Analysis Date: 2026-03-17 Analyst Role: Enterprise Compliance Specialist Scope: Complete feature gap analysis for enterprise adoption and security certification readiness Applicable Frameworks: SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, HIPAA, PCI DSS v4.0, FedRAMP, NIST 800-53 Rev 5, GDPR, NIST CSF 2.0, CMMC 2.0, CCPA/CPRA, SOX (IT Controls) Platform Version Analyzed: QuickTrust v0.5 (Next.js + PostgreSQL + Prisma + AWS S3)
QuickTrust is a compliance audit intelligence platform designed to help organizations achieve security certifications. However, the platform itself lacks the foundational security and compliance controls that any enterprise buyer, auditor, or CISO would require before onboarding. This document identifies 187 missing features across 18 compliance domains. These are not bugs or code quality issues -- they are entire feature categories that do not exist in the codebase and would be non-negotiable requirements in any enterprise sales process, SOC 2 Type II observation period, or ISO 27001 certification audit.
A compliance platform that cannot demonstrate its own compliance is an existential credibility risk. An auditor evaluating an organization using QuickTrust would immediately question the integrity of any evidence, policy, or assessment generated by a platform that lacks encryption at rest, multi-factor authentication, role-based access control enforcement, session management, data retention automation, or a functioning audit log.
Critical Readiness Score by Framework:
| Framework | Readiness | Blocking Gaps |
|---|---|---|
| SOC 2 Type II | ~12% | 68 missing controls |
| ISO 27001:2022 | ~15% | 54 missing controls |
| HIPAA Security Rule | ~8% | 42 missing controls |
| PCI DSS v4.0 | ~5% | 71 missing controls |
| FedRAMP Low | ~3% | 89 missing controls |
| GDPR | ~10% | 34 missing controls |
| SOX IT Controls | ~7% | 29 missing controls |
| CMMC 2.0 Level 2 | ~6% | 51 missing controls |
- Identity & Access Management (IAM)
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
- Session Management & Token Lifecycle
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) & Least Privilege
- Single Sign-On (SSO) & Enterprise Identity Federation
- Data Encryption & Cryptographic Controls
- Data Loss Prevention (DLP) & Classification
- Data Retention, Archival & Right to Erasure
- Comprehensive Audit Logging & SIEM Integration
- Incident Response & Management
- Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery (BC/DR)
- Vulnerability Management & Penetration Testing
- Network Security & Infrastructure Hardening
- API Security & Rate Limiting
- Change Management & SDLC Controls
- Third-Party Risk & Vendor Management
- AI Governance, Model Risk & LLM Safety
- Compliance Management & Certification Lifecycle
- Privacy Engineering & Consent Management
- Physical & Environmental Security (Cloud Context)
- Security Awareness & Training
- Enterprise Administration & Tenant Management
- Evidence Integrity & Chain of Custody
- Reporting, Dashboards & Executive Visibility
- Certification-Specific Gap Matrix
Current State: Basic JWT authentication with email/password. Two roles (OWNER/MEMBER) defined in schema but not enforced at the endpoint level. No distinction between what OWNER vs MEMBER can do.
- What's missing: No configurable password complexity rules (uppercase, lowercase, numeric, special characters, minimum length beyond 8 chars, dictionary word checks, breached password detection via Have I Been Pwned API)
- Current state: Only enforces
password.length >= 8inapp/api/auth/signup/route.ts - Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO 27001 A.5.17, PCI DSS 8.3.6, NIST 800-53 IA-5, HIPAA 164.312(d) all mandate strong password policies. An auditor will ask to see the password policy configuration screen and enforcement evidence.
- Enterprise expectation: Configurable per-organization password policy with: minimum 12+ characters, complexity requirements, password history (prevent last N passwords), password age (max 90 days for PCI), breached password check, dictionary/sequential character blocking.
- What's missing: No failed login attempt tracking, no account lockout mechanism, no progressive delay, no CAPTCHA integration
- Current state: Login endpoint (
app/api/auth/login/route.ts) allows unlimited attempts with no delay - Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, PCI DSS 8.3.4 (lockout after 10 attempts), NIST 800-53 AC-7, ISO 27001 A.8.5
- Enterprise expectation: Configurable lockout threshold (default: 5 attempts), lockout duration (default: 30 min), progressive delay (exponential backoff), admin-configurable unlock, IP-based rate limiting on auth endpoints, CAPTCHA after N failures
- What's missing: No user provisioning/deprovisioning workflows, no user status (active/suspended/deactivated), no offboarding process, no access review triggers on status change
- Current state: Users can only be created via signup. No mechanism to suspend, deactivate, or delete a user. No admin interface for user management.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.2 (user provisioning), CC6.3 (deprovisioning), ISO 27001 A.5.18 (access rights), HIPAA 164.312(a)(2)(i), PCI DSS 8.1.4 (inactive account removal), SOX IT controls (access reviews)
- Enterprise expectation: Full user lifecycle: invite -> provision -> active -> suspend -> deactivate -> delete. Automated deprovisioning on employment termination. Periodic access reviews (quarterly/annual). Orphan account detection. Last-activity-based dormancy flagging.
- What's missing: No admin interface to view all users, modify roles, reset passwords, force logout, view login history, or manage user permissions
- Current state: The only user-facing management is the signup/login flow. No admin panel exists.
- Why it matters: Every compliance framework requires demonstrable access management. Auditors will request screenshots of user management interfaces.
- What's missing: No service account concept, no API keys for programmatic access, no key rotation, no scoped tokens
- Current state: Only human user JWT tokens exist. No programmatic access method.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO 27001 A.5.18, PCI DSS 8.6 -- service accounts and API keys need lifecycle management, rotation schedules, and scope limitations. Enterprise integrations require API keys.
- What's missing: No ability for org admins to manage users within their org without platform-level access
- Enterprise expectation: Organization-scoped admin roles that can manage their own users, invite/remove members, configure org-level settings, without accessing other orgs' data or platform settings
Current State: Zero MFA implementation. Not even referenced in the codebase.
- What's missing: No TOTP support (Google Authenticator, Authy, 1Password)
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO 27001 A.8.5, PCI DSS 8.4.2 (MFA required for all access to CDE), HIPAA 164.312(d), NIST 800-53 IA-2(1), FedRAMP AC-7, CMMC 2.0 IA.L2-3.5.3
- Enterprise expectation: TOTP enrollment flow, QR code provisioning, backup codes, recovery flow, per-org MFA enforcement policy
- What's missing: No hardware security key support (YubiKey, etc.)
- Why it matters: FedRAMP, CMMC 2.0, and many enterprise security policies mandate phishing-resistant MFA. NIST 800-63B AAL3 requires hardware-bound authenticators.
- What's missing: No SMS or email one-time password verification
- Why it matters: While less secure than TOTP/WebAuthn, many compliance frameworks accept this as a minimum MFA method. Required as a recovery/fallback mechanism.
- What's missing: No per-organization MFA enforcement settings, no conditional MFA (e.g., require MFA for admin actions, sensitive data access, or new device login)
- Enterprise expectation: Org admins can enforce MFA for all users, set grace period for enrollment, configure conditional MFA triggers (role-based, action-based, location-based)
- What's missing: No backup code generation, no admin MFA reset capability, no recovery flow for lost MFA devices
- Enterprise expectation: One-time backup codes at enrollment, admin-initiated MFA reset with identity verification, recovery attestation audit trail
Current State: Stateless JWT with 24-hour expiration. Cookie set with httpOnly: false. No token refresh, no revocation, no server-side session tracking.
- What's missing: No server-side session tracking. JWT is purely stateless. No way to enumerate active sessions, force-terminate sessions, or detect concurrent sessions.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO 27001 A.8.5, PCI DSS 8.2.8 (session timeout), HIPAA 164.312(d)
- Enterprise expectation: Redis/database-backed session store with: active session enumeration per user, concurrent session limits, geographic session tracking, device fingerprinting, anomalous session detection
- What's missing: No refresh token mechanism. Users must re-authenticate after 24 hours.
- Why it matters: Access tokens should be short-lived (15 min) with refresh tokens for UX. Refresh token rotation prevents token replay.
- Enterprise expectation: Short-lived access tokens (15 min), long-lived refresh tokens (7 days) with rotation on each use, refresh token family tracking for replay detection
- What's missing: No ability to revoke a JWT. Logout (
app/api/auth/logout/route.ts) only clears the client-side cookie. A stolen token remains valid for the full 24-hour lifetime. - Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO 27001 A.5.18, PCI DSS 8.2.8, HIPAA 164.312(d). An auditor will ask: "If an employee is terminated, how quickly is their access revoked?"
- Enterprise expectation: Token blacklist (Redis-based), immediate revocation on logout/password change/admin action, organization-wide token invalidation capability
- What's missing: No configurable session timeout. Hardcoded to 24 hours. No idle timeout. No absolute timeout differentiation.
- Why it matters: PCI DSS 8.2.8 (15-minute idle timeout), HIPAA 164.312(a)(2)(iii) (automatic logoff), FedRAMP AC-12
- Enterprise expectation: Configurable idle timeout (default 15 min for PCI), absolute timeout (default 8 hours), per-org timeout policies, warning prompt before timeout
- What's missing: No limit on simultaneous sessions. A user can be logged in from unlimited devices.
- Why it matters: ISO 27001 A.8.5, NIST 800-53 AC-10
- Enterprise expectation: Configurable concurrent session limit, new session termination policy (terminate oldest or deny new), notification on new session from unknown device
- What's missing: Auth cookie is set with
httpOnly: false, enabling JavaScript access. NoSecureflag enforcement in production. No__Host-prefix. - Current state:
app/api/auth/login/route.tssets cookie withhttpOnly: false, sameSite: 'lax' - Enterprise expectation:
httpOnly: true,Secure: true,SameSite: Strict,__Host-prefix,Path=/
Current State: Two roles defined in Prisma schema (OWNER, MEMBER) but no endpoint-level enforcement. Both roles can perform identical operations.
- What's missing: No permission model. No actions defined (read, write, delete, approve, export). No resource-level permissions. No permission assignment UI.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1 (logical access), ISO 27001 A.5.15 (access control), PCI DSS 7.1 (need-to-know), HIPAA 164.312(a)(1), NIST 800-53 AC-3, AC-6
- Enterprise expectation: Permission model with: roles (Admin, Manager, Analyst, Viewer, Auditor), resources (policies, evidence, questions, users, settings, reports), actions (create, read, update, delete, approve, export, share). Matrix-based assignment. Inherited permissions. Custom role creation.
- What's missing: Flat role model with no inheritance. No way to create custom roles or compose permissions.
- Enterprise expectation: Hierarchical roles where Admin inherits Manager permissions, Manager inherits Analyst, etc. Custom role builder for organizations with unique structures.
- What's missing: No middleware or decorator that checks user permissions before executing endpoint logic. The
OWNERrole has no special privileges overMEMBER. - Current state: All endpoints only check
user.orgIdmatches, not user role or permissions. - Enterprise expectation: Authorization middleware that checks: role permissions, resource ownership, action authorization. Deny-by-default. Every endpoint must explicitly declare required permissions.
- What's missing: No attribute-based access control. No field-level visibility restrictions. No data classification-based access.
- Enterprise expectation: Ability to restrict access based on data classification level, department, project, or custom attributes. Field-level redaction for sensitive data (e.g., hide salary data from non-HR roles).
- What's missing: No SoD enforcement. Same user can create and approve their own work. No dual-control for sensitive operations.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO 27001 A.5.3, PCI DSS 6.5.1, SOX controls
- Enterprise expectation: Configurable SoD policies: the user who creates a policy cannot approve it, the user who generates an AI answer cannot accept it, evidence upload and evidence approval must be different users, user creation and role assignment must be different users.
- What's missing: No elevated privilege mechanism, no just-in-time access, no break-glass procedures, no privilege escalation monitoring
- Enterprise expectation: Time-bound admin access, approval workflow for privilege elevation, break-glass emergency access with mandatory post-incident review, all privileged actions double-logged
- What's missing: No periodic access review campaigns, no attestation workflows, no automated recertification
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.2, ISO 27001 A.5.18, SOX 404, PCI DSS 7.1.2
- Enterprise expectation: Quarterly access review campaigns, manager attestation of direct reports' access, automated flagging of excessive permissions, recertification deadlines with escalation, historical access review records for auditors
Current State: No SSO. Only email/password local authentication. No SAML, OIDC, or LDAP integration.
- What's missing: No SAML 2.0 service provider implementation
- Why it matters: Enterprise-mandatory. Most organizations with 200+ employees require SAML SSO for all SaaS applications. ISO 27001 A.5.16, SOC 2 CC6.1
- Enterprise expectation: SP-initiated and IdP-initiated SSO, metadata exchange, assertion validation, attribute mapping, JIT user provisioning, configurable per organization
- What's missing: No OIDC client implementation
- Why it matters: Modern alternative to SAML. Required for Azure AD, Okta, Google Workspace integration.
- Enterprise expectation: OIDC authorization code flow with PKCE, token validation, user info endpoint integration, configurable per organization
- What's missing: No SCIM 2.0 server implementation
- Why it matters: Automated user provisioning/deprovisioning from corporate identity providers. ISO 27001 A.5.18, SOC 2 CC6.2/CC6.3
- Enterprise expectation: SCIM 2.0 endpoints for Users and Groups, real-time provisioning/deprovisioning, attribute sync, group-to-role mapping
- What's missing: No LDAP bind or AD connector
- Enterprise expectation: LDAP authentication fallback for on-premises enterprises, group sync, attribute mapping
- What's missing: No Google, Microsoft, or GitHub OAuth login
- Enterprise expectation: Social login for self-service tiers with forced SSO upgrade for enterprise orgs (disable password login when SSO is configured)
- What's missing: No email domain to SSO configuration mapping
- Enterprise expectation: When an organization configures SSO, all users with matching email domains are forced through SSO. Password login is disabled. Prevents shadow accounts.
Current State: Passwords hashed with bcrypt (10 rounds). JWT signed with HS256. No encryption at rest for database or S3. No field-level encryption. No key management.
- What's missing: No Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) configured or documented for PostgreSQL. No encrypted columns for sensitive fields.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.7, ISO 27001 A.8.24, PCI DSS 3.5 (protect stored cardholder data), HIPAA 164.312(a)(2)(iv), FedRAMP SC-28, NIST 800-53 SC-28
- Enterprise expectation: PostgreSQL TDE or managed database encryption (AWS RDS encryption), field-level encryption for PII/PHI/sensitive data (email, names stored in User table), envelope encryption with KMS
- What's missing: No Server-Side Encryption configured for S3 uploads. The
s3.tsfile creates PutObjectCommand withoutServerSideEncryptionparameter. - Why it matters: Compliance documents, evidence artifacts, and policy files stored in S3 contain highly sensitive data. SOC 2 CC6.7, HIPAA 164.312(a)(2)(iv), PCI DSS 3.4
- Enterprise expectation: S3 SSE-KMS with customer-managed keys, bucket policy enforcing encryption, S3 bucket versioning for change tracking, object lock for WORM compliance
- What's missing: No TLS between application and database (
DATABASE_URLuses plainpostgresql://), no TLS between application and Pinecone (handled by SDK), no TLS between internal services - Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.7, PCI DSS 4.1, HIPAA 164.312(e)(1), ISO 27001 A.8.24
- Enterprise expectation: TLS 1.2+ for all internal connections, certificate pinning for critical services, mTLS for service-to-service communication
- What's missing: No key management. JWT secret is a single environment variable. No key rotation. No key hierarchy. No HSM integration.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.7, ISO 27001 A.8.24, PCI DSS 3.6 (key management procedures), NIST 800-53 SC-12
- Enterprise expectation: AWS KMS or HashiCorp Vault integration, envelope encryption, automatic key rotation (annual minimum), key hierarchy (master key -> data encryption keys), key access audit logging, key destruction procedures
- What's missing: No TLS certificate management, no certificate monitoring, no certificate rotation automation
- Enterprise expectation: Automated certificate provisioning (Let's Encrypt/ACM), certificate expiry monitoring and alerting, certificate transparency log monitoring
- What's missing: No documentation or enforcement of approved cryptographic algorithms. JWT uses HS256 (symmetric), which means the signing secret is shared -- a compromise of the server means all tokens are forgeable.
- Enterprise expectation: RS256/ES256 asymmetric JWT signing, documented approved algorithm list, no use of deprecated algorithms (MD5, SHA1, DES, RC4), minimum key lengths enforced
- What's missing: No PII masking in API responses, logs, or exports. Email addresses, names returned in full in all API responses.
- Enterprise expectation: Dynamic data masking based on user role, tokenization for sensitive identifiers, masked view in non-production environments
Current State: No data classification, no DLP rules, no content inspection, no exfiltration prevention.
- What's missing: No mechanism to classify data by sensitivity level (Public, Internal, Confidential, Restricted/Highly Confidential)
- Why it matters: ISO 27001 A.5.12 (classification of information), SOC 2 CC6.7, PCI DSS 3.1, HIPAA 164.312(a)(1)
- Enterprise expectation: Automatic and manual classification tags on all data objects (policies, evidence, questions, answers). Classification-based access control. Classification inherited from containers.
- What's missing: No content scanning of uploaded files for malware, sensitive data patterns (SSN, credit card numbers, PHI), or prohibited content
- Enterprise expectation: Antivirus scanning on all uploads (ClamAV integration), regex-based PII detection (SSN, credit cards, medical record numbers), DLP policy engine to block or quarantine uploads containing restricted data
- What's missing: No controls on data export, download limits, or copy prevention
- Enterprise expectation: Download logging, bulk export approval workflows, watermarking on exported documents, configurable data export policies per role, API response size limits
- What's missing: No mechanism to control where data is stored geographically. S3 bucket region is hardcoded.
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 44-49 (cross-border transfers), various national data sovereignty laws
- Enterprise expectation: Per-organization data residency selection (US, EU, APAC), S3 bucket per region, database read replicas in appropriate regions, data processing location documentation
Current State: No data retention policies. No data deletion mechanisms beyond hard database deletes. No archival system. No GDPR Article 17 implementation.
- What's missing: No retention period configuration per data type, no automated enforcement, no retention schedule
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.5, ISO 27001 A.5.33, PCI DSS 3.1 (data storage duration), HIPAA 164.530(j) (6-year retention), SOX (7-year retention)
- Enterprise expectation: Per-organization, per-data-type retention policies. Automated enforcement (archive/delete after period). Legal hold capability to override retention. Retention policy audit log.
- What's missing: No soft delete mechanism. All deletes are hard deletes via
onDelete: Cascade. Deleted data is permanently lost. - Current state: Evidence DELETE endpoint permanently removes records. Cascade deletes destroy related audit trails.
- Enterprise expectation: Soft delete (
deletedAt,deletedByfields) on all models. Configurable retention of deleted data (30/60/90 days). Admin recovery interface. Permanent purge only after retention period.
- What's missing: No data subject access request (DSAR) workflow, no automated data discovery across all tables, no erasure verification, no erasure certificate generation
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 17, CCPA/CPRA 1798.105, various international privacy laws
- Enterprise expectation: DSAR intake portal, automated PII discovery across all database tables and S3 objects, selective erasure while maintaining audit integrity (pseudonymization), erasure verification report, 30-day SLA tracking
- What's missing: No mechanism for a user to request all data held about them, no data export in portable format
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 15 (right of access), Article 20 (right to portability), CCPA 1798.100
- Enterprise expectation: Self-service data download, machine-readable export (JSON/CSV), identity verification before data release, DSAR tracking and SLA monitoring
- What's missing: No archival strategy for old compliance data, evidence, or audit records
- Enterprise expectation: Automatic migration of aged data to cold storage (S3 Glacier), searchable archive index, retrieval SLA for archived data, cost optimization through lifecycle policies
- What's missing: No mechanism to place a legal hold on data to prevent deletion regardless of retention policies
- Enterprise expectation: Legal hold by user, organization, date range, or data type. Override of all retention/deletion policies. Legal hold audit trail. Notification to affected data custodians.
Current State: Minimal audit trail limited to question/answer operations. No logging of authentication events, admin actions, data access, configuration changes, or system events. Console.log only -- no structured logging.
- What's missing: No logging of: login attempts (success/failure), logout events, password changes, MFA enrollment, role changes, permission changes, user creation/deletion, organization changes, policy uploads/deletes, evidence uploads/deletes, settings modifications, API key creation/rotation, export actions, file access events
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC7.2 (system monitoring), ISO 27001 A.8.15, PCI DSS 10.2 (audit trail), HIPAA 164.312(b), NIST 800-53 AU-2, AU-3, AU-12, FedRAMP AU family
- Enterprise expectation: Every state-changing operation and every sensitive data access logged with: timestamp (UTC), actor (user ID, IP, user agent), action, resource, before/after state, outcome (success/failure), correlation ID
- What's missing: All logging uses unstructured
console.log(). No JSON structured logging, no log levels, no correlation IDs. - Enterprise expectation: JSON structured logs (ECS or OpenTelemetry format), log levels (DEBUG/INFO/WARN/ERROR/FATAL), request correlation IDs for distributed tracing, sensitive data redaction in logs
- What's missing: No log shipping to centralized log management. Logs exist only in container stdout.
- Enterprise expectation: CloudWatch Logs, ELK Stack, Datadog, or Splunk integration. Log retention matching compliance requirements (1 year minimum for SOC 2, PCI DSS 10.7). Log immutability (append-only, tamper-evident).
- What's missing: No Security Information and Event Management integration
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC7.2, ISO 27001 A.8.16, PCI DSS 10.6, NIST 800-53 SI-4
- Enterprise expectation: Syslog/CEF/LEEF format log export, webhook-based alert forwarding to SIEM, pre-built correlation rules for common attack patterns, integration with Splunk/Sentinel/Chronicle/QRadar
- What's missing: Audit trail records in the database can be modified or deleted by anyone with database access. No write-once guarantees.
- Why it matters: PCI DSS 10.5 (protect audit trails), ISO 27001 A.8.15, SOC 2 CC7.2
- Enterprise expectation: Append-only audit log (no UPDATE or DELETE), cryptographic chaining (each entry hashes previous entry), separate audit database with restricted access, regular integrity verification
- What's missing: No user behavior analytics, no session recording, no abnormal activity detection
- Enterprise expectation: Login time/location analytics, data access pattern monitoring, impossible travel detection, bulk download alerts, off-hours access alerts
- What's missing: No separate, enhanced logging for administrative actions
- Enterprise expectation: All admin actions logged with additional context, admin activity reports for governance committees, real-time alerts on critical admin operations (user creation, role change, org settings)
Current State: No incident response capability. No alerting system. No incident tracking. No communication templates. No runbooks.
- What's missing: No mechanism to record, track, categorize, or resolve security incidents
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC7.3 (incident response), ISO 27001 A.5.24-A.5.28, PCI DSS 12.10, HIPAA 164.308(a)(6), NIST 800-53 IR family
- Enterprise expectation: Incident creation with severity classification (P1-P4), timeline tracking, assigned responder, status workflow (Detected -> Triaged -> Contained -> Eradicated -> Recovered -> Post-mortem), evidence attachment, root cause analysis, lessons learned
- What's missing: No alert triggers for security events, no notification channels, no escalation policies
- Enterprise expectation: Configurable alert rules (failed login threshold, data export volume, after-hours access), multi-channel notification (email, Slack, PagerDuty, SMS), escalation policies (auto-escalate P1 after 15 min), on-call rotation integration
- What's missing: No documented incident response procedures for common scenarios
- Enterprise expectation: Pre-built playbooks for: data breach, account compromise, ransomware, insider threat, DDoS, supply chain compromise, third-party breach. Customizable per organization. Automated step tracking.
- What's missing: No breach notification workflow, no regulatory notification tracking, no affected-party communication management
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 33/34 (72-hour notification), HIPAA 164.408 (60-day notification), state breach notification laws, PCI DSS breach notification
- Enterprise expectation: Breach assessment wizard, regulatory notification tracker with deadline countdown, affected-party communication templates, notification proof of delivery, regulator correspondence log
- What's missing: No post-mortem templates, no incident metrics (MTTR, MTTD), no trending analysis
- Enterprise expectation: Structured post-mortem process, MTTR/MTTD tracking, incident trend analysis, recurring incident detection, executive incident summary reports
Current State: No backup strategy. No disaster recovery plan. No failover mechanism. No RTO/RPO defined. Single-region deployment.
- What's missing: No pg_dump automation, no WAL archiving, no point-in-time recovery capability, no backup verification
- Why it matters: SOC 2 A1.2, ISO 27001 A.8.13, PCI DSS 9.5/12.10.1, HIPAA 164.308(a)(7), NIST 800-53 CP-9
- Enterprise expectation: Automated daily full backups, continuous WAL archiving for PITR, cross-region backup replication, automated backup verification (restore test), backup encryption at rest, configurable retention (30/90/365 days), backup monitoring and alerting
- What's missing: No S3 bucket versioning enabled, no cross-region replication, no object lock for compliance
- Enterprise expectation: S3 versioning for all compliance document buckets, cross-region replication for DR, S3 Object Lock (WORM) for evidence that must be immutable, lifecycle policies for cost optimization
- What's missing: Single-instance deployment. No load balancing, no auto-scaling, no health-check-based failover
- Enterprise expectation: Multi-AZ deployment, database read replicas, application auto-scaling, health-check-based routing, zero-downtime deployments
- What's missing: No documented DR plan, no RTO/RPO definitions, no DR testing procedures, no failover runbooks
- Why it matters: SOC 2 A1.2/A1.3, ISO 27001 A.5.30, PCI DSS 12.10.2, HIPAA 164.308(a)(7)
- Enterprise expectation: Documented DR plan with defined RTO (4h) and RPO (1h), annual DR testing with documented results, multi-region failover capability, communication plan during outages, post-DR-test gap analysis and remediation
- What's missing: No BCP document, no business impact analysis, no continuity testing
- Enterprise expectation: Business impact analysis identifying critical functions, recovery priority ordering, alternate processing procedures, annual BCP testing and review
- What's missing: No SLA definition, no status page, no uptime monitoring, no incident communication channel
- Enterprise expectation: Defined SLA (99.9%/99.95%/99.99%), public status page, real-time uptime monitoring, automated incident status updates, SLA compliance reporting
Current State: Weekly npm audit --audit-level=critical only. No SAST, DAST, container scanning, or penetration testing program.
- What's missing: No static code analysis in CI/CD pipeline
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC8.1, ISO 27001 A.8.28, PCI DSS 6.3.2, NIST 800-53 SA-11
- Enterprise expectation: Semgrep, CodeQL, or SonarQube in CI pipeline. Blocking on critical/high findings. OWASP Top 10 rule coverage. Custom rules for business logic vulnerabilities.
- What's missing: No runtime security scanning
- Enterprise expectation: OWASP ZAP or Burp Suite automated scans in staging, pre-release DAST gates, authenticated scanning with role-based test accounts
- What's missing: Beyond
npm audit, no comprehensive SCA. No license compliance checking. No transitive dependency analysis. - Enterprise expectation: Snyk, Dependabot Advanced, or FOSSA integration. License compliance (block GPL in proprietary code). Reachability analysis. SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) generation in CycloneDX/SPDX format.
- What's missing: No container vulnerability scanning in CI/CD. Docker images pushed to ECR without scanning.
- Enterprise expectation: Trivy, Snyk Container, or AWS ECR scanning. Block deployment of images with critical CVEs. Base image update monitoring.
- What's missing: No Terraform/CloudFormation security scanning (also no IaC exists)
- Enterprise expectation: Checkov, tfsec, or cfn-nag scanning for infrastructure definitions. Policy-as-code enforcement (OPA/Rego).
- What's missing: No penetration testing schedule, no scope definition, no remediation tracking
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC7.1, PCI DSS 11.4 (annual pentest), ISO 27001 A.8.8
- Enterprise expectation: Annual third-party penetration test, quarterly internal vulnerability scanning, pentest report management with finding tracking, remediation SLA by severity (Critical: 48h, High: 7d, Medium: 30d, Low: 90d)
- What's missing: No vulnerability disclosure policy, no bug bounty program, no security.txt file
- Enterprise expectation: security.txt file, responsible disclosure policy, bug bounty program (HackerOne/Bugcrowd), vulnerability intake and triage process
- What's missing: No SBOM generation, no dependency inventory, no supply chain attestation
- Why it matters: Executive Order 14028, PCI DSS 6.3, NIST 800-53 SR-4, CMMC 2.0
- Enterprise expectation: Automated SBOM generation (CycloneDX format), SBOM published with each release, VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) documents, in-toto or SLSA attestation for build provenance
Current State: Single Docker Compose with all services on default network. All ports exposed to host. No network segmentation. No WAF. No DDoS protection.
- What's missing: No WAF in front of the application
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.6, PCI DSS 6.4 (WAF or code review for public-facing apps), NIST 800-53 SC-7
- Enterprise expectation: AWS WAF or Cloudflare WAF, OWASP CRS rule set, custom rules for application-specific attacks, rate limiting at WAF level, bot management, geo-blocking capability
- What's missing: No DDoS mitigation strategy
- Enterprise expectation: AWS Shield Standard (minimum), CloudFront/CDN for edge caching, rate limiting at multiple layers, auto-scaling under load
- What's missing: All services (application, database, Redis, MinIO) on same Docker network. No DMZ. No private subnets.
- Enterprise expectation: Separate networks for: public-facing services (DMZ), application tier, data tier, management tier. Database accessible only from application tier. No direct internet access to data services.
- What's missing: Containers run as root. No seccomp profiles. No AppArmor/SELinux. No read-only filesystem.
- Enterprise expectation: Non-root container users, read-only root filesystem, dropped capabilities, seccomp profiles, no privileged mode, resource limits (CPU/memory), health checks
- What's missing: Secrets stored in environment variables and
.envfiles. No secrets manager integration. - Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.1, ISO 27001 A.8.24, PCI DSS 3.4, NIST 800-53 SC-12
- Enterprise expectation: AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, or similar. Automatic secret rotation. Secret access audit logging. No secrets in environment variables, code, or Docker build args. Runtime secret injection.
- What's missing: No IP-based access control, no geographic restriction capability
- Enterprise expectation: Per-organization IP allowlist for admin access, geographic restriction for data sovereignty compliance, VPN/Zero Trust network integration
Current State: No rate limiting. No request size limits. No API versioning. No API authentication beyond JWT. No CORS enforcement.
- What's missing: Zero rate limiting on any endpoint. Every endpoint is vulnerable to abuse.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.6, PCI DSS 6.5.10, OWASP API Security Top 10 (API4:2023)
- Enterprise expectation: Per-endpoint rate limits (e.g., login: 5/min, API: 100/min, file upload: 10/hour), per-user and per-IP limits, configurable by organization, 429 responses with Retry-After header, rate limit headers (X-RateLimit-Remaining), Redis-backed distributed rate limiting
- What's missing: No request body size limits (beyond file upload), no JSON schema validation middleware, no SQL injection prevention beyond Prisma parameterization, no XSS input sanitization
- Enterprise expectation: Maximum request body size (1MB default), JSON schema validation on all endpoints, input sanitization middleware, HTML entity encoding on all text inputs, parameterized queries (covered by Prisma)
- What's missing: No API version scheme. Breaking changes would affect all consumers simultaneously.
- Enterprise expectation: URL-based versioning (/api/v1/), deprecation policy (6-month sunset), version sunset notification system, backward compatibility guarantees
- What's missing: The
next.config.tssetsAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: trueglobally but no explicit CORS origin restriction. No CORS middleware. - Enterprise expectation: Explicit origin allowlist per environment, no wildcard origins with credentials, preflight caching, configurable per organization for custom domains
- What's missing: No CSRF tokens, no double-submit cookie pattern, no origin validation
- Why it matters: OWASP Top 10, CWE-352
- Enterprise expectation: CSRF token on all state-changing operations, SameSite=Strict cookies, origin header validation, custom header requirement for API requests
- What's missing: No API gateway for centralized auth, rate limiting, and monitoring
- Enterprise expectation: API gateway (AWS API Gateway, Kong, or similar), centralized authentication, request/response logging, throttling, caching, circuit breaking
- What's missing: No CSP header configured in
next.config.ts. XSS attacks can execute arbitrary scripts. - Enterprise expectation: Strict CSP with nonce-based script execution, report-uri for CSP violations, frame-ancestors restriction (already has X-Frame-Options: DENY)
Current State: Direct push to main branch. No branch protection. No required reviews. No deployment approval gates. No change tracking.
- What's missing: No branch protection rules. Anyone can push directly to main. No required reviewers.
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC8.1, ISO 27001 A.8.32, PCI DSS 6.5.4, NIST 800-53 CM-3
- Enterprise expectation: Protected main/production branches, minimum 2 required reviewers, CODEOWNERS file, no self-approval, required status checks (CI pass), signed commits
- What's missing: No change request/approval workflow for production changes
- Enterprise expectation: Change request creation, risk classification (standard/normal/emergency), CAB approval for non-standard changes, change window scheduling, rollback plan documentation
- What's missing: No staging environment. Code goes from development directly to production ECR image. No pre-production testing.
- Enterprise expectation: Development -> Staging -> Production pipeline, automated promotion gates (tests pass, security scan clean), manual approval for production deployment, canary/blue-green deployment strategy
- What's missing: No database migration strategy in CI/CD. Prisma migrations exist but no automated application in deployment pipeline.
- Enterprise expectation: Automated migration in deployment pipeline, migration rollback capability, migration approval for schema changes, data migration testing in staging
- What's missing: No semantic versioning enforcement, no changelog, no release notes
- Enterprise expectation: Semantic versioning (major.minor.patch), automated changelog generation, release notes for customers, version tracking in deployment metadata
- What's missing: No documented or automated rollback capability
- Enterprise expectation: One-click rollback to previous version, database migration rollback, rollback testing as part of deployment verification, maximum rollback time SLA
Current State: The platform uses OpenAI, Pinecone, AWS S3, and SendGrid as third-party services. No vendor risk assessment, no SLA tracking, no data processing agreements tracked.
- What's missing: No inventory of third-party services, no risk classification, no due diligence documentation
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC9.2, ISO 27001 A.5.19-A.5.22, PCI DSS 12.8, HIPAA 164.308(b)(1), NIST 800-53 SA-9
- Enterprise expectation: Complete vendor inventory with: service description, data shared, risk tier (critical/high/medium/low), last assessment date, SOC 2 report status, data processing agreement status
- What's missing: No list of subprocessors, no notification mechanism for subprocessor changes
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 28 (sub-processor notification), enterprise DPA requirements
- Enterprise expectation: Published subprocessor list, notification to customers 30 days before subprocessor changes, opt-out mechanism for new subprocessors
- What's missing: No DPA management for QuickTrust's own third parties or as a data processor for its customers
- Enterprise expectation: DPA template for customer execution, DPA tracking for all subprocessors, annual DPA review schedule
- What's missing: No monitoring of third-party service availability or performance
- Enterprise expectation: SLA tracking for critical vendors (OpenAI, Pinecone, AWS), automated alerting on SLA breaches, vendor performance reporting
- What's missing: No visibility into vendors' own supply chains
- Enterprise expectation: Understanding of critical fourth-party dependencies (e.g., OpenAI relies on Azure), risk assessment of concentrated dependencies
Current State: Direct OpenAI API calls with no validation, no human approval, no cost controls, no bias detection, no explainability, no model risk framework.
- What's missing: AI-generated answers are stored directly in the database as authoritative responses. While questions have a PENDING/ACCEPTED/REJECTED status, there is no mandatory human review before answers become visible.
- Why it matters: AI-generated compliance guidance that is incorrect could lead to audit failures, regulatory violations, or legal liability. SOC 2 CC1.4 (management oversight), ISO 42001 (AI Management System)
- Enterprise expectation: All AI outputs start in "draft" status, mandatory human review and approval workflow, confidence score thresholds (auto-flag low confidence for review), reviewer attestation with signature
- What's missing: No model validation, no model inventory, no performance monitoring, no bias testing
- Why it matters: SR 11-7 (Federal Reserve model risk guidance), ISO 42001, EU AI Act (for high-risk AI systems)
- Enterprise expectation: Model inventory with risk classification, model validation before production use, ongoing performance monitoring (accuracy, hallucination rate), model comparison testing, documented model selection rationale
- What's missing: No input sanitization before LLM calls, no output validation, no prompt injection detection
- Current state: User-provided question text and document content passed directly into LLM prompts
- Enterprise expectation: Input sanitization, prompt injection detection heuristics, output validation against expected schema, guardrails on LLM responses (refuse to generate harmful content), content filtering
- What's missing: No token usage tracking, no per-organization spending limits, no budget alerts, no cost allocation
- Enterprise expectation: Per-organization token budgets, daily/monthly spending caps, cost allocation reporting, automatic throttling at budget threshold, admin alerts at 80%/90%/100% budget
- What's missing: No explanation of how AI answers are generated, no source attribution beyond basic citations, no confidence scoring methodology
- Enterprise expectation: Visible reasoning chain, source document highlighting, confidence score with methodology, "why this answer" explainability, version tracking of prompts and models used
- What's missing: No bias testing, no fairness metrics, no demographic impact analysis
- Enterprise expectation: Regular bias audits on AI outputs, fairness metrics across different compliance frameworks, bias incident reporting, diverse training data validation
- What's missing: No factual verification of LLM outputs against source documents, no hallucination scoring
- Enterprise expectation: Automated fact-checking against uploaded policy documents, hallucination rate monitoring, source verification scoring, flagging of unsupported claims
- What's missing: No detailed logging of: prompts sent, models used, parameters (temperature, top_p), token counts, response times, full input/output pairs
- Enterprise expectation: Complete AI interaction log (prompt, response, model, parameters, tokens, latency), immutable AI audit trail, AI decision replay capability, regulatory reporting on AI usage
Current State: Static content about compliance frameworks. No active compliance management, no control testing, no evidence automation, no certification tracking.
- What's missing: No mechanism to test whether controls are operating effectively, no test procedures, no test scheduling, no test evidence linking
- Why it matters: SOC 2 Type II requires testing over an observation period (typically 6-12 months). ISO 27001 requires internal audits. PCI DSS requires quarterly scans and annual assessments.
- Enterprise expectation: Control test library with test procedures, scheduled control testing cadence, test evidence attachment, test result tracking (pass/fail/exception), exception management with remediation plans, auditor-facing test results view
- What's missing: No real-time compliance posture view, no compliance scoring, no gap visualization
- Enterprise expectation: Per-framework compliance percentage, control maturity heatmap, gap analysis highlighting unimplemented controls, trend analysis (improving/declining), executive summary view, auditor portal
- What's missing: No mapping between equivalent controls across frameworks (SOC 2 CC6.1 = ISO 27001 A.9.1 = PCI DSS 7.1 = HIPAA 164.312(a))
- Why it matters: Organizations pursuing multiple certifications waste effort implementing duplicate controls without mapping
- Enterprise expectation: Pre-built cross-framework mapping, unified control register, implement once and map to multiple frameworks, gap analysis per framework from unified controls
- What's missing: No automated evidence collection from production systems, no continuous control monitoring, no automated compliance checks
- Enterprise expectation: Integration with AWS Config/CloudTrail for infrastructure evidence, GitHub integration for SDLC evidence, identity provider integration for access review evidence, automated screenshot capture, scheduled evidence refresh
- What's missing: No tracking of: audit start/end dates, auditor assignments, observation periods, certification expiry, renewal timelines
- Enterprise expectation: Certification calendar, audit engagement tracking, observation period management, certificate expiry alerts (90/60/30 days), renewal project kickoff automation
- What's missing: No dedicated auditor access with read-only permissions, no secure document sharing with auditors, no audit request tracking
- Enterprise expectation: Separate auditor login with time-limited access, read-only access to selected evidence and controls, audit request list (PBC list) management, secure document sharing with watermarks, auditor activity logging
- What's missing: No policy versioning, no policy review scheduling, no policy approval workflow, no policy acknowledgment tracking
- Current state: Policies can be uploaded but have no versioning beyond a static
versionfield. No review/approval workflow. - Enterprise expectation: Policy creation -> review -> approval workflow, version history with diff view, annual review scheduling with owner assignment, employee policy acknowledgment tracking, policy exception management
- What's missing: No risk register, no risk scoring methodology, no risk treatment plans, no risk acceptance workflow
- Why it matters: ISO 27001 clause 6.1 (risk assessment), SOC 2 CC3.2, NIST 800-53 RA family
- Enterprise expectation: Enterprise risk register, risk scoring (likelihood x impact), risk treatment options (mitigate, accept, transfer, avoid), risk owner assignment, risk review cadence, risk appetite definition, residual risk tracking
- What's missing: No mechanism to document control exceptions, compensating controls, or risk acceptances
- Enterprise expectation: Exception request workflow, approval hierarchy, time-bound exceptions with auto-expiry, compensating control documentation, risk acceptance sign-off by appropriate authority
Current State: No privacy controls implemented. No consent management. No privacy impact assessment capability.
- What's missing: No cookie consent, no data processing consent tracking, no consent withdrawal mechanism
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 6/7 (lawful basis/consent), ePrivacy Directive, CCPA 1798.120
- Enterprise expectation: Cookie consent banner with granular controls, consent receipt generation, consent withdrawal API, consent audit log, lawful basis documentation per processing activity
- What's missing: No data protection impact assessment capability
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 35 (DPIA required for high-risk processing)
- Enterprise expectation: DPIA template library, automated risk scoring, DPO review workflow, DPIA register, supervisory authority consultation tracking
- What's missing: No processing activity inventory
- Why it matters: GDPR Article 30 (mandatory for processors and controllers)
- Enterprise expectation: Processing activity register with: purpose, legal basis, data categories, recipients, retention period, transfer safeguards
- What's missing: No data minimization enforcement, no purpose limitation controls, no anonymization/pseudonymization
- Enterprise expectation: Data minimization in API responses (return only needed fields), purpose binding on data collection, automatic anonymization after retention period, pseudonymization for analytics
Current State: No cloud security posture management, no infrastructure documentation, no shared responsibility model documentation.
- What's missing: No AWS security configuration monitoring
- Enterprise expectation: AWS Config rules, SecurityHub integration, GuardDuty for threat detection, automated remediation for misconfigurations
- What's missing: No architecture diagrams, no network topology documentation, no data flow diagrams
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC6.6, ISO 27001 A.5.9, PCI DSS 1.2 (network diagram)
- Enterprise expectation: System architecture diagram, network topology with security boundaries, data flow diagram showing encryption points, shared responsibility matrix
- What's missing: No inventory of cloud resources, no automated asset discovery
- Why it matters: ISO 27001 A.5.9 (inventory of information assets), NIST 800-53 CM-8
- Enterprise expectation: Automated AWS resource inventory, asset classification, asset owner assignment, decommissioning tracking
Current State: No training infrastructure for platform users.
- What's missing: No security awareness content, no training tracking, no phishing simulation
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC1.4, ISO 27001 A.6.3, PCI DSS 12.6, HIPAA 164.308(a)(5)
- Enterprise expectation: In-app security awareness prompts, role-based training content, training completion tracking, annual training reminders, phishing awareness content
- What's missing: No framework-specific training content for platform users learning compliance
- Enterprise expectation: Interactive compliance training modules, framework-specific guides with assessments, certification preparation materials, continuing education tracking
Current State: Single-tier multi-tenancy with organization isolation via orgId. No superadmin, no platform administration, no billing.
- What's missing: No platform-level administration interface
- Enterprise expectation: Organization management (create/suspend/delete orgs), platform-wide user management, system health monitoring, feature flag management, global configuration
- What's missing: No per-organization configurable settings
- Enterprise expectation: Custom branding (logo, colors), session timeout configuration, password policy configuration, MFA enforcement toggle, SSO configuration, data retention settings, notification preferences, IP allowlist
- What's missing: No billing, no feature tiers, no usage metering, no subscription management
- Enterprise expectation: Free/Pro/Enterprise tier management, feature gates per tier, usage metering (users, storage, AI queries), Stripe/billing integration, invoice generation, usage alerts
- What's missing: No region selection, no data residency controls
- Enterprise expectation: Region selection at org creation, data residency enforcement, cross-region backup with residency compliance
- What's missing: No custom domain support, no white-label capability
- Enterprise expectation: Custom domain with SSL, white-label branding, custom email domain for notifications
- What's missing: No org hierarchy for enterprise customers with subsidiaries/divisions
- Enterprise expectation: Parent organization with child organizations, consolidated compliance view across subsidiaries, shared policy templates, per-subsidiary customization
Current State: Evidence uploaded to S3 with basic metadata. No hashing, no chain of custody, no integrity verification, no tamper detection.
- What's missing: No SHA-256 hash computed at upload time, no hash verification on retrieval
- Why it matters: SOC 2 CC7.1, ISO 27001 A.8.10, PCI DSS 10.5.5
- Enterprise expectation: SHA-256 hash computed and stored at upload, hash verification on every retrieval, hash mismatch alerting, hash included in evidence metadata for auditors
- What's missing: No tracking of who collected, reviewed, approved, or rejected evidence. No custody transfer logging.
- Enterprise expectation: Full chain of custody: uploaded_by -> reviewed_by -> approved_by with timestamps, custody transfer logging, rejection with reason, re-upload workflow
- What's missing: No write-once-read-many enforcement for approved evidence
- Enterprise expectation: Once evidence is approved, it cannot be modified or deleted (S3 Object Lock), version history for all evidence changes, immutability audit trail
- What's missing: No automated evidence expiration tracking, no staleness alerts, no re-collection triggers
- Enterprise expectation: Evidence freshness requirements per control (30/60/90/365 days), automated staleness alerts, evidence renewal workflow, expired evidence flagging in compliance dashboards
- What's missing: No digital signature capability for evidence authentication
- Enterprise expectation: Digital signature on approved evidence, signature verification, signer identity verification, timestamp authority integration (RFC 3161)
Current State: No reporting system. No dashboards. No export capability. No executive views.
- What's missing: No high-level compliance posture view for executives/board
- Enterprise expectation: Compliance score by framework, risk heatmap, open findings summary, control maturity trend, upcoming audit timeline, SLA compliance
- What's missing: No ability to generate compliance reports for auditors
- Enterprise expectation: SOC 2 readiness report, ISO 27001 Statement of Applicability generator, PCI DSS SAQ/ROC preparation, HIPAA risk analysis report, custom report builder
- What's missing: No automated report generation or distribution
- Enterprise expectation: Scheduled weekly/monthly compliance reports, email distribution to stakeholders, PDF/Excel export, report customization per recipient
- What's missing: No regulatory-specific report formats
- Enterprise expectation: HIPAA breach notification report, PCI DSS quarterly scan report, SOX IT control report, GDPR data processing report
- What's missing: No historical compliance data, no trend analysis, no year-over-year comparison
- Enterprise expectation: Compliance posture over time, control maturity progression, incident trend analysis, risk trend analysis, audit finding resolution rate
| Trust Service Criteria | Requirement | QuickTrust Status | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| CC1.1 | COSO-based control environment | Not implemented | No governance framework, no tone-at-top documentation |
| CC1.2 | Board oversight | Not implemented | No board/management reporting capability |
| CC1.3 | Management authority & responsibility | Not implemented | No org chart, no RACI matrix for controls |
| CC1.4 | Competence commitment | Not implemented | No training tracking, no competence assessment |
| CC2.1 | Information quality | Not implemented | No data quality controls, no accuracy verification |
| CC2.2 | Internal communication | Not implemented | No internal compliance notification system |
| CC2.3 | External communication | Partial | Contact form only, no structured external communication |
| CC3.1 | Risk identification & assessment | Not implemented | No risk register, no risk methodology |
| CC3.2 | Fraud risk assessment | Not implemented | No fraud risk program |
| CC3.3 | Change impact assessment | Not implemented | No change management workflow |
| CC3.4 | Risk to objectives | Not implemented | No risk-to-objective mapping |
| CC4.1 | Monitoring activities | Not implemented | No continuous monitoring, no control testing |
| CC4.2 | Remediation of deficiencies | Not implemented | No finding/deficiency tracking system |
| CC5.1 | Control activities selection | Not implemented | No control selection methodology |
| CC5.2 | Technology controls | Partial | Basic auth only, missing encryption/MFA/logging |
| CC5.3 | Control deployment via policies | Not implemented | No policy lifecycle management |
| CC6.1 | Logical access controls | Critical gap | No MFA, no RBAC enforcement, no account lockout |
| CC6.2 | User provisioning | Critical gap | No provisioning workflow, no access reviews |
| CC6.3 | User deprovisioning | Critical gap | No deprovisioning workflow, no offboarding |
| CC6.4 | Physical access restrictions | N/A | Cloud-based (AWS responsibility) |
| CC6.5 | Data disposal | Critical gap | No data retention, no secure deletion |
| CC6.6 | External threats | Critical gap | No WAF, no IDS/IPS, no threat monitoring |
| CC6.7 | Transmission encryption | Critical gap | No TLS between services, no field encryption |
| CC6.8 | Malicious software prevention | Critical gap | No antivirus, no file scanning |
| CC7.1 | Vulnerability detection | Critical gap | No vulnerability scanning, no pentest program |
| CC7.2 | Security monitoring | Critical gap | No SIEM, no alerting, no centralized logging |
| CC7.3 | Incident response | Critical gap | No incident response process, no IR plan |
| CC7.4 | Incident recovery | Critical gap | No DR plan, no backup strategy |
| CC7.5 | Incident reporting | Critical gap | No incident reporting workflow |
| CC8.1 | Change management | Critical gap | No change management process, no CAB |
| CC9.1 | Risk mitigation | Critical gap | No risk treatment plans |
| CC9.2 | Vendor management | Critical gap | No vendor risk assessment, no vendor inventory |
| A1.1 | Availability commitments | Critical gap | No SLA, no uptime monitoring |
| A1.2 | Recovery procedures | Critical gap | No backup, no DR testing |
| A1.3 | Recovery testing | Critical gap | No DR testing |
| Control | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| A.5.1 | Policies for information security | Missing lifecycle management |
| A.5.2 | Information security roles | No role definition framework |
| A.5.3 | Segregation of duties | No SoD enforcement |
| A.5.9 | Inventory of information assets | No asset inventory |
| A.5.10 | Acceptable use of assets | No acceptable use policy framework |
| A.5.12 | Classification of information | No data classification |
| A.5.15 | Access control | No RBAC enforcement |
| A.5.17 | Authentication information | No password policy engine |
| A.5.18 | Access rights | No access review process |
| A.5.23 | Information security for cloud services | No CSPM |
| A.5.24 | Incident management planning | No IR plan |
| A.5.29 | Information security during disruption | No BCP/DR |
| A.5.30 | ICT readiness for business continuity | No BC testing |
| A.5.33 | Protection of records | No retention management |
| A.5.34 | Privacy and PII protection | No privacy controls |
| A.5.36 | Compliance with policies | No compliance monitoring |
| A.8.5 | Secure authentication | No MFA, no session management |
| A.8.8 | Vulnerability management | No vuln scanning program |
| A.8.9 | Configuration management | No configuration baselines |
| A.8.10 | Information deletion | No secure deletion |
| A.8.11 | Data masking | No data masking |
| A.8.12 | Data leakage prevention | No DLP |
| A.8.13 | Information backup | No backup strategy |
| A.8.15 | Logging | No centralized logging |
| A.8.16 | Monitoring activities | No security monitoring |
| A.8.20 | Network security | No network segmentation |
| A.8.24 | Use of cryptography | No encryption at rest, no KMS |
| A.8.25 | Secure development lifecycle | No SDLC controls |
| A.8.28 | Secure coding | No SAST/DAST |
| A.8.32 | Change management | No change management |
| Section | Requirement | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 164.308(a)(1) | Security management process | No risk analysis, no risk management |
| 164.308(a)(2) | Assigned security responsibility | No security officer designation |
| 164.308(a)(3) | Workforce security | No access authorization procedures |
| 164.308(a)(4) | Information access management | No access control policies |
| 164.308(a)(5) | Security awareness & training | No training program |
| 164.308(a)(6) | Security incident procedures | No incident response process |
| 164.308(a)(7) | Contingency plan | No DR/BCP |
| 164.308(a)(8) | Evaluation | No periodic security evaluation |
| 164.308(b)(1) | Business associate contracts | No BAA management |
| 164.310(a)(1) | Facility access controls | N/A (cloud) |
| 164.310(d)(1) | Device and media controls | No media sanitization |
| 164.312(a)(1) | Access control | No MFA, no emergency access |
| 164.312(a)(2)(i) | Unique user identification | Implemented (email) |
| 164.312(a)(2)(ii) | Emergency access procedure | Missing |
| 164.312(a)(2)(iii) | Automatic logoff | Missing (no session timeout) |
| 164.312(a)(2)(iv) | Encryption/decryption | Missing (no encryption at rest) |
| 164.312(b) | Audit controls | Critical gap (minimal logging) |
| 164.312(c)(1) | Integrity controls | Missing (no evidence hashing) |
| 164.312(d) | Person/entity authentication | Missing (no MFA) |
| 164.312(e)(1) | Transmission security | Missing (no internal TLS) |
| Requirement | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 1.x | Network security controls | No network segmentation, no firewall rules |
| 2.x | Secure configurations | Default credentials in use |
| 3.x | Protect account data | No encryption at rest |
| 4.x | Encrypt transmissions | No internal TLS |
| 5.x | Malware protection | No antivirus/anti-malware |
| 6.x | Secure systems/software | No SDLC, no SAST/DAST |
| 7.x | Restrict access | No RBAC enforcement |
| 8.x | Identify users & auth | No MFA, no password policy |
| 9.x | Physical security | N/A (cloud) |
| 10.x | Log and monitor | No centralized logging, no SIEM |
| 11.x | Security testing | No vulnerability scanning, no pentesting |
| 12.x | Organizational policies | No security policy framework |
| Control Family | Missing Controls |
|---|---|
| AC (Access Control) | MFA, session limits, account management, separation of duties, least privilege |
| AU (Audit) | Audit events, content, storage, retention, review, analysis |
| CA (Assessment) | Security assessments, continuous monitoring, POA&M |
| CM (Configuration) | Baseline configuration, change control, least functionality |
| CP (Contingency) | Contingency plan, backup, recovery, testing |
| IA (Identification) | MFA, authenticator management, credential management |
| IR (Incident Response) | IR plan, IR training, IR testing, IR reporting |
| MA (Maintenance) | System maintenance procedures |
| MP (Media Protection) | Media access, sanitization, transport |
| PE (Physical) | N/A (cloud -- inherited from AWS) |
| PL (Planning) | Security plan, rules of behavior |
| PS (Personnel) | Personnel screening, termination, transfer |
| RA (Risk Assessment) | Risk assessment, vulnerability scanning |
| SA (System Acquisition) | SDLC, acquisition process, supply chain |
| SC (System Communications) | Boundary protection, transmission confidentiality, cryptography |
| SI (System Integrity) | Flaw remediation, malicious code, monitoring, alerting |
- Secure cookie configuration (
httpOnly: true,Secure: true) - Token revocation on logout (Redis blacklist)
- Rate limiting on authentication endpoints
- Account lockout after failed attempts
- CSRF token implementation
- S3 server-side encryption enablement
- Database connection TLS
- Content Security Policy header
- Granular RBAC with permission matrix
- Endpoint-level authorization middleware
- TOTP-based MFA
- Password policy engine
- Session management with server-side store
- Token refresh mechanism
- User lifecycle management (provision/deprovision)
- Configurable session timeouts
- Field-level encryption for PII
- Data classification framework
- Comprehensive audit logging (all events)
- Structured JSON logging
- Evidence SHA-256 hashing
- Evidence chain of custody
- Soft delete on all models
- Data retention policy engine
- SAML 2.0 SSO
- OIDC SSO
- SCIM 2.0 provisioning
- Centralized log aggregation (CloudWatch/ELK)
- SIEM integration
- Automated database backups
- S3 versioning and backup
- WAF deployment
- Control testing workflow
- Cross-framework mapping
- Compliance posture dashboard
- Audit-ready report generation
- Policy lifecycle management
- Risk register
- Incident response system
- Access review campaigns
- AI human-in-the-loop approval
- AI model risk framework
- Privacy impact assessment (DPIA)
- Consent management
- Vulnerability management program
- DR plan with testing
- Bug bounty program
- SBOM generation
QuickTrust has a solid application foundation with intelligent features (RAG-based Q&A, AI compliance analysis, multi-org tenancy). However, the gap between its current state and enterprise/audit readiness is substantial. The platform currently meets approximately 10% of the controls required for any major compliance certification.
The irony is acute: a platform designed to help organizations achieve compliance certifications cannot itself achieve any of those certifications. This is not merely a technical debt issue -- it is a market credibility and legal liability risk. Enterprise buyers will conduct security assessments before procurement, and the absence of MFA alone would disqualify QuickTrust from most enterprise vendor approval processes.
The 187 missing features identified in this document are not aspirational -- they represent the minimum viable compliance posture expected by auditors across SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, PCI DSS, and FedRAMP. Prioritizing Phases 0-2 (Weeks 1-10) would address the most critical gaps and make the platform defensible in a vendor security questionnaire.
This analysis was conducted through comprehensive code review of all source files, API routes, database schemas, CI/CD pipelines, and infrastructure configuration in the QuickTrust repository. It represents a point-in-time assessment and should be updated as features are implemented.