DKLs23 Lockness, Threshold ECDSA MVP

What does this project do?

DKLs23 Lockness is a Rust library demonstrating the core protocol flow for threshold ECDSA signatures using the DKLs23 design, built for the Lockness ecosystem. It shows how multiple parties can jointly generate a key, pre-sign, and sign messages without any single party ever holding the full secret key.

Key features:

• Honest, readable protocol structure
• Multi-party key generation (MPC DKG)
• Pre-signing and signing helpers
• Curve-generic cryptography (works for any supported curve)
• Explicit boundaries for unimplemented cryptography (OT/MtA)
• Simulation tests for protocol correctness

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Example output:

Benchmarks

Benchmark plots are saved in bench_results:

To regenerate them:

cargo bench --bench flows -- --noplot
python3 scripts/plot_benchmarks.py

Protocol Flowchart

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How it works

1. Key Generation: Each party creates a secret share, commits to it, then reveals it. All parties verify everyone was honest and compute a shared public key.
2. Pre-signing: Each party samples a random nonce, commits, and reveals. (The real protocol would use advanced OT/MtA here; this MVP uses a mock.)
3. Signing: Parties combine their shares and nonces to produce a valid ECDSA signature, without any single party ever knowing the full secret key.
4. Simulation: The protocol is tested in-memory with multiple parties to ensure correctness.

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What works today

• Keygen round 1: commitment broadcast
• Keygen round 2: decommitment and verification
• Presign nonce commitment/opening helpers
• Real ECDSA signing and verification helpers
• Simulation test: all parties agree on the same public key

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Honest status

Component	Status
Key generation	Implemented
Presign commitment/open	Implemented
Signing helpers	Implemented
OT extension / MtA	Testing
Malicious checks	Not yet
Full threshold signing	Not yet

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Quickstart

cargo test

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Why this matters

This MVP shows that the DKLs23 paper can be translated into a clean Lockness style Rust layout with typed protocol flow, curve-generic key material, and simulation-backed tests. It gives a starting point for the cryptographic work that is still ahead, while being explicit about what is implemented and what remains deferred.