Command Flow\n\n```\nargv[1] = \"greet\"\nargv[2] = \n |\n v\nmain() dispatches to greet_user(name)\n |\n v\ngreet_user(name):\n - clamp_copy_length(name, 32) -> copy_len\n - memcpy(buffer, name, copy_len)\n - buffer[copy_len] = '\\0'\n - printf(\"Hello, %s\\n\", buffer)\n```\n\n**Security Relevance**: Manual buffer management with memcpy — potential for buffer overflow if name length is not properly handled.\n\n### 2. CLI Argument → Echo Command Flow\n\n```\nargv[1] = \"echo\"\nargv[2] = \n |\n v\nmain() dispatches to echo_message(message)\n |\n v\necho_message(message):\n - printf(message)\n - putchar('\\n')\n```\n\n**Security Relevance**: Direct user input passed to printf — format string vulnerability that can read arbitrary memory.\n\n### 3. CLI Argument → Remove Command Flow\n\n```\nargv[1] = \"remove\"\nargv[2] = \n |\n v\nmain() dispatches to remove_file(path)\n |\n v\nremove_file(path):\n - snprintf(command, 256, \"rm -f %s\", path)\n - system(command)\n```\n\n**Security Relevance**: User input directly interpolated into shell command — OS command injection vulnerability.\n\n## Untrusted Input Sources\n\n| Source | Type | Control Level |\n|--------|------|---------------|\n| `argv[1]` | Command name | Full (user chooses) |\n| `argv[2]` | Argument value | Full (user provides) |\n\n## Dangerous Sinks\n\n| Sink | Location | Danger |\n|------|----------|--------|\n| `memcpy` | `greet.c:12` | Buffer overflow |\n| `printf(message)` | `greet.c:19` | Format string |\n| `system(command)` | `greet.c:27` | Command injection |\n\n## Authentication / Authorization\n\n- **None** — No authentication or authorization in this CLI tool\n- Any user who can execute the binary has full control\n\n## Tenant Isolation\n\n- **N/A** — Single-tenant CLI tool\n\n## Secret Handling\n\n- **None** — No secrets are handled by this tool\n\n## File Paths\n\n- The `remove` command accepts a user-controlled path\n- Path is passed directly to `rm -f` shell command without validation\n\n## External Commands\n\n- `system()` call in `remove_file()` is the primary external command sink\n- No other command execution\n\n## Parsers\n\n- **None** — No data parsing in this tool\n\n## Serialization\n\n- **None** — No serialization\n\n## Cryptography\n\n- **None** — No cryptographic operations\n\n## Network Calls\n\n- **None** — No network operations\n\n## Memory Unsafe Operations\n\n- `memcpy` with user-controlled length in `greet_user()` (via clamp_copy_length)\n- Fixed-size buffer stack allocation: `char buffer[32]`"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/data-flow.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/data-flow.md","time":{"start":1779039336572,"end":1779039336579}},"id":"prt_e3701f878001g9zUEbBfAItXQt","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e37019a35001OMEL5UxHhqWZW9"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039336692,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3701f8f30012ElIo6tMpm0eLt","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"6f85753727431de22d1f9ad75bd7f12a5826b386","messageID":"msg_e37019a35001OMEL5UxHhqWZW9","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":54095,"input":790,"output":718,"reasoning":11,"cache":{"write":0,"read":52576}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039338251,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3701ff08001lB32nQs69HlNij","messageID":"msg_e3701f96d001tz2OVdgvZeRvCV","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"fe7ce512b83b35f40caf2f5a5ee21be1eede3857","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039363570,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_d3acd2fc8abe103d","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/validation-model.md","content":"# Validation Model\n\n## Overview\n\nThis document explains how findings can be validated for the target.\n\n## Target Build Capability\n\n**Can the target be built?** Yes\n\n```bash\ncd src && make\n```\n\nThe target builds cleanly with no errors using standard C compiler.\n\n## Target Execution Capability\n\n**Can the target be run locally?** Yes\n\nThe target is a standalone CLI executable:\n\n```bash\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet Alice\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello\n./bin/sample-c-cli remove \n```\n\n## Sandbox Suitability\n\n**Is Docker sufficient?** Yes\n\nA simple Docker container with a C compiler (gcc) and make is sufficient to build and test the target. No complex runtime dependencies required.\n\n## Useful Validation Commands\n\n### Build\n\n```bash\ncd /workspace/src && make\n```\n\n### Test\n\n```bash\ncd /workspace/src && make test\n```\n\n### Manual Testing\n\n```bash\n# Format string test\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo \"%x %x %x %x\"\n\n# Command injection test \n./bin/sample-c-cli remove \"/tmp; echo pwned > /tmp/pwned\"\n\n# Buffer overflow test (long input)\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet $(python3 -c 'print(\"A\"*100)')\n```\n\n## Useful Sanitizer/Debugger Strategy\n\n### AddressSanitizer (ASAN)\n\nBuild with ASAN to detect memory safety issues:\n\n```bash\nCFLAGS=\"-fsanitize=address -g\" make clean && make\n```\n\nThis would detect buffer overflows in `greet_user()`.\n\n### Valgrind\n\nRun with valgrind to detect memory issues:\n\n```bash\nvalgrind ./bin/sample-c-cli greet AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\n```\n\n## Test Strategy\n\n- **Unit tests**: Not applicable (no unit test framework)\n- **Integration tests**: `tests/smoke.sh` provides basic smoke tests\n- **Functional tests**: Manual CLI invocation for each command\n\n## Evidence to Capture\n\nFor each finding, capture:\n\n1. **Reproduction command** — Exact CLI invocation\n2. **Expected output** — What should happen\n3. **Actual output** — What actually happens\n4. **Exit code** — Command exit status\n5. **Evidence files** — Any created files or output\n\n## Validation Limitations\n\n1. **No runtime debugging** — Simple CLI, no complex debugging needed\n2. **No network validation** — Not applicable\n3. **No database validation** — Not applicable\n4. **Manual test cases** — Most validation is manual CLI testing\n\n## Blockers\n\n- **None identified** — Simple C project with no blockers\n\n## Summary\n\n| Validation Aspect | Status | Approach |\n|-------------------|--------|----------|\n| Build | ✓ Available | `make` |\n| Run | ✓ Available | CLI invocation |\n| Test | ✓ Available | `make test` or smoke.sh |\n| Sanitizers | ✓ Available | ASAN, Valgrind |\n| Network | ✗ N/A | Not applicable |\n| Database | ✗ N/A | Not applicable |"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/validation-model.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/validation-model.md","time":{"start":1779039363561,"end":1779039363568}},"id":"prt_e370261e3001QNO13tMM9oPkTi","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3701f96d001tz2OVdgvZeRvCV"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039363801,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370262d8001NZPgLhwtuAEeox","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"4f5e2608dc92c08dedf588804a7bfceb73d0d8aa","messageID":"msg_e3701f96d001tz2OVdgvZeRvCV","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":54822,"input":774,"output":691,"reasoning":13,"cache":{"write":0,"read":53344}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039365050,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370267b8001aaWwh56b6fQEt7","messageID":"msg_e37026338001Hw222NWZpmxF0i","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"38d36c9092febc72a835166c55892507449739f9","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039390607,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_0d29619ece71ab9d","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md","content":"# Interesting Files\n\n## Overview\n\nThis document lists files and directories worth reviewing during Phase 2 (hypothesis generation).\n\n## High-Interest Files\n\n### 1. src/greet.c\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Path** | `src/greet.c` |\n| **Why Interesting** | Contains all three security-sensitive functions: `greet_user`, `echo_message`, `remove_file` |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Buffer overflow, format string, command injection |\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Deep analysis of each function |\n\n**Key Functions**:\n- `greet_user()` — Buffer handling with memcpy\n- `echo_message()` — Format string vulnerability\n- `remove_file()` — Shell command injection\n\n### 2. src/main.c\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Path** | `src/main.c` |\n| **Why Interesting** | CLI entrypoint and argument parsing |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Argument injection, command routing issues |\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Review argument handling logic |\n\n**Key Functions**:\n- `main()` — Command dispatch based on argv\n\n### 3. src/util.c\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Path** | `src/util.c` |\n| **Why Interesting** | Contains `clamp_copy_length` used in buffer operations |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | Integer overflow, off-by-one |\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Verify clamp logic is correct |\n\n**Key Functions**:\n- `clamp_copy_length()` — Length calculation for buffer copy\n\n## Medium-Interest Files\n\n### 4. include/greet.h\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Path** | `include/greet.h` |\n| **Why Interesting** | Public API definitions |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None — header only |\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Verify API contracts |\n\n### 5. include/util.h\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Path** | `include/util.h` |\n| **Why Interesting** | Utility function declarations |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None — header only |\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | Verify API contracts |\n\n## Low-Interest Files\n\n### 6. src/Makefile\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Path** | `src/Makefile` |\n| **Why Interesting** | Build configuration |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None — build system |\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | None required |\n\n### 7. tests/smoke.sh\n\n| Attribute | Details |\n|-----------|---------|\n| **Path** | `tests/smoke.sh` |\n| **Why Interesting** | Test script |\n| **Likely Vulnerability Classes** | None — test file |\n| **Recommended Follow-up** | None required |\n\n## Phase 2 Priority Order\n\n1. **src/greet.c** — Primary target with three vulnerable functions\n2. **src/util.c** — Helper function with potential integer issues\n3. **src/main.c** — Entry point and command routing\n4. Headers — Verify API contracts\n\n## Summary\n\n| File | Interest Level | Priority |\n|------|----------------|----------|\n| src/greet.c | High | 1 |\n| src/util.c | High | 2 |\n| src/main.c | High | 3 |\n| include/greet.h | Medium | 4 |\n| include/util.h | Medium | 5 |\n| src/Makefile | Low | — |\n| tests/smoke.sh | Low | — |"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md","time":{"start":1779039390601,"end":1779039390606}},"id":"prt_e3702cb83001frdUaVGX1pbDvL","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e37026338001Hw222NWZpmxF0i"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039390737,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3702cc10001VFZh5GtzJoSKFn","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"3d148ff8148933da4b2e670d886ae5d2dddccbfe","messageID":"msg_e37026338001Hw222NWZpmxF0i","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":55664,"input":1467,"output":808,"reasoning":13,"cache":{"write":0,"read":53376}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039392741,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3702d3e3001tsWxvdTs2bIPKz","messageID":"msg_e3702cc6c001yle4Wmc2eUOMtH","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"3f0bde327f305858d33b1c23de8f7bad6ff347cd","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039409654,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_04ba6aedfab6076b","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md","content":"# Security Assumptions\n\n## Overview\n\nThis document lists assumptions made during reconnaissance, marked by confidence level.\n\n## Confirmed Assumptions\n\n- [confirmed] The target contains C source files.\n- [confirmed] The target is a CLI tool with no network capabilities.\n- [confirmed] The build system uses Make.\n- [confirmed] The target compiles with no errors using `make`.\n\n## Likely Assumptions\n\n- [likely] The target is intentionally designed as a test corpus with security vulnerabilities.\n- [likely] The `remove` command uses `system()` for shell command execution.\n- [likely] The `echo_message` function has a format string vulnerability.\n- [likely] The `greet_user` function has potential buffer handling issues.\n\n## Unknown Assumptions\n\n- [unknown] Whether the project is meant to have vulnerabilities for testing or if they are accidental.\n- [unknown] Whether there are additional hidden test cases or commands.\n\n## Risky Assumptions\n\n- [risky] The `remove_file` function appears to directly interpolate user input into a shell command.\n- [risky] The `echo_message` function passes user input directly to printf.\n- [risky] Buffer size is hardcoded to 32 bytes in `greet_user()` without validation.\n\n## Security Considerations\n\n| Aspect | Assessment | Risk Level |\n|--------|------------|------------|\n| Input validation | None apparent | High |\n| Buffer handling | Manual with fixed size | Medium |\n| Shell execution | Direct system() call | Critical |\n| Format string | Direct printf of user input | High |\n| Authentication | N/A | N/A |\n| Authorization | N/A | N/A |\n\n## Notes\n\nThis appears to be a test corpus with intentional security vulnerabilities for CodeCome workflow testing. The vulnerabilities are straightforward and clearly exploitable:\n\n1. **Command injection** in `remove_file()` — highest severity\n2. **Format string** in `echo_message()` — high severity\n3. **Buffer handling** in `greet_user()` — medium severity\n\nThe assumptions above should be validated through Phase 2 hypothesis generation and Phase 4 validation."},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md","time":{"start":1779039409634,"end":1779039409652}},"id":"prt_e370315d7001WIHUs02I4ZFg1X","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3702cc6c001yle4Wmc2eUOMtH"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039409943,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37031713001UtnMSfrTsgTT6S","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"10a6ce3346139eaa9cdbc0535bd8468fdcc23bf2","messageID":"msg_e3702cc6c001yle4Wmc2eUOMtH","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":56183,"input":37,"output":484,"reasoning":14,"cache":{"write":0,"read":55648}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039411788,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37031e49001F9RjCnrZdhel1p","messageID":"msg_e370317f8001W4pF0iBNAr6XdN","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"d6f5a803e2af3e35e62dcb42f5e0bb78b33cb51a","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039484215,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_80c2b08140e47a9f","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml","content":"# CodeCome file risk index\n#\n# Generated during Phase 1 and consumed by optional file-by-file Phase 2 sweeps.\n# Scores are intentionally coarse so agents can prioritize attention without\n# pretending the ranking is precise.\n\nschema_version: 1\ngenerated_by: \"phase-1-recon\"\ngenerated_at: \"2026-05-17T00:00:00Z\"\ntarget: \"sample-c-cli\"\nscoring_scale:\n min: 1\n max: 5\n meaning:\n \"1\": \"Low security interest; unlikely to cross a trust boundary or reach a dangerous sink.\"\n \"2\": \"Some security relevance, but weak attacker control or low impact.\"\n \"3\": \"Moderate interest; plausible source, sink, or security decision.\"\n \"4\": \"High interest; likely attack surface, trust boundary, parser, authz/authn, or dangerous sink.\"\n \"5\": \"Very high interest; externally reachable, security-critical, complex parser, privileged operation, or historically bug-prone surface.\"\n\nscoring_dimensions:\n - attacker_controlled_input\n - externally_influenced_state\n - trust_boundary_crossing\n - security_decision\n - dangerous_sink\n - parser_complexity\n - privilege_boundary\n - asset_sensitivity\n - historical_vulnerability_density\n - validation_feasibility\n\nfiles:\n - path: \"src/greet.c\"\n score: 5\n confidence: \"HIGH\"\n target_area: \"Core CLI functionality - security-sensitive functions\"\n reasons:\n - \"Contains three security-critical functions: greet_user, echo_message, remove_file\"\n - \"remove_file() uses system() with user-controlled path - OS command injection\"\n - \"echo_message() passes user input directly to printf - format string vulnerability\"\n - \"greet_user() uses manual buffer handling with memcpy\"\n - \"Crosses trust boundary from CLI user input to shell execution\"\n entry_points:\n - \"CLI: ./bin/sample-c-cli remove \"\n - \"CLI: ./bin/sample-c-cli echo \"\n - \"CLI: ./bin/sample-c-cli greet \"\n sources:\n - \"argv[2] from main()\"\n sinks:\n - \"system() in remove_file()\"\n - \"printf() in echo_message()\"\n - \"memcpy() in greet_user()\"\n trust_boundaries:\n - \"CLI user input -> shell command execution\"\n - \"CLI user input -> printf format string\"\n - \"CLI user input -> buffer copy\"\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n - \"OS command injection\"\n - \"Format string vulnerability\"\n - \"Buffer overflow\"\n suggested_skills:\n - \"c-cpp-security\"\n suggested_validation_methods:\n - \"static_proof\"\n - \"cli_exploit\"\n - \"sanitizer_detection\"\n notes: \"Primary attack surface - contains highest risk vulnerabilities\"\n\n - path: \"src/util.c\"\n score: 4\n confidence: \"HIGH\"\n target_area: \"Utility functions\"\n reasons:\n - \"Contains clamp_copy_length() used in buffer operations\"\n - \"Integer handling in length calculations\"\n - \"Called by greet_user() which handles user input\"\n entry_points:\n - \"Called from greet_user() in greet.c\"\n sources:\n - \"name parameter from greet_user()\"\n sinks:\n - \"strlen() result\"\n trust_boundaries:\n - \"User input -> length calculation\"\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n - \"Integer overflow\"\n - \"Off-by-one error\"\n suggested_skills:\n - \"c-cpp-security\"\n suggested_validation_methods:\n - \"static_proof\"\n - \"sanitizer_detection\"\n notes: \"Supporting function with potential integer issues\"\n\n - path: \"src/main.c\"\n score: 3\n confidence: \"HIGH\"\n target_area: \"CLI entrypoint and command dispatch\"\n reasons:\n - \"Entry point for all user input\"\n - \"Command routing to security-sensitive functions\"\n - \"Basic argument validation only\"\n entry_points:\n - \"CLI invocation: ./bin/sample-c-cli [args]\"\n sources:\n - \"argv[] command-line arguments\"\n sinks:\n - \"Function dispatch based on argv[1]\"\n trust_boundaries:\n - \"External CLI input -> application\"\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n - \"Argument injection\"\n suggested_skills:\n - \"c-cpp-security\"\n suggested_validation_methods:\n - \"static_proof\"\n notes: \"Low interest due to simple dispatch logic\"\n\n - path: \"include/greet.h\"\n score: 2\n confidence: \"HIGH\"\n target_area: \"Public API header\"\n reasons:\n - \"Declares public functions including remove_file\"\n entry_points:\n - \"N/A - header file\"\n sources:\n - \"N/A\"\n sinks:\n - \"N/A\"\n trust_boundaries:\n - \"N/A\"\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n - \"None\"\n suggested_skills:\n - \"c-cpp-security\"\n suggested_validation_methods:\n - \"static_proof\"\n notes: \"Low interest - header only\"\n\n - path: \"include/util.h\"\n score: 2\n confidence: \"HIGH\"\n target_area: \"Utility header\"\n reasons:\n - \"Declares clamp_copy_length\"\n entry_points:\n - \"N/A - header file\"\n sources:\n - \"N/A\"\n sinks:\n - \"N/A\"\n trust_boundaries:\n - \"N/A\"\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n - \"None\"\n suggested_skills:\n - \"c-cpp-security\"\n suggested_validation_methods:\n - \"static_proof\"\n notes: \"Low interest - header only\"\n\n - path: \"src/Makefile\"\n score: 1\n confidence: \"HIGH\"\n target_area: \"Build configuration\"\n reasons:\n - \"Standard Makefile - no security implications\"\n entry_points:\n - \"N/A - build file\"\n sources:\n - \"N/A\"\n sinks:\n - \"N/A\"\n trust_boundaries:\n - \"N/A\"\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n - \"None\"\n suggested_skills:\n - \"none\"\n suggested_validation_methods:\n - \"none\"\n notes: \"Lowest interest - build system only\"\n\n - path: \"tests/smoke.sh\"\n score: 1\n confidence: \"HIGH\"\n target_area: \"Test script\"\n reasons:\n - \"Simple smoke test - no security implications\"\n entry_points:\n - \"N/A - test file\"\n sources:\n - \"N/A\"\n sinks:\n - \"N/A\"\n trust_boundaries:\n - \"N/A\"\n suggested_vulnerability_classes:\n - \"None\"\n suggested_skills:\n - \"none\"\n suggested_validation_methods:\n - \"none\"\n notes: \"Lowest interest - test file only\""},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml","exists":true,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml","time":{"start":1779039484208,"end":1779039484215}},"id":"prt_e3704392a001iUXEfE77YYkMf7","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e370317f8001W4pF0iBNAr6XdN"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039484357,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370439c3001I7134Tg7SvkG2j","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"86e5b0deb72a680360fe95818c6764750fe096b1","messageID":"msg_e370317f8001W4pF0iBNAr6XdN","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":57770,"input":44,"output":1546,"reasoning":20,"cache":{"write":0,"read":56160}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039486149,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370440c2001ugj2DYnKYl6Swy","messageID":"msg_e37043a20001FFvlD9aE3xpxfy","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"14bd469658c9396aee3cf26381720f8d65a7c069","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039489511,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37044483002HP4hdZMUmsNvxW","messageID":"msg_e37043a20001FFvlD9aE3xpxfy","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"Now let me verify the YAML syntax and check the existing notes:\n","time":{"start":1779039487107,"end":1779039489509}}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039489624,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call_00ba79f77b610e9a","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"make frontmatter","description":"Validate YAML frontmatter","workdir":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing"},"output":".venv/bin/python3 tools/check-frontmatter.py\n[OK] itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml\n","metadata":{"output":".venv/bin/python3 tools/check-frontmatter.py\n[OK] itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml\n","exit":0,"description":"Validate YAML frontmatter","truncated":false},"title":"Validate YAML frontmatter","time":{"start":1779039489619,"end":1779039489623}},"id":"prt_e37044dce001nfsMvgM1t0yfkl","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e37043a20001FFvlD9aE3xpxfy"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039489704,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37044ea6001aa0E4vQ1e0SiIk","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"202cb61516de434ec493d5aba935b85263b4888b","messageID":"msg_e37043a20001FFvlD9aE3xpxfy","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":57913,"input":2974,"output":74,"reasoning":49,"cache":{"write":0,"read":54816}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039491267,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370454c00016w5McKInnQvjqj","messageID":"msg_e37044f06001JuINCJKqwUq7Tx","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"574176f8c0f6718f55b5ded65178fbfaaf1273d7","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039495497,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37045e66001zURjDLDXcnzWky","messageID":"msg_e37044f06001JuINCJKqwUq7Tx","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"Phase 1a is complete. Now let me proceed with Phase 1b: Sandbox Bootstrap.\n","time":{"start":1779039493734,"end":1779039495495}}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039495628,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call_ba3f82feb0303fd1","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"make sandbox-status","description":"Check sandbox status","workdir":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing"},"output":"Sandbox status\n path: sandbox\n state: generated\n provenance: yes\n last validation: passed\n allow override: no\n capabilities:\n setup ok sandbox/scripts/setup.sh\n start ok sandbox/scripts/up.sh\n check ok sandbox/scripts/check.sh\n build ok sandbox/scripts/build.sh\n test ok sandbox/scripts/test.sh\n stop ok sandbox/scripts/down.sh\n shell ok sandbox/scripts/shell.sh\n logs ok sandbox/scripts/logs.sh\n clean ok sandbox/scripts/clean.sh\n reset ok sandbox/scripts/reset.sh\n[OK] Phase 2 sandbox gate would pass (last validation passed).\n","metadata":{"output":"Sandbox status\n path: sandbox\n state: generated\n provenance: yes\n last validation: passed\n allow override: no\n capabilities:\n setup ok sandbox/scripts/setup.sh\n start ok sandbox/scripts/up.sh\n check ok sandbox/scripts/check.sh\n build ok sandbox/scripts/build.sh\n test ok sandbox/scripts/test.sh\n stop ok sandbox/scripts/down.sh\n shell ok sandbox/scripts/shell.sh\n logs ok sandbox/scripts/logs.sh\n clean ok sandbox/scripts/clean.sh\n reset ok sandbox/scripts/reset.sh\n[OK] Phase 2 sandbox gate would pass (last validation passed).\n","exit":0,"description":"Check sandbox status","truncated":false},"title":"Check sandbox status","time":{"start":1779039495620,"end":1779039495627}},"id":"prt_e370465370018CIXe8QElSUSeT","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e37044f06001JuINCJKqwUq7Tx"}} 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+{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039506626,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_795829002aa5d15b","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md\nfile\n\n1: ---\n2: generated_at: \"2026-05-17T15:25:22+00:00\"\n3: source_example: \"c-cpp\"\n4: source_example_path: \"templates/sandboxes/c-cpp\"\n5: markers:\n6: DEBIAN_BASE_TAG: \"bookworm\"\n7: TARGET_NAME: \"sample-c-cli\"\n8: baseline_files:\n9: \".env\": \"d2cd42ab9472edb49eecb0597125f5fc3c999f6ce2ffddc46bfc151145b09bcb\"\n10: \"Dockerfile\": \"5b82e04ca4cd071805d596fb0fc099e074cddce49ef36745cf570776f73f83ae\"\n11: \"README.md\": \"57fcf4d16eacd0625a97077e3808d89ac6eafa3e25f1dea5f6610178373fd829\"\n12: \"docker-compose.yml\": \"e075ba1c7100389863e61a3aaf531222cb2419c75d62eac24da7f9bc5ca20881\"\n13: \"notes.md\": \"e8cfc83c38835eadf399ce4f305ea4e2b8592abea6572bf135cc508c3991210a\"\n14: \"scripts/build.sh\": \"3ed8ed516c7494ac805dd905d0bfad342ca9505c91218bb05ac41c3e36c4cce1\"\n15: \"scripts/test.sh\": \"896eb120ea3500144706c46477eddc8b362fdc83b26b56defc53ce4944fa8c42\"\n16: validation: []\n17: ---\n18: \n19: # CodeCome sandbox provenance\n20: \n21: This file is generated by `tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py`. Its presence marks `sandbox/` as bootstrap-managed.\n22: \n23: ## Manifest summary\n24: \n25: - id: `c-cpp`\n26: - display_name: C / C++ project\n27: - source path: `templates/sandboxes/c-cpp`\n28: - declared template_vars: TARGET_NAME, DEBIAN_BASE_TAG\n29: - caveats:\n30: - Includes ASan/UBSan-friendly clang-tools.\n31: - No cross-compilation toolchain. Use nested-virt for firmware.\n32: - Ships strace; tweak Dockerfile if you need ptrace seccomp options.\n33: \n34: ## Provided marker values\n35: \n36: | Marker | Value |\n37: |---|---|\n38: | `DEBIAN_BASE_TAG` | `bookworm` |\n39: | `TARGET_NAME` | `sample-c-cli` |\n40: \n41: ## Runtime metadata\n42: \n43: | Key | Value |\n44: |---|---|\n45: | `COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME` | `codecome-target` |\n46: \n47: ## Manual edits since generation\n48: \n49: Compare hashes in `baseline_files` against the current files to detect manual edits. Re-running `apply` or `regenerate` will refresh this provenance after backing up the previous content.\n50: \n51: ## Validation history\n52: \n53: Filled in by `tools/sandbox-bootstrap.py validate` (pending).\n54: \n55: ## Validation run 2026-05-17T15:25:51+00:00\n56: \n57: | Tier | Purpose | Outcome | Exit | Duration | Command |\n58: |---|---|---|---|---|---|\n59: | T1 | Sandbox setup | passed | 0 | 0.531s | `sandbox/scripts/setup.sh` |\n60: | T2 | Environment start | passed | 0 | 0.266s | `sandbox/scripts/up.sh` |\n61: | T3 | Sandbox sanity | passed | 0 | 0.378s | `sandbox/scripts/check.sh` |\n62: | T4 | Target build | passed | 0 | 0.457s | `sandbox/scripts/build.sh` |\n63: | T5 | Target test | passed | 0 | 0.289s | `sandbox/scripts/test.sh` |\n64: | T6 | Environment stop | passed | 0 | 1.356s | `sandbox/scripts/down.sh` |\n65: \n\n(End of file - total 65 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"---\ngenerated_at: \"2026-05-17T15:25:22+00:00\"\nsource_example: \"c-cpp\"\nsource_example_path: \"templates/sandboxes/c-cpp\"\nmarkers:\n DEBIAN_BASE_TAG: \"bookworm\"\n TARGET_NAME: \"sample-c-cli\"\nbaseline_files:\n \".env\": \"d2cd42ab9472edb49eecb0597125f5fc3c999f6ce2ffddc46bfc151145b09bcb\"\n \"Dockerfile\": \"5b82e04ca4cd071805d596fb0fc099e074cddce49ef36745cf570776f73f83ae\"\n \"README.md\": \"57fcf4d16eacd0625a97077e3808d89ac6eafa3e25f1dea5f6610178373fd829\"\n \"docker-compose.yml\": \"e075ba1c7100389863e61a3aaf531222cb2419c75d62eac24da7f9bc5ca20881\"\n \"notes.md\": \"e8cfc83c38835eadf399ce4f305ea4e2b8592abea6572bf135cc508c3991210a\"\n \"scripts/build.sh\": \"3ed8ed516c7494ac805dd905d0bfad342ca9505c91218bb05ac41c3e36c4cce1\"\n \"scripts/test.sh\": \"896eb120ea3500144706c46477eddc8b362fdc83b26b56defc53ce4944fa8c42\"\nvalidation: []\n---\n\n# CodeCome sandbox provenance\n","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md","time":{"start":1779039506614,"end":1779039506624}},"id":"prt_e370490b3001GEKBgqCfhlhgxP","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e37047efa001k0dHHZF8TvC5c1"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039506710,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37049115001CIkPe4Ufphbh0a","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"fda22b77ac089529db246e71e16ea7e7f40fe1de","messageID":"msg_e37047efa001k0dHHZF8TvC5c1","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":59558,"input":1034,"output":40,"reasoning":52,"cache":{"write":0,"read":58432}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039507695,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370494ea001iRyox6AY5HKs1B","messageID":"msg_e3704916d00178r7IL6ga0drkX","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"145efc6c1403392d8dceae50dd038cc90dc9833e","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039513499,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37049f6c001mgNCA56EDH6OM4","messageID":"msg_e3704916d00178r7IL6ga0drkX","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"The sandbox is already properly configured for this C target. Let me run the validation to confirm everything works:\n","time":{"start":1779039510380,"end":1779039513498}}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039517067,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call_abe1050466d0df7f","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"make sandbox-validate","description":"Run sandbox validation tiers","workdir":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing"},"output":" T1 Sandbox setup running sandbox/scripts/setup.sh\n T1 Sandbox setup passed exit=0 duration=0.63s\n T2 Environment start running sandbox/scripts/up.sh\n T2 Environment start passed exit=0 duration=0.28s\n T3 Sandbox sanity running sandbox/scripts/check.sh\n T3 Sandbox sanity passed exit=0 duration=0.38s\n T4 Target build running sandbox/scripts/build.sh\n T4 Target build passed exit=0 duration=0.43s\n T5 Target test running sandbox/scripts/test.sh\n T5 Target test passed exit=0 duration=0.29s\n T6 Environment stop running sandbox/scripts/down.sh\n T6 Environment stop passed exit=0 duration=1.35s\n\n overall: passed\n- Validation history appended to sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md\n","metadata":{"output":" T1 Sandbox setup running sandbox/scripts/setup.sh\n T1 Sandbox setup passed exit=0 duration=0.63s\n T2 Environment start running sandbox/scripts/up.sh\n T2 Environment start passed exit=0 duration=0.28s\n T3 Sandbox sanity running sandbox/scripts/check.sh\n T3 Sandbox sanity passed exit=0 duration=0.38s\n T4 Target build running sandbox/scripts/build.sh\n T4 Target build passed exit=0 duration=0.43s\n T5 Target test running sandbox/scripts/test.sh\n T5 Target test passed exit=0 duration=0.29s\n T6 Environment stop running sandbox/scripts/down.sh\n T6 Environment stop passed exit=0 duration=1.35s\n\n overall: passed\n- Validation history appended to sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md\n","exit":0,"description":"Run sandbox validation tiers","truncated":false},"title":"Run sandbox validation tiers","time":{"start":1779039517050,"end":1779039517066}},"id":"prt_e3704ab67001SNuT1Ei1RPtzNw","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3704916d00178r7IL6ga0drkX"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039517160,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3704b9e6001gq5QaBBzpDI7XV","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"d2428ec8fcb960c1592eee9f3e54686fa85e4a07","messageID":"msg_e3704916d00178r7IL6ga0drkX","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":60741,"input":1040,"output":75,"reasoning":74,"cache":{"write":0,"read":59552}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039518406,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3704bebe001FH4Vmfs6a3ILTE","messageID":"msg_e3704ba3e001vKffm1AiQ3mTCH","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"565ae4118d4ca34d02c5e8c720abf21b1a976573","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039522520,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_82e8b0ba1d610f5a","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/scripts/build.sh"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/scripts/build.sh\nfile\n\n1: #!/usr/bin/env bash\n2: # Copyright (C) 2025-2026 Pablo Ruiz García \n3: # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\n4: \n5: # CodeCome C/C++ build hook. Marker: sample-c-cli.\n6: set -euo pipefail\n7: \n8: docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml run --rm codecome-sandbox bash -lc '\n9: set -euo pipefail\n10: \n11: cd /workspace\n12: \n13: echo \"CodeCome C/C++ build hook\"\n14: echo \"Target source path: /workspace/src\"\n15: echo\n16: \n17: if [ -f /workspace/src/CMakeLists.txt ]; then\n18: echo \"Detected CMakeLists.txt. Running CMake build.\"\n19: mkdir -p /workspace/tmp/build\n20: cd /workspace/tmp/build\n21: cmake /workspace/src\n22: cmake --build . -j\n23: elif [ -f /workspace/src/Makefile ]; then\n24: echo \"Detected Makefile. Running: make\"\n25: cd /workspace/src\n26: make\n27: elif [ -f /workspace/src/meson.build ]; then\n28: echo \"Detected meson.build. Running meson + ninja build.\"\n29: meson setup /workspace/tmp/build /workspace/src\n30: ninja -C /workspace/tmp/build\n31: else\n32: echo \"No known build system detected for target sample-c-cli.\"\n33: echo \"Add target-specific build logic here.\"\n34: exit 1\n35: fi\n36: '\n\n(End of file - total 36 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Copyright (C) 2025-2026 Pablo Ruiz García \n# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\n\n# CodeCome C/C++ build hook. Marker: sample-c-cli.\nset -euo pipefail\n\ndocker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml run --rm codecome-sandbox bash -lc '\nset -euo pipefail\n\ncd /workspace\n\necho \"CodeCome C/C++ build hook\"\necho \"Target source path: /workspace/src\"\necho\n\nif [ -f /workspace/src/CMakeLists.txt ]; then\n echo \"Detected CMakeLists.txt. Running CMake build.\"\n mkdir -p /workspace/tmp/build\n cd /workspace/tmp/build","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"sandbox/scripts/build.sh","time":{"start":1779039522502,"end":1779039522516}},"id":"prt_e3704cec1001jwB16WlYwQ7ZNh","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3704ba3e001vKffm1AiQ3mTCH"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039522520,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"read","callID":"call_5c03c40b013488e7","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/scripts/test.sh"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/sandbox/scripts/test.sh\nfile\n\n1: #!/usr/bin/env bash\n2: # Copyright (C) 2025-2026 Pablo Ruiz García \n3: # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\n4: \n5: # CodeCome C/C++ test hook. Marker: sample-c-cli.\n6: set -euo pipefail\n7: \n8: docker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml run --rm codecome-sandbox bash -lc '\n9: set -euo pipefail\n10: \n11: cd /workspace\n12: \n13: echo \"CodeCome C/C++ test hook\"\n14: \n15: if [ -f /workspace/src/Makefile ] && grep -qE \"^test:\" /workspace/src/Makefile; then\n16: echo \"Detected Makefile test target. Running: make test\"\n17: cd /workspace/src\n18: make test\n19: elif [ -d /workspace/tmp/build ] && [ -f /workspace/tmp/build/CTestTestfile.cmake ]; then\n20: echo \"Detected CMake CTest. Running ctest --output-on-failure.\"\n21: cd /workspace/tmp/build\n22: ctest --output-on-failure\n23: else\n24: echo \"No test runner configured for target sample-c-cli.\"\n25: fi\n26: '\n\n(End of file - total 26 lines)\n","metadata":{"preview":"#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Copyright (C) 2025-2026 Pablo Ruiz García \n# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\n\n# CodeCome C/C++ test hook. Marker: sample-c-cli.\nset -euo pipefail\n\ndocker compose -f sandbox/docker-compose.yml run --rm codecome-sandbox bash -lc '\nset -euo pipefail\n\ncd /workspace\n\necho \"CodeCome C/C++ test hook\"\n\nif [ -f /workspace/src/Makefile ] && grep -qE \"^test:\" /workspace/src/Makefile; then\n echo \"Detected Makefile test target. Running: make test\"\n cd /workspace/src\n make test\nelif [ -d /workspace/tmp/build ] && [ -f /workspace/tmp/build/CTestTestfile.cmake ]; then\n echo \"Detected CMake CTest. Running ctest --output-on-failure.\"","truncated":false,"loaded":[]},"title":"sandbox/scripts/test.sh","time":{"start":1779039522508,"end":1779039522518}},"id":"prt_e3704cec9001uDV3DKPvgif8n0","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3704ba3e001vKffm1AiQ3mTCH"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039522628,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3704cf43001ExFBAqX5e1lmuH","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"8b4c520d5670458a2dc5530b1a572c9ac53a70f4","messageID":"msg_e3704ba3e001vKffm1AiQ3mTCH","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":61101,"input":241,"output":78,"reasoning":46,"cache":{"write":0,"read":60736}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039523601,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3704d30f0017S5PjNqcy17oG5","messageID":"msg_e3704cf96001WU9x4NgM9PnXMX","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"5e86641d5347c252f2c1049329f31cc06cccc667","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039566170,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"write","callID":"call_a171d4b5ee5df418","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"filePath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md","content":"# Sandbox Plan\n\nDate: 2026-05-17 \nPhase: 1b (sandbox bootstrap)\n\n## Detected Stack\n\n| Aspect | Details |\n|--------|---------|\n| **Languages** | C |\n| **Build System** | Make (Makefile) |\n| **Target Type** | CLI executable |\n| **Runtime Model** | build-only (CLI tool with no persistent runtime) |\n\n### Source Artifacts\n\n- `src/Makefile` — Build configuration\n- `src/src/*.c` — C source files\n- `src/include/*.h` — Header files\n- `src/tests/smoke.sh` — Test script\n\n## Honoring Decision\n\n| Artifact | Decision | Reason |\n|----------|----------|--------|\n| `src/Makefile` | Honored | Used by `sandbox/scripts/build.sh` for building target |\n| `src/tests/smoke.sh` | Honored | Used by `sandbox/scripts/test.sh` via `make test` |\n| No `src/Dockerfile` | N/A | Not present — target is C CLI, not containerized |\n| No `src/docker-compose.yml` | N/A | Not present |\n\n**Summary**: The sandbox honors the existing Makefile and test infrastructure. The target is simple enough that no custom runtime services are needed.\n\n## Chosen Example(s)\n\n- **ID**: `c-cpp`\n- **Display Name**: C / C++ project\n- **Source Path**: `templates/sandboxes/c-cpp`\n\n## Marker Values Applied\n\n| Marker | Value | Source |\n|--------|-------|--------|\n| `DEBIAN_BASE_TAG` | `bookworm` | Default from template |\n| `TARGET_NAME` | `sample-c-cli` | Derived from repository structure |\n\n## Runtime Model\n\n**Model**: `build-only`\n\n**Justification**: The target is a simple CLI tool that:\n1. Has no network capabilities\n2. Has no persistent runtime\n3. Requires only compilation to build\n4. No database, cache, or external services needed\n5. Test execution is via `make test` which runs `tests/smoke.sh`\n\n## Services Started\n\n| Service | Status | Details |\n|---------|--------|---------|\n| `codecome-sandbox` | Started | Docker container with C toolchain (gcc, make) |\n| Database | N/A | Not required |\n| Cache | N/A | Not required |\n| Queue | N/A | Not required |\n| Web server | N/A | Not required |\n\n## Health / Smoke Checks\n\nThe validation uses these checks:\n\n1. **T1 Setup**: Build Docker image with C toolchain\n2. **T2 Start**: Bring up container\n3. **T3 Sanity**: Verify toolchain and workspace mounts\n4. **T4 Build**: Run `make` in container to build target\n5. **T5 Test**: Run `make test` to execute smoke tests\n6. **T6 Stop**: Clean down container\n\n**Manual verification commands**:\n\n```bash\n# Build target\ncd src && make\n\n# Run tests\n./bin/sample-c-cli --help\n./bin/sample-c-cli greet tester\n./bin/sample-c-cli echo hello\n```\n\n## Known Runtime Gaps\n\n| Gap | Impact | Mitigation |\n|------|--------|-------------|\n| No runtime services needed | None | Target is CLI-only |\n| No network exposure | None | No network vulnerabilities possible |\n| No database | None | N/A |\n| No external services | None | Target is self-contained |\n\n## Validation Matrix\n\n| Tier | Purpose | Outcome | Exit | Duration | Command |\n|------|---------|---------|------|----------|---------|\n| T1 | Sandbox setup | passed | 0 | 0.63s | `sandbox/scripts/setup.sh` |\n| T2 | Environment start | passed | 0 | 0.28s | `sandbox/scripts/up.sh` |\n| T3 | Sandbox sanity | passed | 0 | 0.38s | `sandbox/scripts/check.sh` |\n| T4 | Target build | passed | 0 | 0.43s | `sandbox/scripts/build.sh` |\n| T5 | Target test | passed | 0 | 0.29s | `sandbox/scripts/test.sh` |\n| T6 | Environment stop | passed | 0 | 1.35s | `sandbox/scripts/down.sh` |\n\n## `validation_model`\n\n**Model**: `docker`\n\n**Justification**: The target is a C CLI tool that builds cleanly in a Docker container. This is the appropriate model because:\n1. Target builds with Make in container\n2. Tests run via make test in container\n3. No complex runtime needed\n4. Docker provides clean, isolated environment\n\n## Remediation Log\n\n| Attempt | Issue | Action | Outcome |\n|---------|-------|--------|---------|\n| 1 | Initial setup | Already configured in prior run | passed |\n| 2 | Validation run | All tiers passed on first attempt | passed |\n\n**Note**: No remediation needed — sandbox was already properly configured.\n\n## Open Questions for the User\n\nNone — the sandbox is fully operational.\n\n## Halt Notice\n\n**Status**: NOT HALTED\n\nPhase 1b completed successfully. The sandbox is ready for Phase 2.\n\n## Summary\n\n- ✓ Target: C CLI tool (`sample-c-cli`)\n- ✓ Sandbox: `c-cpp` example with Docker\n- ✓ Validation: All 6 tiers passed\n- ✓ Phase 2: Ready for hypothesis generation"},"output":"Wrote file successfully.","metadata":{"diagnostics":{},"filepath":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md","exists":false,"truncated":false},"title":"itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md","time":{"start":1779039566157,"end":1779039566168}},"id":"prt_e37057944001JtQpJZ9XS6qxg7","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3704cf96001WU9x4NgM9PnXMX"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039566173,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3704e06f001gnVtfLX0dSGb5I","messageID":"msg_e3704cf96001WU9x4NgM9PnXMX","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"Now let me create the sandbox-plan.md file:\n","time":{"start":1779039527023,"end":1779039566173}}} 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+{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039569878,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"glob","callID":"call_6cd8c491e084a332","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"pattern":"itemdb/notes/*.md"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/validation-model.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/data-flow.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/execution-model.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/build-model.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/target-profile.md","metadata":{"count":10,"truncated":false},"title":"","time":{"start":1779039569844,"end":1779039569877}},"id":"prt_e370587b2001Z7YqJHX00kpZd8","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e37057a19001521Mgq1SScs8Fq"}} 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+{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039573641,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"glob","callID":"call_c1a4d26853f524b1","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"pattern":"itemdb/notes/*"},"output":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/validation-model.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/data-flow.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/execution-model.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/build-model.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/target-profile.md\n/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing/itemdb/notes/.gitkeep","metadata":{"count":12,"truncated":false},"title":"","time":{"start":1779039573606,"end":1779039573639}},"id":"prt_e37059662001gGLnnjX7B6U4O0","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e370589350011iXqDi3dxfPhEf"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039573719,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e370596d6001S3ypSSCr60UgXt","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"29035da713d32e95ead9dba3c6801e8e7a97a75b","messageID":"msg_e370589350011iXqDi3dxfPhEf","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":63572,"input":288,"output":27,"reasoning":25,"cache":{"write":0,"read":63232}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039575704,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e37059e950016YCBeU0M1cyh4I","messageID":"msg_e3705972c001TE769wNJPTYocu","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"b670b04e010f8102dc91813e20cb8f4493f7ae28","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"tool_use","timestamp":1779039578492,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"type":"tool","tool":"bash","callID":"call_f247e9f5534f5764","state":{"status":"completed","input":{"command":"make frontmatter","description":"Validate YAML frontmatter","workdir":"/Users/pruiz/Develop/mine/CodeCome-e2e-testing"},"output":".venv/bin/python3 tools/check-frontmatter.py\n[OK] itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml\n","metadata":{"output":".venv/bin/python3 tools/check-frontmatter.py\n[OK] itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml\n","exit":0,"description":"Validate YAML frontmatter","truncated":false},"title":"Validate YAML frontmatter","time":{"start":1779039578485,"end":1779039578491}},"id":"prt_e3705a90300130oKySy67cgmPO","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","messageID":"msg_e3705972c001TE769wNJPTYocu"}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039578570,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3705a9c8001kCSVRRKpM4FJ6V","reason":"tool-calls","snapshot":"90a05c25af6e4ffdae25c8e4dc2c4c68aa614458","messageID":"msg_e3705972c001TE769wNJPTYocu","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":63974,"input":333,"output":62,"reasoning":27,"cache":{"write":0,"read":63552}},"cost":0}} +{"type":"step_start","timestamp":1779039579829,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3705aeab001HL3sidJzJuoBnm","messageID":"msg_e3705aa1f001E9zt0CQRX9hJ9g","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","snapshot":"a80a0b0c61e9a07960ba3c5d435bd0feeb279840","type":"step-start"}} +{"type":"text","timestamp":1779039596306,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3705b008001pNzdvE85M6BZ2L","messageID":"msg_e3705aa1f001E9zt0CQRX9hJ9g","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"text","text":"## Phase 1 Complete\n\n### Summary\n\n**Target Type**: C CLI tool (`sample-c-cli`)\n\n**Most Important Attack Surfaces**:\n1. **Remove command** - Shell command injection via `system()`\n2. **Echo command** - Format string vulnerability via `printf`\n3. **Greet command** - Buffer handling issues via `memcpy`\n\n**Recommended Phase 2 Focus**: \n- Hypothesis generation on the three vulnerable functions in `src/greet.c`\n- OS command injection, format string, and buffer overflow vulnerabilities\n\n**Highest-Risk Files from `file-risk-index.yml`**:\n1. `src/greet.c` — Score 5 (command injection, format string, buffer handling)\n2. `src/util.c` — Score 4 (integer handling in buffer operations)\n3. `src/main.c` — Score 3 (CLI entrypoint)\n\n### Files Created/Updated\n\n**Phase 1a (Reconnaissance Notes)**:\n- `itemdb/notes/target-profile.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/attack-surface.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/build-model.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/execution-model.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/trust-boundaries.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/data-flow.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/validation-model.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/interesting-files.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/security-assumptions.md`\n- `itemdb/notes/file-risk-index.yml`\n\n**Phase 1b (Sandbox Bootstrap)**:\n- `itemdb/notes/sandbox-plan.md`\n- `sandbox/CODECOME-GENERATED.md` (already existed, validation updated)\n\n### Sandbox Details\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|-----------|-------|\n| **Chosen Example** | `c-cpp` |\n| **Validation Model** | `docker` |\n| **Validation Outcome** | `passed` (all 6 tiers) |\n\n### Key Limitations\n\n- No network vulnerabilities possible (CLI tool has no network capabilities)\n- No database or external service dependencies\n- Simple build-only runtime model is appropriate for this target\n\n### Validation Status\n\n```\n✓ Phase 1a complete (10 notes created)\n✓ Phase 1b complete (sandbox-plan.md created)\n✓ All validation tiers passed\n✓ Frontmatter validation passed\n```\n\n**Phase 2 is ready for hypothesis generation.**","time":{"start":1779039580168,"end":1779039596301}}} +{"type":"step_finish","timestamp":1779039596401,"sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","part":{"id":"prt_e3705ef70001ckTIq83T6RnMWk","reason":"stop","snapshot":"f1f625320312fb9becccb0552f546ec80244cb51","messageID":"msg_e3705aa1f001E9zt0CQRX9hJ9g","sessionID":"ses_1c900d483ffe3X7x4o8qKel0y4","type":"step-finish","tokens":{"total":64519,"input":45,"output":485,"reasoning":21,"cache":{"write":0,"read":63968}},"cost":0}} diff --git a/tools/test-e2e.py b/tools/test-e2e.py new file mode 100755 index 0000000..3a0a4ed --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/test-e2e.py @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" +E2E workflow test script. +Orchestrates the aimock server, runs CodeCome phases, and compares JSON output/artifacts. +""" + +import os +import sys +import json +import shutil +import subprocess + +def run_cmd(cmd, env=None, capture=True): + print(f"Running: {cmd}") + result = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, env=env, text=True, capture_output=capture) + if result.returncode != 0: + print(f"Command failed with exit code {result.returncode}:\n{result.stderr}") + sys.exit(result.returncode) + return result.stdout + +def setup_workspace(): + print("Setting up workspace...") + run_cmd("make itemdb-reset", capture=False) + + # Ensure src directory exists and is empty + if os.path.exists("src"): + shutil.rmtree("src") + shutil.copytree("tests/fixtures/sample-c-cli", "src") + +def compare_json_streams(baseline_path, actual_output): + if not os.path.exists(baseline_path): + print(f"Warning: Baseline {baseline_path} does not exist. Skipping exact JSON comparison.") + return + + with open(baseline_path, "r") as f: + baseline_lines = [line.strip() for line in f if line.strip()] + + actual_lines = [line.strip() for line in actual_output.split("\n") if line.strip()] + + # Very basic comparison: check if the sequence of event types match + # (ignoring text/tool_use ordering within a single step) + def group_events_by_step(lines): + steps = [] + current_step = [] + for line in lines: + try: + data = json.loads(line) + event_type = data.get("type") + if event_type == "step_start": + current_step = [event_type] + elif event_type == "step_finish": + current_step.append(event_type) + steps.append(current_step) + current_step = [] + elif event_type in ("text", "tool_use"): + current_step.append(event_type) + else: + # ignore other top-level events (e.g. error) for structure + pass + except json.JSONDecodeError: + pass + return steps + + baseline_steps = group_events_by_step(baseline_lines) + actual_steps = group_events_by_step(actual_lines) + + if len(baseline_steps) != len(actual_steps): + print("ERROR: Step count mismatch!") + print(f"Expected steps: {len(baseline_steps)}") + print(f"Actual steps: {len(actual_steps)}") + sys.exit(1) + + mismatched = False + for i, (b_step, a_step) in enumerate(zip(baseline_steps, actual_steps)): + # Within a step, text and tool_use ordering is non-deterministic, + # but the counts and the relative order of tool_use events matter. + if b_step[0] != "step_start" or a_step[0] != "step_start": + mismatched = True + print(f"ERROR: Step {i+1} missing step_start!") + print(f" Expected: {b_step}") + print(f" Actual: {a_step}") + break + if b_step[-1] != "step_finish" or a_step[-1] != "step_finish": + mismatched = True + print(f"ERROR: Step {i+1} missing step_finish!") + print(f" Expected: {b_step}") + print(f" Actual: {a_step}") + break + b_inner = b_step[1:-1] + a_inner = a_step[1:-1] + if b_inner != a_inner: + # Allow if only text/tool_use positions differ (same counts) + b_tools = [e for e in b_inner if e == "tool_use"] + a_tools = [e for e in a_inner if e == "tool_use"] + b_texts = b_inner.count("text") + a_texts = a_inner.count("text") + if b_tools != a_tools or b_texts != a_texts: + mismatched = True + print(f"ERROR: Step {i+1} event mismatch!") + print(f" Expected: {b_step}") + print(f" Actual: {a_step}") + break + + if mismatched: + sys.exit(1) + else: + print(f"JSON stream event types match step-by-step ({len(baseline_steps)} steps).") + +def main(): + # 1. Stop and start server + run_cmd("make e2e-server-stop", capture=False) + run_cmd("make e2e-server-start", capture=False) + + try: + # 2. Setup + setup_workspace() + + # 3. Run Phase 1 + env = os.environ.copy() + env["CODECOME_USE_WRAPPER"] = "0" + + model_to_use = os.environ.get("AIMOCK_MODEL", "minimax/minimax-m2.5:free") + env["OPENCODE_ARGS"] = f"--format json -m aimock/{model_to_use}" + env["CODECOME_MODEL"] = f"aimock/{model_to_use}" + + print("Running Phase 1...") + stdout = run_cmd("make phase-1", env=env) + + # 4. Compare JSON + baseline_file = "tests/fixtures/recordings/phase-1.json" + compare_json_streams(baseline_file, stdout) + + # 5. Assert File Artifacts + print("Checking artifacts...") + if not os.path.exists("itemdb/notes/target-profile.md"): + print("ERROR: target-profile.md was not generated.") + sys.exit(1) + + print("E2E Test completed successfully.") + + finally: + # Clean up server + run_cmd("make e2e-server-stop", capture=False) + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main()