From 4b085ba65fed65641e322e90ccb29057850b5b1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alisa Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 22:21:48 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] feat(lab2): Threagile threat model + secure variant + auth flow --- labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml | 429 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ submissions/lab2.md | 55 ++++ 2 files changed, 484 insertions(+) create mode 100644 labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml create mode 100644 submissions/lab2.md diff --git a/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml b/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ac4657a9a --- /dev/null +++ b/labs/lab2/threagile-model-secure.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,429 @@ +threagile_version: 1.0.0 + +title: OWASP Juice Shop +date: 2025-09-18 + +author: + name: Student Name + homepage: https://example.edu + +management_summary_comment: > + Threat model for a local OWASP Juice Shop setup. Users access the app + either directly via HTTP on port 3000 or through an optional reverse proxy that + terminates TLS and adds security headers. The app runs in a container + and writes data to a host-mounted volume (for database, uploads, logs). + Optional outbound notifications (e.g., a challenge-solution WebHook) can be configured for integrations. + +business_criticality: important # archive, operational, important, critical, mission-critical + +business_overview: + description: > + Training environment for DevSecOps. This model covers a deliberately vulnerable + web application (OWASP Juice Shop) running locally in a Docker container. The focus is on a minimal architecture, STRIDE threat analysis, and actionable mitigations for the identified risks. + + images: + # - dfd.png: Data Flow Diagram (if exported from the tool) + +technical_overview: + description: > + A user’s web browser connects to the Juice Shop application (Node.js/Express server) either directly on **localhost:3000** (HTTP) or via a **reverse proxy** on ports 80/443 (with HTTPS). The Juice Shop server may issue outbound requests to external services (e.g., a configured **WebHook** for solved challenge notifications). All application data (the SQLite database, file uploads, logs) is stored on the host’s filesystem via a mounted volume. Key trust boundaries include the **Internet** (user & external services) → **Host** (local machine/VM) → **Container Network** (isolated app container). + images: [] + +questions: + Do you expose port 3000 beyond localhost?: "" + Do you use a reverse proxy with TLS and security headers?: "" + Are any outbound integrations (webhooks) configured?: "" + Is any sensitive data stored in logs or files?: "" + +abuse_cases: + Credential Stuffing / Brute Force: > + Attackers attempt repeated login attempts to guess credentials or exhaust system resources. + Stored XSS via Product Reviews: > + Malicious scripts are inserted into product reviews, getting stored and executed in other users’ browsers. + SSRF via Outbound Requests: > + Server-side requests (e.g. profile image URL fetch or WebHook callback) are abused to access internal network resources. + +security_requirements: + TLS in transit: Enforce HTTPS for user traffic via a TLS-terminating reverse proxy with strong ciphers and certificate management. + AuthZ on sensitive routes: Implement strict server-side authorization checks (role/permission) on admin or sensitive functionalities. + Rate limiting & lockouts: Apply rate limiting and account lockout policies to mitigate brute-force and automated attacks on authentication and expensive operations. + Secure headers: Add security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, etc.) at the proxy or app to mitigate client-side attacks. + Secrets management: Protect secret keys and credentials (JWT signing keys, OAuth client secrets) – keep them out of code repos and avoid logging them. + +tags_available: + # Relevant technologies and environment tags + - docker + - nodejs + # Data and asset tags + - pii + - auth + - tokens + - logs + - public + - actor + - user + - optional + - proxy + - app + - storage + - volume + - saas + - webhook + # Communication tags + - primary + - direct + - egress + +# ========================= +# DATA ASSETS +# ========================= +data_assets: + + User Accounts: + id: user-accounts + description: "User profile data, credential hashes, emails." + usage: business + tags: ["pii", "auth"] + origin: user-supplied + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: confidential + integrity: critical + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Contains personal identifiers and authentication data. High confidentiality is required to protect user privacy, and integrity is critical to prevent account takeovers. + + Orders: + id: orders + description: "Order history, addresses, and payment metadata (no raw card numbers)." + usage: business + tags: ["pii"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: confidential + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Contains users’ personal data and business transaction records. Integrity and confidentiality are important to prevent fraud or privacy breaches. + + Product Catalog: + id: product-catalog + description: "Product information (names, descriptions, prices) available to all users." + usage: business + tags: ["public"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: public + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Product data is intended to be public, but its integrity is important (to avoid defacement or price manipulation that could mislead users). + + Tokens & Sessions: + id: tokens-sessions + description: "Session identifiers, JWTs for authenticated sessions, CSRF tokens." + usage: business + tags: ["auth", "tokens"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: confidential + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + If session tokens are compromised, attackers can hijack user sessions. They must be kept confidential and intact; availability is less critical (tokens can be reissued). + + Logs: + id: logs + description: "Application and access logs (may inadvertently contain PII or secrets)." + usage: devops + tags: ["logs"] + origin: application + owner: Lab Owner + quantity: many + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: > + Logs are for internal use (troubleshooting, monitoring). They should not be exposed publicly, and sensitive data should be sanitized to protect confidentiality. + +# ========================= +# TECHNICAL ASSETS +# ========================= +technical_assets: + + User Browser: + id: user-browser + description: "End-user web browser (client)." + type: external-entity + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: true + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: system + technology: browser + tags: ["actor", "user"] + internet: true + machine: virtual + encryption: none + owner: External User + confidentiality: public + integrity: operational + availability: operational + justification_cia_rating: "Client controlled by end user (potentially an attacker)." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: [] + data_assets_stored: [] + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: + To Reverse Proxy (preferred): + target: reverse-proxy + description: "User browser to reverse proxy (HTTPS on 443)." + protocol: https + authentication: session-id + authorization: enduser-identity-propagation + tags: ["primary"] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_received: + - product-catalog + Direct to App (no proxy): + target: juice-shop + description: "Direct browser access to app (HTTP on 3000)." + protocol: https + authentication: session-id + authorization: enduser-identity-propagation + tags: ["direct"] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_received: + - product-catalog + + Reverse Proxy: + id: reverse-proxy + description: "Optional reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) for TLS termination and adding security headers." + type: process + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: application + technology: reverse-proxy + tags: ["optional", "proxy"] + internet: false + machine: virtual + encryption: transparent + owner: Lab Owner + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: "Not exposed to internet directly; improves security of inbound traffic." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: + - product-catalog + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_stored: [] + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: + To App: + target: juice-shop + description: "Proxy forwarding to app (HTTP on 3000 internally)." + protocol: https + authentication: client-certificate + authorization: none + tags: [] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_received: + - product-catalog + + Juice Shop Application: + id: juice-shop + description: "OWASP Juice Shop server (Node.js/Express, v19.0.0)." + type: process + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: application + technology: web-server + tags: ["app", "nodejs"] + internet: false + machine: container + encryption: none + owner: Lab Owner + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: "In-scope web application (contains all business logic and vulnerabilities by design)." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: true + data_assets_processed: + - user-accounts + - orders + - product-catalog + - tokens-sessions + data_assets_stored: + - logs + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: + To Challenge WebHook: + target: webhook-endpoint + description: "Optional outbound callback (HTTP POST) to external WebHook when a challenge is solved." + protocol: https + authentication: none + authorization: none + tags: ["egress"] + vpn: false + ip_filtered: false + readonly: false + usage: business + data_assets_sent: + - orders + + Persistent Storage: + id: persistent-storage + description: "Host-mounted volume for database, file uploads, and logs." + type: datastore + usage: devops + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: false + justification_out_of_scope: + size: component + technology: file-server + tags: ["storage", "volume"] + internet: false + machine: virtual + encryption: data-with-symmetric-shared-key + owner: Lab Owner + confidentiality: internal + integrity: important + availability: important + justification_cia_rating: "Local disk storage for the container – not directly exposed, but if compromised it contains sensitive data (database and logs)." + multi_tenant: false + redundant: false + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: [] + data_assets_stored: + - logs + - user-accounts + - orders + - product-catalog + data_formats_accepted: + - file + communication_links: {} + + Webhook Endpoint: + id: webhook-endpoint + description: "External WebHook service (3rd-party, if configured for integrations)." + type: external-entity + usage: business + used_as_client_by_human: false + out_of_scope: true + justification_out_of_scope: "Third-party service to receive notifications (not under our control)." + size: system + technology: web-service-rest + tags: ["saas", "webhook"] + internet: true + machine: virtual + encryption: none + owner: Third-Party + confidentiality: internal + integrity: operational + availability: operational + justification_cia_rating: "External service that receives data (like order or challenge info). Treated as a trusted integration point but could be abused if misconfigured." + multi_tenant: true + redundant: true + custom_developed_parts: false + data_assets_processed: + - orders + data_assets_stored: [] + data_formats_accepted: + - json + communication_links: {} + +# ========================= +# TRUST BOUNDARIES +# ========================= +trust_boundaries: + + Internet: + id: internet + description: "Untrusted public network (Internet)." + type: network-dedicated-hoster + tags: [] + technical_assets_inside: + - user-browser + - webhook-endpoint + trust_boundaries_nested: + - host + + Host: + id: host + description: "Local host machine / VM running the Docker environment." + type: network-dedicated-hoster + tags: [] + technical_assets_inside: + - reverse-proxy + - persistent-storage + trust_boundaries_nested: + - container-network + + Container Network: + id: container-network + description: "Docker container network (isolated internal network for containers)." + type: network-dedicated-hoster + tags: [] + technical_assets_inside: + - juice-shop + trust_boundaries_nested: [] + +# ========================= +# SHARED RUNTIMES +# ========================= +shared_runtimes: + + Docker Host: + id: docker-host + description: "Docker Engine and default bridge network on the host." + tags: ["docker"] + technical_assets_running: + - juice-shop + # If the reverse proxy is containerized, include it: + # - reverse-proxy + +# ========================= +# INDIVIDUAL RISK CATEGORIES (optional) +# ========================= +individual_risk_categories: {} + +# ========================= +# RISK TRACKING (optional) +# ========================= +risk_tracking: {} + +# (Optional diagram layout tweaks can be added here) +#diagram_tweak_edge_layout: spline +#diagram_tweak_layout_left_to_right: true diff --git a/submissions/lab2.md b/submissions/lab2.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b5438493f --- /dev/null +++ b/submissions/lab2.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +## Task 1: Baseline Threat Model + +### Risk count by severity +| Severity | Count | +|----------|------:| +| Critical | 0 | +| High | 0 | +| Elevated | 4 | +| Medium | 14 | +| Low | 5 | +| **Total** | 23 | + +### Top 5 risks (paste from `jq` output) +1. **missing-authentication** — Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) risk at Juice Shop Application; severity elevated; affecting juice-shop +2. **unencrypted-communication** — Unencrypted Communication named Direct to App (no proxy) between User Browser and Juice Shop Application transferring authentication data (like credentials, token, session-id, etc.); severity elevated; affecting juice-shop +3. **unencrypted-communication** — Unencrypted Communication named To App between Reverse Proxy and Juice Shop Application; severity elevated; affecting reverse-proxy +4. **cross-site-scripting** — Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) risk at Juice Shop Application; severity elevated; affecting juice-shop +5. **unnecessary-data-transfer** — Unnecessary Data Transfer of Tokens & Sessions data at User Browser from/to Juice Shop Application; severity low; affecting user-browser + +### STRIDE mapping (Lecture 2 slide 7) +For each top-5 risk, name the STRIDE letter(s) it primarily violates: +- Risk 1: **S** — An attacker can spoof the request source by posing as a trusted person. +- Risk 2: **I** — Internal traffic between the proxy and the application is not encrypted, which leads to data leakage if the internal network is compromised. +- Risk 3: **I** — The lack of authentication between Reverse Proxy and the application allows an attacker to forge a request and impersonate a trusted party. +- Risk 4: **T/I** — An attacker can inject malicious Javascript. +- Risk 5: **I** — such data transfer may reveal non-public information. + +### Trust boundary observation +An arrow from **User Browser** to **Juice Shop Application** crosses a trust boundary. This data transfer uses HTTP, which means that all data, including login credentials, JWT tokens, and session IDs, is transferred in clear text. This is especially dangerous because the arrow carries authentication data. + +## Task 2: Secure Variant & Diff + +### Risk count comparison +| Severity | Baseline | Secure | Δ | +|----------|---------:|-------:|--:| +| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | +| High | 0 | 0 | 0 | +| Elevated | 4 | 1 | 3 | +| Medium | 14 | 13 | 1 | +| Low | 5 | 5 | 0 | +| **Total** | 23 | 19 | 4 | + +### Which rules are GONE in the secure variant? +List 3 rule IDs that fired in baseline but not in secure-variant: +1. `missing-authentication` — fixed by `authentication: client-certificate` to the `To App` communication link between Reverse Proxy and Juice Shop Application +2. `unencrypted-communication` — fixed by changing `protocol: http` to `https` +3. `unencrypted-asset` — (Not gone, but decreased from 2 to 1), fixed by adding `encryption: data-with-symmetric-shared-key` to Persistent Storage + +### Which rules are STILL THERE in the secure variant? +- **cross-site-scripting** — We added HTTPS and database encryption, but this has no impact on user input. An attacker could still inject a malicious script into the search bar, for example. To resolve this issue, we needed to sanitize all user input before displaying it on the page. +- **unnecessary-data-transfer** — The application transmits personal data that is not required for its operation. The server continues to send these same fields in the JSON file. To resolve this issue, we could rewrite the API endpoints to return only the necessary fields. + +### Honesty check + +The total risk count dropped from 23 to 19, which is less than 50% of total drop. The most significant changes occurred in the risk category `elevated`. Fixing network-level errors is a quick and easy process, but it does not significantly reduce the overall risk profile; consequently, we would still need to address the remaining code-level issues, which take longer to resolve. \ No newline at end of file