diff --git a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99cbc09d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +## Goal + + +## Changes + +- + +## Testing + + +## Artifacts & Screenshots + + +--- + +### Checklist +- [ ] Title is clear (`feat(labN): ` style) +- [ ] No secrets / large temp files committed +- [ ] Submission file at `submissions/labN.md` exists diff --git a/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml b/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a0d162905 --- /dev/null +++ b/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,429 @@ +threagile_version: 1.0.0 + +title: OWASP Juice Shop Threat Model +date: 2025-09-18 + +author: + name: Student Name + homepage: https://example.edu + +management_summary_comment: > + Threat model for a local OWASP Juice Shop setup. Users access the app + either directly via HTTP on port 3000 or through an optional reverse proxy that + terminates TLS and adds security headers. The app runs in a container + and writes data to a host-mounted volume (for database, uploads, logs). + Optional outbound notifications (e.g., a challenge-solution WebHook) can be configured for integrations. + +business_criticality: important # archive, operational, important, critical, mission-critical + +business_overview: + description: > + Training environment for DevSecOps. This model covers a deliberately vulnerable + web application (OWASP Juice Shop) running locally in a Docker container. The focus is on a minimal architecture, STRIDE threat analysis, and actionable mitigations for the identified risks. + + images: + # - dfd.png: Data Flow Diagram (if exported from the tool) + +technical_overview: + description: > + A user’s web browser connects to the Juice Shop application (Node.js/Express server) either directly on **localhost:3000** (HTTP) or via a **reverse proxy** on ports 80/443 (with HTTPS). The Juice Shop server may issue outbound requests to external services (e.g., a configured **WebHook** for solved challenge notifications). All application data (the SQLite database, file uploads, logs) is stored on the host’s filesystem via a mounted volume. Key trust boundaries include the **Internet** (user & external services) → **Host** (local machine/VM) → **Container Network** (isolated app container). + images: [] + +questions: + Do you expose port 3000 beyond localhost?: "" + Do you use a reverse proxy with TLS and security headers?: "" + Are any outbound integrations (webhooks) configured?: "" + Is any sensitive data stored in logs or files?: "" + +abuse_cases: + Credential Stuffing / Brute Force: > + Attackers attempt repeated login attempts to guess credentials or exhaust system resources. + Stored XSS via Product Reviews: > + Malicious scripts are inserted into product reviews, getting stored and executed in other users’ browsers. + SSRF via Outbound Requests: > + Server-side requests (e.g. profile image URL fetch or WebHook callback) are abused to access internal network resources. + +security_requirements: + TLS in transit: Enforce HTTPS for user traffic via a TLS-terminating reverse proxy with strong ciphers and certificate management. + AuthZ on sensitive routes: Implement strict server-side authorization checks (role/permission) on admin or sensitive functionalities. + Rate limiting & lockouts: Apply rate limiting and account lockout policies to mitigate brute-force and automated attacks on authentication and expensive operations. + Secure headers: Add security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, etc.) at the proxy or app to mitigate client-side attacks. + Secrets management: Protect secret keys and credentials (JWT signing keys, OAuth client secrets) – keep them out of code repos and avoid logging them. + +tags_available: + # Relevant technologies and environment tags + - docker + - nodejs + # Data and asset tags + - pii + - auth + - tokens + - logs + - public + - actor + - user + - optional + - proxy + - app + - storage + - volume + - saas + - webhook + # Communication tags + - primary + - direct + - egress + +# ========================= +# DATA ASSETS +# ========================= +data_assets: + + User Accounts: + id: user-accounts + description: "User profile data, credential hashes, emails." + usage: business + tags: ["pii", "auth"] + origin: user-supplied + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: confidential + integrity: critical + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Contains personal identifiers and authentication data. High confidentiality is required to protect user privacy, and integrity is critical to prevent account takeovers. + + Orders: + id: orders + description: "Order history, addresses, and payment metadata (no raw card numbers)." + usage: business + tags: ["pii"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: confidential + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Contains users’ personal data and business transaction records. Integrity and confidentiality are important to prevent fraud or privacy breaches. + + Product Catalog: + id: product-catalog + description: "Product information (names, descriptions, prices) available to all users." + usage: business + tags: ["public"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: public + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Product data is intended to be public, but its integrity is important (to avoid defacement or price manipulation that could mislead users). + + Tokens & Sessions: + id: tokens-sessions + description: "Session identifiers, JWTs for authenticated sessions, CSRF tokens." + usage: business + tags: ["auth", "tokens"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: confidential + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + If session tokens are compromised, attackers can hijack user sessions. They must be kept confidential and intact; availability is less critical (tokens can be reissued). + + Logs: + id: logs + description: "Application and access logs (may inadvertently contain PII or secrets)." + usage: devops + tags: ["logs"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Logs are for internal use (troubleshooting, monitoring). They should not be exposed publicly, and sensitive data should be sanitized to protect confidentiality. + +# ========================= +# TECHNICAL ASSETS +# ========================= +technical_assets: + + User Browser: + id: user-browser + description: "End-user web browser (client)." + type: external-entity + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: true + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: system + technology: browser + tags: ["actor", "user"] + internet: true + machine: virtual + encryption: none + owner: External User + confidentiality: public + integrity: operational + availability: operational + justification_cia_rating: "Client controlled by end user (potentially an attacker)." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: [] + data_assets_stored: [] + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: + To Reverse Proxy (preferred): + target: reverse-proxy + description: "User browser to reverse proxy (HTTPS on 443)." + protocol: https + authentication: session-id + authorization: enduser-identity-propagation + tags: ["primary"] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_received: + - product-catalog + Direct to App (no proxy): + target: juice-shop + description: "Direct browser access to app (HTTPS on 3000)." + protocol: https + authentication: session-id + authorization: enduser-identity-propagation + tags: ["direct"] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_received: + - product-catalog + + Reverse Proxy: + id: reverse-proxy + description: "Optional reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) for TLS termination and adding security headers." + type: process + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: application + technology: reverse-proxy + tags: ["optional", "proxy"] + internet: false + machine: virtual + encryption: transparent + owner: Lab Owner + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: "Not exposed to internet directly; improves security of inbound traffic." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: + - product-catalog + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_stored: [] + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: + To App: + target: juice-shop + description: "Proxy forwarding to app (HTTPS internally)." + protocol: https + authentication: session-id + authorization: enduser-identity-propagation + tags: [] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_received: + - product-catalog + + Juice Shop Application: + id: juice-shop + description: "OWASP Juice Shop server (Node.js/Express, v19.0.0)." + type: process + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: application + technology: web-server + tags: ["app", "nodejs"] + internet: false + machine: container + encryption: transparent + owner: Lab Owner + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: "In-scope web application (contains all business logic and vulnerabilities by design)." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: true + data_assets_processed: + - user-accounts + - orders + - product-catalog + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_stored: + - logs + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: + To Challenge WebHook: + target: webhook-endpoint + description: "Optional outbound callback (HTTP POST) to external WebHook when a challenge is solved." + protocol: https + authentication: none + authorization: none + tags: ["egress"] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - orders + + Persistent Storage: + id: persistent-storage + description: "Host-mounted volume for database, file uploads, and logs." + type: datastore + usage: devops + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: component + technology: file-server + tags: ["storage", "volume"] + internet: false + machine: virtual + encryption: data-with-symmetric-shared-key + owner: Lab Owner + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: "Local disk storage for the container – not directly exposed, but if compromised it contains sensitive data (database and logs)." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: [] + data_assets_stored: + - logs + - user-accounts + - orders + - product-catalog + data_formats_accepted: + - file + communication_links: {} + + Webhook Endpoint: + id: webhook-endpoint + description: "External WebHook service (3rd-party, if configured for integrations)." + type: external-entity + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: true + justification_out_of_scope: "Third-party service to receive notifications (not under our control)." + size: system + technology: web-service-rest + tags: ["saas", "webhook"] + internet: true + machine: virtual + encryption: none + owner: Third-Party + confidentiality: internal + integrity: operational + availability: operational + justification_cia_rating: "External service that receives data (like order or challenge info). Treated as a trusted integration point but could be abused if misconfigured." + multi_tenant: true + redundant: true + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: + - orders + data_assets_stored: [] + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: {} + +# ========================= +# TRUST BOUNDARIES +# ========================= +trust_boundaries: + + Internet: + id: internet + description: "Untrusted public network (Internet)." + type: network-dedicated-hoster + tags: [] + technical_assets_inside: + - user-browser + - webhook-endpoint + trust_boundaries_nested: + - host + + Host: + id: host + description: "Local host machine / VM running the Docker environment." + type: network-dedicated-hoster + tags: [] + technical_assets_inside: + - reverse-proxy + - persistent-storage + trust_boundaries_nested: + - container-network + + Container Network: + id: container-network + description: "Docker container network (isolated internal network for containers)." + type: network-dedicated-hoster + tags: [] + technical_assets_inside: + - juice-shop + trust_boundaries_nested: [] + +# ========================= +# SHARED RUNTIMES +# ========================= +shared_runtimes: + + Docker Host: + id: docker-host + description: "Docker Engine and default bridge network on the host." + tags: ["docker"] + technical_assets_running: + - juice-shop + # If the reverse proxy is containerized, include it: + # - reverse-proxy + +# ========================= +# INDIVIDUAL RISK CATEGORIES (optional) +# ========================= +individual_risk_categories: {} + +# ========================= +# RISK TRACKING (optional) +# ========================= +risk_tracking: {} + +# (Optional diagram layout tweaks can be added here) +#diagram_tweak_edge_layout: spline +#diagram_tweak_layout_left_to_right: true diff --git a/submissions/lab2.md b/submissions/lab2.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..389a3ae12 --- /dev/null +++ b/submissions/lab2.md @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +## Task 1: Baseline Threat Model + +### Risk count by severity +| Severity | Count | +|----------|------:| +| Critical | 0 | +| High | 0 | +| Elevated | 4 | +| Medium | 14 | +| Low | 5 | +| **Total** | 23 | + +### Top 5 risks (paste from `jq` output) +1. **unencrypted-communication** - Unencrypted Communication named Direct to App (no proxy) between User Browser and Juice Shop Application transferring authentication data (like credentials, token, session-id, etc.); severity elevated; affecting user-browser +2. **unencrypted-communication** - Unencrypted Communication named To App between Reverse Proxy and Juice Shop Application; severity elevated; affecting reverse-proxy +3. **cross-site-scripting** - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) risk at Juice Shop Application; severity elevated; affecting juice-shop +4. **missing-authentication** - Missing Authentication covering communication link To App from Reverse Proxy to Juice Shop Application; severity elevated; affecting juice-shop +5. **unnecessary-technical-asset** - Unnecessary Technical Asset named Persistent Storage; severity low; affecting persistent-storage + +### STRIDE mapping (Lecture 2 slide 7) +For each top-5 risk, name the STRIDE letter(s) it primarily violates: +### STRIDE mapping (Lecture 2 slide 7) +- Risk 1 (`unencrypted-communication`, Browser → App): **I** (Information Disclosure), secondary **T** (Tampering) — credentials and session tokens travel in cleartext, so anyone on the network path can read them and could also alter the traffic in transit. +- Risk 2 (`unencrypted-communication`, Reverse Proxy → App): **I** (Information Disclosure), secondary **T** (Tampering) — the internal proxy-to-app channel is unencrypted, exposing the same data in transit to anyone who can observe or modify the internal link. +- Risk 3 (`cross-site-scripting`): **T** (Tampering), leading to **I** and **E** — injected script alters the page rendered in the victim's browser and can steal session tokens or act on the user's behalf. +- Risk 4 (`missing-authentication`): **S** (Spoofing), secondary **E** (Elevation of Privilege) — with no authentication on the link, an attacker can impersonate a legitimate caller and reach functionality meant for authenticated parties. +- Risk 5 (`unnecessary-technical-asset`, Persistent Storage): **I** (Information Disclosure) — an unused storage asset left in the design keeps an extra, unguarded place where sensitive data could reside and leak; primarily an attack-surface-reduction finding rather than one classic STRIDE threat. + +### Trust boundary observation +The arrow **User Browser → Juice Shop Application** (`http`, "Direct to App (no proxy)") crosses from the untrusted **Internet** zone straight into the innermost **Container Network**, bypassing the Reverse Proxy. It maps to Risk 1 (`unencrypted-communication`). + +It's attractive to an attacker because it carries credentials in cleartext HTTP across the Internet boundary with no TLS and no proxy in between — anyone on the path can sniff the credentials or run a man-in-the-middle attack to reach the app's trust zone directly. + +## Task 2: Secure Variant & Diff + +### Risk count comparison +| Severity | Baseline | Secure | Δ | +|----------|---------:|-------:|--:| +| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | +| High | 0 | 0 | 0 | +| Elevated | 4 | 1 | −3 | +| Medium | 14 | 12 | −2 | +| Low | 5 | 5 | 0 | +| **Total** | **23** | **18** | **−5** | + +### Rules GONE in secure variant +1. `unencrypted-communication` — fixed by `protocol: https` on both the Browser→App and Proxy→App links. +2. `unencrypted-asset` — fixed by at-rest encryption on Persistent Storage and the Juice Shop app. +3. `missing-authentication` — fixed by adding `authentication` + `authorization` on the Proxy→App link. + +### Rules STILL firing +1. `cross-site-scripting` — app-level flaw; transport/storage encryption doesn't affect input handling, so it stays. +2. `unnecessary-technical-asset` — Persistent Storage still has no communication links; encryption doesn't connect it to the data flow. + +### Honesty check +No — total dropped 23 → 18 (~22%), not over 50%. Four cheap config edits cleared the easy transport/storage risks, but the rest are app-level (XSS, CSRF, SSRF) and architectural (missing WAF, vault, hardening) and need real engineering, not YAML edits. Classic threat-modeling curve: first mitigations are cheap and high-impact, the rest aren't.